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Summary 
This research provides the first direct assessment of human values and value-
expressive behaviours based on their conceptual meaning. Chapter 1 provides a brief 
history of the study of human values and dissects the dominant contemporary theory of 
values, the Theory of Basic Human Values, proposed by Shalom Schwartz. I also 
discuss methodological approaches used to assess the structure of human values, and the 
nature of concepts and categorization. In Chapter 2, seven studies containing data from 
nine samples in two countries (United Kingdom and Brazil) asked participants to 
compare the meaning of different values found within Schwartz’s influential quasi-
circumplex model of values. Different methods were used across the studies, including 
direct similarity judgment tasks, pile sorting, and spatial arrangement. The results of 
these diverse conceptual assessments corresponded to spatial configurations that are 
broadly convergent with Schwartz’s model, both between and within participants. In 
Chapter 3, four studies were conducted using British samples, asking participants to 
make direct comparisons between value-expressive behaviours and different levels of 
mental representations of values (e.g., value types, higher order values). Some of the 
methods used in Chapter 2 were also used for these studies. It was an open question 
whether the structure from Schwartz’s value model would be replicated by the spatial 
plane composed of value-expressive behaviours. The spatial configurations from these 
studies broadly converged with Schwartz's structure, and also provided a novel point of 
view of how values and behaviours are related based on how people interpret them. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I discuss the contributions of this research, its implications, 
limitations, and future directions. 
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Values are a common topic in daily life and across different situations. People 
frequently cite the importance of these abstract ideals, such as freedom, creativity, 
equality, power, and tradition.  For instance, in an organizational context, it is common 
to see the employers trying to identify values that best describe their companies’ work 
(e.g., efficiency, social responsibility, security).  In an educational context, teachers try 
to inform their young students about the values that are crucial for proper conduct in 
society (e.g., respect, tolerance, equality).  Also, politicians frequently argue that they 
uniquely promote particular values (e.g., devout, family security, social order), in an 
attempt to attract individuals to their ideas.  At home, parents try to better educate their 
children regarding the values that are commonly acceptable and endorsed among their 
culture (e.g., protecting the environment, honouring of elders, respect for tradition).  In 
these domains, values are treated as essential guidelines to attitudes and behaviour, 
which require thought and contemplation. 
There is an increasing interest in understanding the role of human values in our 
lives.  This interest can be seen across different areas of social science, such as 
philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and psychology.  In this thesis, I focus on the 
contributions of values to psychology, an area in which their properties and structural 
associations have been widely studied through extensive research (Gouveia, 2013; 
Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).  In psychology, human values can be understood as 
desirable, trans-situational goals that vary in importance (Schwartz, 1992).  Values are 
considered as a set of fundamental principles that transcend specific situations and are 
influenced by several factors, such as culture, genetics, family, and peers (Döring, 
Daniel, & Knafo-Noam, 2016; Gouveia, 2013; Schermer, Vernon, Maio, & Jang, 2011).  
Values play a crucial role in understanding various sociopsychological variables (e.g., 
attitudes, judgments, choices, attributions, actions), and are an important determinant to 
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understanding and predicting human behaviour (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Rokeach, 
1973).   
Values have been implicated as a key influence on a wide range of psychological 
relevant variables, including political orientation (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, 
Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005), pro-
environmental behaviour (Bouman, Steg, & Kiers, 2018; Evans et al., 2013; Milfont & 
Gouveia, 2006),  personality traits (Fischer & Boer, 2015; Kajonius, Persson, & 
Jonason, 2015; Parks-Leduc, Feldman, & Bardi, 2015), well-being (Boer, 2017; Sagiv 
& Schwartz, 2000), need for cognition (Coelho, Hanel, & Wolf, 2018), and antisocial 
behaviour (Seddig & Davidov, 2018). 
Crucially, however, researchers have paid relatively little attention to how 
individuals interpret and understand values.  Studies have assessed how values are 
configured in a spatial plane being based on how individuals endorse them – or to what 
extent they consider different values as important to their lives (e.g., Gouveia, Milfont, 
& Guerra, 2014; Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2012).  It is undoubtedly 
important to see how the endorsed values relate one to the other, but assessing how 
individuals interpret and group values is a vital topic to address, especially due to their 
abstract nature.  These abstract ideals arise from abstractions or generalizations from 
previous experiences.  When introduced to new items, our cognitive system allows a 
classification regarding similarities to previously seen items (Smith, 1989).  While there 
is a sophisticated understanding of how categorization processes apply to natural 
categories such as shapes and animals (Delorme, Richard, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2010; 
Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1988; Sigala & Logothetis, 2002), there is a lack of 
understanding of how categorization processes apply to abstract ideals like values.  
Therefore, even if we do not endorse two values at the same level, they can be 
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considered as similar based on their content, and how we interpret them.  For instance, 
one can highly endorse the value “pleasure” and not necessarily see the value “mature 
love” as something important, while still can consider that these values are highly 
similar when considering their concepts.  The central aim of this thesis is to develop our 
understanding of how these categorizations based on conceptual representations apply 
to human values. 
The present chapter starts with a brief history of the study of human values, 
discussing some of the main precursors (e.g., Kluckhohn, Parsons, Maslow), the main 
theories developed for both cultural (Hofstede and Inglehart), and individual (Rokeach 
and Gouveia) perspectives, and the dominant contemporary theory of values, the Theory 
of Basic Human Values proposed by Shalom Schwartz.  Specifically, I will discuss his 
circular structure of values, measures developed over the years to assess values, cross-
cultural comparisons, and the associations of values to a range of constructs (e.g., 
attitudes, well-being), including relations between values and behaviours in particular.  
Next, I discuss methodological approaches used to assess the structure of human values, 
focusing on Multidimensional Scaling, a technique that provides spatial representations 
based on the similarities\dissimilarities of objects.  The chapter then discusses the nature 
of concepts and categorization, highlighting their relevance to the present research.  
Finally, I give an outline of the empirical chapters. 
Human Values 
Although discussions about human values can be traced back to the ancient 
Greek philosophers (Maio, 2010), in this thesis I focus on the contemporary 
understanding of values in psychology.  To provide a better understanding of their 
contemporary treatment, it is important to cover some important previous contributions 
that helped to develop current perspectives.  Specifically, I briefly present the 
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contributions of Thomas and Znaniecki, Talcott Parsons, Clyde Kluckhohn, and 
Abraham Maslow. 
Precursors. 
Thomas and Znaniecki. 
Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) are responsible for one of the first works in 
psychology encompassing values.  These researchers presented a systematic discussion 
of the value concept and discussed its relation to other psychological variables, such as 
attitudes.  These authors introduced the concepts of attitudes and values in “The Polish 
Peasant in Europe and America”, a treatise that described the researchers’ analysis of 
personal documents written by Polish immigrants who moved to the United States in the 
20th century. In their work, attitudes were described as a subjective orientation that 
determines the meaning for things – any predisposition of an individual towards an 
object.  Values were defined as any empirical data endowed with meaning and 
accessible to the members of a social group.  This work was a useful impetus to future 
(and necessary) distinctions between values and attitudes: while attitudes are directed 
towards a specific object (e.g., positive\negative attitudes towards political leaders), 
values are general beliefs (e.g., endorsing the values "social order", "national security"), 
and are evaluated through their importance (Rokeach, 1973).  Furthermore, while 
attitudes can be both positive and negative, values are characteristically positive 
constructs (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). 
Talcott Parsons. 
Parsons is mainly known for developing Social Action Theory.  This theory 
aimed to explain human behaviour in modern society, considering different areas (e.g., 
anthropology, sociology, psychology), with diverse aims.  However, Parsons (1951) 
also made a significant contribution to the development of values research.  Parsons 
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postulated that, without shared values, social life would be hardly possible.  After 
introducing the concept of motivated action, Parsons defined a value as "an element of a 
shared symbolic system which serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the 
alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation" (p. 12).  Thus, the 
concept proposed by Parsons introduced the idea that a value represents an underlying 
motivational goal (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).   
Clyde Kluckhohn. 
The anthropologist Kluckhohn (1951) defined value orientations as “a 
conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, 
of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends 
of action” (p. 395), “(…) influencing behavior, of nature, of man's place in it, of man's 
relation to man, and of the desirable and nondesirable as they may relate to man-
environment and interhuman relations” (p. 411).  This definition embraced values as 
principles common to social groups, presenting an influence on human behaviour.  
Therefore, Kluckhohn treated values as a) a concept, such that values are abstract and 
cannot be directly observed, only inferred through behaviour; b) explicit or implicit, 
such that not all values can be verbalized; c) characteristic of an individual or a group, 
being able to be converted into something deprived of the personality of each one; d) 
about the desirable, such that values are not considered as something desired, but 
principles aspired to by the people; and e) influence the choice of the modes, means 
(instrumental values) and ends (terminal values) of action.  This view inspired current 
conceptions of values as positive, desirable, and appreciated by people (Schwartz, 
Verkasalo, Antonovsky, & Sagiv, 1997). 
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Abraham Maslow. 
Finally, the work of Maslow on the hierarchy of needs resonates through 
contemporary research on values.  For Maslow (1943, 1954, 1971), human needs 
represent deficiencies of the organism, and these needs can arise in physiological, 
psychological, or social levels.   These needs are relatively universal (the difference is 
how they are fulfilled in different cultures), neutral or positive, and established through 
a hierarchical system (physiological, safety, social, self-esteem, self-actualization). 
When more basic needs are fulfilled (e.g., physiological needs), relatively higher-order 
(less basic) needs can be considered (e.g., self-actualization).  Therefore, Maslow (1943, 
1954, 1971) draws attention to the intrinsic relations between our environment and 
human needs, which has implications for understanding the way in which values 
express psychological needs.  As our needs are changing over time after their 
fulfillment, our values may change in parallel.  
Differences between human values and attitudes, morality, norms, and 
personality traits 
The authors discussed above provided important precursors to seminal 
contemporary research on values.  In the 1950s and 1960s, values become increasingly 
popular in research (e.g., Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960).  From the 1970s onwards, 
researchers increasingly focused on elaborating the psychological nature of values and 
on the cross-cultural measurement values, resulting in the development of diverse value 
models (Gouveia, 2013; Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart, 1977; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 
1992, 2006).  However, before discussing these models, it is important to first 
distinguish between human values and other concepts that are sometimes conflated, 
such as attitudes, morality, norms, and personality traits.   
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These variables are hierarchically related to each other. If we consider the three-
level model of personality (McAdams & Pals, 2006), the first level refers to 
dispositional traits, being defined as "broad individual differences in behavior, thought, 
and feeling that account for general consistencies across situations and over time" (p. 
212). At this level, we can identify variables such as personality traits. The second level, 
named characteristic adaptations, refers to "more specific motivational, social cognitive, 
and developmental variables that are contextualized in time, situations, and social 
roles" (p. 212). At this level, we can find human values and morality. Finally, the third 
level, named integrative life narratives, refers to "Internalized and evolving life stories 
that reconstruct the past and imagine the future to provide a person’s life with identity" 
(p. 212). At this level we can place attitudes and norms. 
Attitudes can be defined as an "overall evaluation of an object that is based on 
cognitive, affective, and behavioural information" (Maio & Haddock, 2015, p. 4), and 
they vary in terms of valence (positive or negative) and strength (less or more). 
Hierarchically speaking, values underlie our attitudes (Schwartz, 2012). We tend to 
evaluate things positively or negatively, according to whether they are promoting or 
threatening our values. For instance, if an individual strongly endorses stimulation 
values, it is likely that s\he will present positive attitudes towards exciting activities 
(e.g., parachuting, snowboarding). 
Morality, as operationalised through Graham and Haidt’s moral foundation 
theory (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011), is based on intuitions and 
judgements of what people should and should not do, and what is right and wrong.  
Thus, moral foundations have a stronger intuitive and normative focus than values 
(Feldman, 2018).  While there are meaningful correlations between values and the five 
moral foundations (Boer & Fischer, 2013; Feldman, 2018), they are empirically distinct 
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(Feldman, 2018).  Haidt, Graham and Joseph, 2009) argued based on McAdams and 
Pals (2006) three-level model of personality that moral foundations and values are both 
based on the same level (level 2).   
Norms are patterns or rules that socially guide our behaviours as part of a group 
(Schwartz, 2012). They are more externally guided than values (Rokeach, 1973), and 
vary on how much we agree or disagree that we should act in a certain way (Schwartz, 
2012). For instance, the two demands "we should listen to the elderly", and "we should 
say thank you to express gratitude" express norms. The values we endorse will 
influence the level of agreement that we have with such norms. For the prior examples, 
a high endorsement of values such as "politeness" would result in a high agreement with 
the norms. 
Finally, both personality traits and human values are key concepts in the 
psychological literature. However, their differentiation is somewhat more difficult than 
the prior constructs. Traits are broad descriptions of stable patterns of behaviour, 
whereas values are stable life goals and abstract ideals (Parks-Leduc et al., 2014). That 
is, traits refer to "tendencies to show consistent patterns of thought, feelings, and actions 
across time and situations" (Schwartz, 2012, p. 16). Therefore, values may be shaped 
by our traits (cf. McAdams and Pals, 2006). Indeed, a recent longitudinal study 
including over 11,000 people from the Netherlands found that traits predict values better 
over time than values do traits (Fetvadjiev & He, in press). For instance, “responsible” 
can be seen as a personality trait, as it describes patterns of behaviour, but it can also be 
seen as a human value, if seem as a life goal. 
Cultural and individual level perspectives of values. 
In psychological research, values have been studied through a cultural and 
individual view.  In the cultural perspective, human values can vary in systematic ways 
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between nations and cultures, and this perspective compares the scores of different 
cultures and countries.  This perspective was extensively researched by Hofstede 
(1980), Inglehart (1977), and more recently, Schwartz (2006). The psychological 
perspective characterizes value priorities of individuals, in which values guide their 
attitudes and behaviour and explain individual differences.  The main theoretical models 
of the psychological perspective were elaborated by Rokeach (1973), Gouveia (2003), 
and Schwartz (1992).   
The cultural and individual levels of values are described below.  Because this 
thesis focuses on the individual-level, specifically on Schwartz’s model, I will discuss 
his individual-level model in more detail.  Nonetheless, I briefly describe the cultural 
perspective because it is a useful background for understanding the individual-level 
perspective. 
Cultural perspective. 
The cultural perspective on human values seeks to test theoretical structures or 
value dimensions in a pancultural way.  The values are used to explain differences 
across countries.  Within this perspective, two researchers stand out for their large 
contributions: Hofstede and Inglehart. 
Geert Hofstede. 
Hofstede’s (1980) Cultural Dimensions Theory considers values as central 
elements defined by the culture in which the individuals live. He defined values as 
"broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others" (Hofstede, 1991, p. 
35). In his theory, culture is “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes 
the members of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9). 
Thus, culture guides individuals in their interactions – that is, as a collective 
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phenomenon that partially determines how the individual will behave in society.  In 
other words, the culture in which individuals live is essential to shape their values.  
Hofstede’s (1980) attempted to map cultural differences in values.  To address 
this goal, data were collected in 72 countries, consisting of 116,000 IBM employees. 
His model distinguished four value dimensions, which were later increased to five 
(Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010): power distance, representing the extent to 
which members in the bottom of the social hierarchy accept that power is not fairly 
distributed; masculinity - femininity, representing differences in value endorsement 
between genders; uncertainty avoidance, representing society's tolerance for ambiguity, 
or how people embrace or avoid the unexpected; and individualism-collectivism, 
highlighting how individuals from a society feel responsible or independent from 
others.  The fifth dimension was later found in data from Hong Kong: time orientation, 
referring to how society tends to seek immediate gratification or to invest for the future 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Hofstede contributions are considered some of the most important to values 
research.  Not only did his work yield a theory that emphasizes the study of human 
values at a cultural level, it introduced the duality of individualism and collectivism, 
which remains one of the most important topics in social, organizational, and cross-
cultural psychology.  In fact, individualism-collectivism is a conceptual dimension now 
evident in decades of research (Kagitçibasi, 1987; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 
2002).  However, even though Hofstede’s (1984) model offered these relevant advances 
in the study of values, his model was criticized for the lack of a theoretical basis to 
justify the initial model (McSweeney, 2002).  The theory was described only in further 
research.  Also, his survey was criticized for not being a psychometrically adequate 
instrument to determine cultural differences, as some of its items are more sensitive to 
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one culture than other (Schwartz, 1999).  Another critique regards Hofstede’s 
assumption that individualism tends to appear after the economic development of a 
society (Gouveia, 2013).  With the possession of more resources, individuals are 
capable of pursuing their own goals in life (Hofstede, 2001).  However, this assumption 
is controversial, as many contemporary societies mix both individualist and collectivist 
elements (Sinha & Tripathi, 1994).  
Ronald Inglehart. 
Inglehart (1977), author of “The Silent Revolution”, proposed a theoretically 
driven model, different from Hofstede.  Based on Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs, 
Inglehart incorporated in his model the cultural aspects of human values.  Two main 
assumptions can be seen in his theory (Inglehart, 1977; Knutsen, 1990): the scarcity 
hypothesis, which suggests that people tend to prioritize needs that are short in supply; 
and the socialization hypothesis, in which individuals are guided by socialization 
processes through their development. 
To assess values, Inglehart (1991) analyzed data from various countries. These 
data were collected over 17 years, which allowed him to portray generational changes 
and compare cultures.  He suggested that values are organized hierarchically in a 
unidimensional continuum, from materialistic to post-materialistic (Inglehart, 1977): 
materialism concerns the most basic security and physiological needs (e.g., 
physiological and security); and post-materialism refers to higher needs (e.g., 
intellectual, self-esteem, self-realization), which emerge after the satisfaction of 
materialistic needs. In sum, materialistic societies encompass cultures that do not fulfil 
their basic needs, while the post-materialistic countries are considered more developed, 
with enough conditions to fulfil the basic needs. This idea is consistent with Maslow’s 
(1954) hierarchy, with individuals tending to strive for higher needs after their basic 
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needs are fulfilled.  Thus, the transition from a materialist to a post-materialistic 
orientation is a shift to greater human emancipation (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010).  Also, 
when observing the results through time, Inglehart pointed out that the changes are 
gradual in societies.  In other words, values are influenced by changes through 
generations, first emphasizing physical and economic security, and further with a higher 
emphasis in values of self-expression, subjective well-being, and concern regarding the 
quality of life (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). 
However, Inglehart's (1977) theory is questioned regarding the strength of 
evidence for the assumption that materialism prevails in societies that do not meet their 
basic needs and that societies with more financial resources have post-materialist 
characteristics.  The influence of financial resources in this change has not been directly 
assessed (Kidd & Lee, 1997).  Also, the idea of assessing human values in a 
unidimensional continuum has been criticized, because both materialistic and 
postmaterialistic values are often seen in the same culture (Gouveia, 2013).  Finally, 
Inglehart misses out on various important values that emerged later in Schwartz’s 
(1992) theory, such as power and benevolence (Dobewall & Rudnev, 2014; Hanel, 
Litzellachner, & Maio, 2018). Despite these limitations, Inglehart's theory persists as 
one of the most influential study of values on a cultural level. 
Individual-level perspective. 
The psychological perspective characterizes value priorities at an individual 
level, in which values guide people’s attitudes and behaviour. The main theoretical 
models in this perspective were elaborated by Rokeach, Gouveia, and Schwartz. 
Rokeach and Gouveia’s contributions are important to understanding human values at 
the individual level, but Schwartz’s model has been subjected to substantially more 
empirical scrutiny and received abundant support in these tests.  I will discuss the 
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conceptualization of values according to Rokeach and Gouveia, and then discuss 
Schwartz’s (1992) model in more detail. 
Milton Rokeach. 
One of the most influential contributions to the contemporary study of human 
values is Rokeach’s (1973) book “The nature of human values”.  Rokeach 
conceptualized values as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-
state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode 
of conduct or end-state of existence ... along a continuum of relative importance" (1973, 
p. 5).  His model is based on five assumptions: (1) the number of values of a person is 
relatively small; (2) the values are the same but have different degrees of importance; 
(3) the values are organized into value systems; (4) the antecedents of values can be 
determined by the culture, society, institutions, and personality of each person; and (5) 
the manifestations of values can be observed in all social phenomena that may be 
considered important to study.  Also, Rokeach (1981) emphasized the role of values in 
guiding human behaviour, acting like a criteria for judging the self, others, or specific 
situations. 
Rokeach (1973) divided values into two types: terminal, representing desirable 
end-states of existence (e.g., equality, pleasure, freedom), and instrumental, 
representing desirable modes of behaviour (e.g., honesty, love, logic). Based on this 
division, he was one of the first authors to propose a measure for human values, the 
Rokeach Value Survey (RVS).  The measure is still one of the most extensively used 
measures of values worldwide.  
Rokeach’s main contributions include: (1) the synthesis of concepts and ideas 
from different perspectives (e.g., anthropological, philosophical, sociological), resulting 
in a transdisciplinary approach; (2) discussions of differences between human values 
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from other concepts such as attitudes and traits; (3) a specific definition and a value 
system; (4) one of the first instruments for measuring human values as a specific 
construct; and (5) articulation of the centrality of values in the cognitive system of 
individuals (Gouveia, Martínez, Meira, & Milfont, 2001).  Despite being very 
influential, many limitations led to newer models. For instance, as recognized by 
Rokeach, the list of values was created through intuition, undermining the strength of 
the theoretical contribution. Also, Rokeach did not test whether his values fall into a 
meaningful structure or can otherwise be combined to reflect similarities and 
differences between values.  Finally, his samples consisted mostly of American 
university students, which limits the cross-cultural generalizability of his findings 
(Arnett, 2008; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). 
Valdiney Gouveia. 
More recently, Gouveia (2003, 2013) developed the Functional Theory of 
Human Values, which is based on Maslow's (1954) hierarchy of needs.  Gouveia 
understands values as psychological aspects that transcend specific situations, are 
desirable, relatively stable, and have the functions of guiding human behaviour and 
cognitively representing human needs (Gouveia, 2013).   
The Functional Theory assumes that values can be ordered along two 
dimensions: goals and needs. The first dimension outlines personal, central, and social 
goals. The second dimension distinguishes between survival and thriving needs. Taken 
together, this model presents the six subfunctions in a 3x2 structure (Gouveia et al., 
2014; Maslow, 1954): (1) excitement, representing the physiological need for variety 
and pleasure; (2) promotion, typical in individuals that have a materialistic orientation 
and cherish their own personal benefits; (3) suprapersonal, representing the need of 
aesthetics, cognition, and self-actualization; (4) existence, representing the basic 
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conditions for individuals’ biological and physiological survival; (5) interactive, with 
values that are essential in regulating, establishing, and maintaining interpersonal 
relationships; and (6) normative, representing survival needs through social goals of 
security and control. 
Although Gouveia’s model is relatively new, I mention it because of its 
relevance to Schwartz’s model and the potential for Gouveia’s model to attract more 
research attention in subsequent years.  Nonetheless, the model has not yet received a 
great deal of empirical attention and there are substantive conceptual overlaps between 
it and Schwartz’s model, below, which has received a great deal of attention in research 
worldwide. 
Theory of Basic Human Values 
Overview.  
The Theory of Basic Human Values, developed by Schwartz (1992), is the most 
widely cited model of values. It is a powerful theoretical perspective that is empirically 
supported with data from 80 nations around the world (Schwartz et al., 2012).  In his 
theory, Schwartz (1992, 2012) states six main characteristics of values.  First, values are 
beliefs linked to affect; thus, individuals can feel aroused if a value is threatened, and 
happy if they can enjoy it (e.g., something compromising\enhancing the individuals' 
authority or their self-respect).  Second, values refer to desirable goals, motivating 
individuals to pursue their objectives (e.g., search for social justice, a world at peace, or 
equality).  Third, values transcend specific actions and situations, thus they are not 
directly linked to one goal (e.g., influential, which can be used for political speeches 
and for peer interactions).  Fourth, values serve as standards or criteria, helping to raise 
awareness regarding the actions (e.g., protecting the environment, which helps to 
increase the quality of life).  Fifth, values are ordered by importance, as a system of 
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priorities that helps to characterize individuals. Sixth, the relative importance of 
multiple values guides action (e.g., an exciting life and independent, when planning a 
trip alone to Alaska).  Schwartz’s model postulates a universal, circular organization of 
human values in a space defined by contrasting motivations, as shown in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1. Schwartz’s model of human values (examples of values in italic). 
The original version of this model included 57 values divided into ten value 
types (Schwartz, 1992): (1) universalism (e.g., equality, social justice), representing 
"understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people 
and for nature" (p. 12), (2) benevolence (e.g., helpful, responsible), representing the 
"preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent 
personal contact" (p. 11) (3) conformity (e.g., obedient, self-discipline), referring to the 
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"restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and 
violate social expectations or norms" (p. 9), (4) tradition (e.g., humble, respect for 
tradition), referring to "respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas 
that one’s culture or religion impose on the individual" (p. 10), (5) security (e.g., 
national security, social order), encompassing "safety, harmony, and stability of society, 
of relationships, and of self" (p. 9), (6) power (e.g., authority, wealth), reflecting the 
"attainment of social status and prestige, and control or dominance over people and 
resources" (p. 9), (7) achievement (e.g., ambitious, successful), representing "personal 
success through demonstrating competence according to social standards." (p. 8), (8) 
hedonism (e.g., pleasure, enjoying life), referring to "pleasure or sensuous gratification 
for oneself" (p. 8), (9) stimulation (e.g., a varied life, an exciting life), encompassing 
"excitement, novelty, and challenge in life" (p. 8), and (10) self-direction (e.g., 
creativity, choosing own goals), referring to "independent thought and action - 
choosing, creating, exploring" (p. 5).  An eleventh value type was proposed, spirituality, 
but it did not emerge distinctly from other value types in most cultures.  Research has 
shown that these 10 value types can be reliably differentiated across samples from 
different countries (Bilsky et al., 2011; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). 
These ten value types are positioned in relation to two bipolar motivation 
dimensions, as can be seen in Figure 1.  One of the dimensions is openness to change 
versus conservation, with self-direction, hedonism, and stimulation values opposing 
security, conformity, and tradition values.  Openness to change values emphasize 
independent action, thought, and feeling, whereas conservation values emphasize self-
restriction, order, and resistance to change.  The second dimension is self-enhancement 
versus self-transcendence, with power and achievement values opposing universalism 
and benevolence values.  Self-enhancement includes values that focus on promoting 
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self-interest, whereas self-transcendence includes values that express concern for the 
welfare of others.  These four quadrants (also known as high-order values) can also be 
divided regarding their focus.  Self-transcendence and conservation values present a 
social focus, or how the individuals socially relate to and affect others, while self-
enhancement and openness to change values have a personal focus, therefore regulating 
how individuals express their personal interests and characteristics (Schwartz et al., 
2012). 
Of importance, Schwartz et al. (2012) further proposed a refined theory of basic 
values, aiming to provide greater heuristic and explanatory power.  The new structure 
proposed 19 value types.  Some of the original value types were further "divided" (e.g., 
power into dominance and resources; security into societal and personal).  Gouveia and 
colleagues (2014) asserted that the proposition of new value types is a flaw from 
Schwartz’s theory, reflecting an indecisiveness and lack of parsimony.  Nevertheless, 
the original value structure proposed by Schwartz is well-established cross-culturally, 
with coherent empirical support (Maio, 2010), and its widespread use makes it a 
suitable focus of examination for understanding value structure in the present thesis. 
Measurement.  
Several scales were developed over the past decades to assess the values 
specified in the Theory of Basic Human Values (Schwartz, 1992).  The first proposed 
measure was the Schwartz Values Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992), which includes 57 
value items.  Participants rate the importance of these value items as guiding principles 
in their lives.  Each value is followed by a phrase to clarify its meaning (e.g., An 
exciting life - stimulating experiences).  Analyses across over 70 nations showed 
evidence for partial measurement invariance, showing that individuals from different 
countries\cultures understand and answer the measure in a similar way (Spini, 2003).   
21 
 
 
 
A shorter version of the SVS was then developed, but focusing on the value 
types instead of the value items. Thus, the Short SVS is composed of only ten items 
(Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005). Each value type is followed by examples of value 
items, making it easier to comprehend their meaning (e.g., Power - social power, 
authority, wealth). Although the short version has not yet been used widely in research, 
analysis of this scale have again supported the circular structure proposed by Schwartz 
(Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005).  
An ostensibly less cognitively complex measure was also developed, the Portrait 
Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz et al., 2001).  Unlike the SVS, the PVQ relies on 
indirect comparisons.  Participants compare themselves to fictional characters (gender 
matched) on 40 short verbal portraits, saying how similar they think s\he is to them. 
These portraits highlight values that are important to the characters’ lives (e.g., It is 
important to him/her to be rich. S/He wants to have a lot of money and expensive 
things). This measure is intended to be more concrete than the SVS, enabling similar 
interpretations across participants from different backgrounds.  However, a shorter 
version of the PVQ has been developed, the PVQ-21, composed of 21 items (Schwartz, 
2003). Two other shorter versions of the PVQ-40 were also proposed, composed of 10 
(Ultrabrief version) and 20 (Brief) items (Sandy, Gosling, Schwartz, & Koelkebeck, 
2017). Unlike the short form of the SVS, the PVQ-21 is widely used, being frequently 
included in the European Social Survey (ESS; Bilsky et al., 2011).   
Other methods are less frequently used.  One example is the Best-Worst Refined 
Values Scale (BWVr).  To complete this scale, participants use a forced choice method 
to order the values’ importance as guiding principles in their lives (Lee et al., 2016). 
Another example is an implicit measure of values, based on the well-known Implicit 
Association Test (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).  This test has been adapted to 
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assess achievement and benevolence values (Dentale, Vecchione, Gebauer, & 
Barbaranelli, 2018) and favorability toward power over universalism values (Souchon, 
Maio, Hanel, & Bardin, 2017).  In theory, these implicit approaches tap spontaneous 
favorability to values rather than thoughtful judgments of value importance, enabling 
the implicit measures to predict more spontaneous aspects of attitudes and behaviour 
(Souchon et al., 2017).  Nonetheless, these measures have yet to be deployed across 
diverse research and cultural contexts. 
Value structure.  
A crucial element of Schwartz’s model is that values express different 
motivational synergies and conflicts.  For example, achievement values (e.g., personal 
success) are adjacent to power values (e.g., dominance), because of a similar underlying 
motivation to self-enhance.  Conversely, achievement is opposed to benevolence values 
(preserving and enhancing the welfare of the in-group), because the underlying 
motivations of these two sets of values (benefit the self-versus benefit others) are 
putatively in conflict.  Similar reasoning applies to the dimension containing 
conservation and openness to change values, wherein value types on the opposing poles 
express conflicting motivations (protect the status quo versus seeking change), and 
adjacent value types share common motives. In sum, the model predicts that adjacent 
values are more likely to be similar in importance for a given individual than orthogonal 
values, which may be less similar in importance than opposing values. However, it is 
unclear whether this pattern holds for every group of people.  For example, for medical 
practitioners to be successful, they presumably need to consider the opposing values 
achievement and benevolence to be high in importance (in order to help more patients).  
This leads to one interesting question regarding the circular structure and its 
assumptions of synergies and conflicts: is it possible that values seen as opposing share 
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more in common than they presumably do? I will return to this issue later in the 
introduction. 
This motivational continuum is one of the main reasons for the popularity of 
Schwartz’s model. These motivational relations help to make inferences about values 
and external variables, such as behaviours and attitudes.  If one external variable 
exhibits a strong positive correlation with one of the value types, then the circular model 
predicts that correlations should become progressively less positive (and then perhaps 
more negative) moving around the circular model from adjacent value types through 
orthogonal value types to opposing value types (Schwartz, 1992).  For example, when 
interpersonal cooperation is measured using an experimental game, cooperation is 
positively associated with the importance that people attach to benevolence values, at 
best weakly related to most openness and conservation values, and negatively 
associated with the importance they attach to power values (Schwartz, 1996).  The 
resulting pattern of correlations follows a sine wave across the motivational continuum: 
it first increases (correlations with a value type and its adjacent values), then decreases 
(correlating with opposing values), and finally increases again (completing the circle, 
returning to the adjacent values) (e.g., Boer & Fischer, 2013; Hanel, Zacharopoulos, 
Mégardon, & Maio, 2017; Schwartz, 1992).   
To assess the structure of human values, one of the most powerful and 
frequently used techniques is called Multidimensional Scaling (MDS).  MDS provides a 
spatial representation based on similarities\dissimilarities between objects.  The data can 
be provided from different methods, such as intercorrelations of items and ratings of 
similarities (Borg, Groenen, & Mair, 2012).  The similarities\dissimilarities allow 
generalization and discrimination between the objects being considered, with the MDS 
analysis providing their positions across a spatial plane.  For instance, suppose we want 
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to assess the similarities between the music styles played by Radiohead, Pink Floyd, 
Led Zeppelin, Aerosmith, and Taylor Swift.  Radiohead and Pink Floyd are known for 
their more progressive sound and experimentation with different arrangements through 
their albums, while Led Zeppelin and Aerosmith rooted their sound on hard rock, 
typically associated with heavy beats and powerful riffs and vocals.  In contrast, Taylor 
Swift plays pop music – a softer sonority and mainly with romantic lyrics.  If we assess 
the similarities between these artists, it is likely that the MDS would generate a spatial 
plane where the prog and hard rock bands would be clustered in separate groups, but 
next to each other, while the pop singer would be further away from them.  In sum, 
MDS allows us to visualize the relations between variables based on how close they are 
to each other (perceived similarity), reducing potentially complex data to Cartesian 
spatial planes.  Items that are positioned more closely together into the spatial 
representation can be interpreted as more similar, whereas those that are positioned 
further apart are more dissimilar (Hout, Papesh, & Goldinger, 2013). 
As previously mentioned, there are several methods that can be used to collect 
data, develop a "proximity matrix" (i.e., a matrix that contains all the similarities 
between the pairs of items), and finally perform Multidimensional Scaling.  These 
include a range of indirect methods, where scores are not calculated from participants’ 
direct comparisons of items, but are inferred from data such as response times in 
categorisation tasks (Hout et al., 2013).  In this thesis, my empirical studies focus on the 
direct methods, which ask participants to compare items (Hout et al., 2013).  For 
instance, participants can be asked to organize the items in groups\piles, based on how 
similar they judge these items to be (Yeh et al., 2014), such that more similar items are 
placed together in a group\pile.  Another example of a direct method is a Spatial 
Arrangement (SpAM), technique developed by Goldstone (1994), in which participants 
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have to drag-and-drop the items on a screen, with their proximity indicating greater 
similarity and greater distance indicating greater dissimilarity (Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, 
Unkelbach, & Alves, 2016).  Another simple method to assess similarities is to present 
two items at a time to participants (e.g., How similar are Pink Floyd and Aerosmith?) 
(Hout et al., 2013).  Also, basic intercorrelations of items can indicate similarities, with 
higher correlations showing higher similarity (Borg et al., 2012).   
In values research, Smallest Space Analysis (SSA; Guttman, 1968), another 
name given to Multidimensional Scaling, has been widely used to assess the structure of 
Schwartz’s theory (e.g., Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).  The SSA uses the 
intercorrelation between all value items, one to the other, to plot them into a two-
dimensional space, also providing partitions that help to identify regions. As stated by 
Schwartz (1992, p. 45), "the partition lines in the SSAs represent conceptually 
convenient decisions about where one type of motivation ends and another begins".  
Recent research also assessed the structure of values using other types of MDS (Bilsky 
et al., 2011; Fontaine et al., 2008; Schwartz et al., 2012). 
As previously mentioned, when assessing Schwartz’s (1992) value structure, 
research has relied mainly on participants’ ratings of value importance.  MDS plots the 
intercorrelations between each value item’s importance.  These ratings are crucial for 
tapping the motivational aspects of values, which is a key aspect of what is meant by 
values (because of their motivational significance to the self).  Nonetheless, similarities 
and differences in motivational content between values are built on people’s 
understanding of values as concepts, and these conceptual representations have not been 
directly examined.  We know which values are strongly endorsed by different groups or 
cultures, and how they are generally distributed across a spatial plane, but if we assess 
how individuals judge values based on the similarity of their content, would we see the 
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same relations?  For instance, if we assess value importance, an individual can see 
creativity as important, but not wealth.  However, if we ask about the similarities 
between their content, a person might see them as extremely similar, because, for 
example, creativity may help entrepreneurs to increase profit.  Because values arise 
from abstractions or generalizations from previous individuals’ experience, it is vital to 
examine their conceptual content and check if the similarities between these concepts 
generate a different spatial plane.  Making these conceptual comparisons would help to 
either strengthen values theory or provide suggestions for improvement. 
Value structure cross-culturally.   
The circular structure has been extensively supported with results from different 
countries, gender, age groups, and sample types (Bilsky et al., 2011; Borg, Bardi, & 
Schwartz, 2017; Hanel et al., 2018; Schwartz, 1992, 2012; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; 
Struch, Schwartz, & Kloot, 2002), either as independent research (e.g., cultural 
validations, correlational research), or as part of large datasets (e.g., European Social 
Survey).  Examples of independent studies that assessed values' structure can be found 
in many countries, such as Germany (Schmidt, Bamberg, Davidov, Herrmann, & 
Schwartz, 2007), Brazil (Tamayo & Porto, 2009; Tamayo & Schwartz, 1993), and Spain 
(Paez & De-Juanas, 2015). The structure was also replicated in research assessing how 
individuals’ perceive the values of members of their own family, and from the country 
and city in which they live (Hanel et al., 2018). The structure has also been widely 
replicated using large datasets.  For example, across 38 countries (using the SVS), the 
structure was replicated (Fontaine et al., 2008).  Using data from the European Social 
Survey, the structure was replicated using 71 national samples from 32 countries (using 
the PVQ-21; Bilsky et al., 2011).  Thus, the evidence broadly supports the universality 
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of Schwartz’s model, with results consistently reproducing the structure and its features 
of conflicting and congruent values. 
Some small deviations from the original structure were also found across 
different groups.  For instance, considering 88 samples from 40 countries, Schwartz and 
Sagiv (1995) aimed to identify the culture-specifics of value content and structure.  The 
motivational continuum was replicated cross-culturally, but results indicated that 13 of 
the 57 values were highly inconsistent in their positions in the circular model (e.g., self-
respect, inner harmony, meaning in life), fluctuating through adjacent value types.  On 
average, results indicated that 16% of the values diverged from their theoretical original 
position.  With the European Social Survey data (Bilsky et al., 2011), deviations were 
found in 42 out of 71 samples (from 32 countries), always involving value types that are 
adjacent to each other - either reversing their order around the circle (e.g. universalism 
peripheral to benevolence; Italy), or mixing them (e.g., conformity and tradition 
together; Norway).  Several explanations were raised to clarify these differences, such 
as sample differences (e.g., general population vs student population), the meaning 
attributed to the values cross culturally, and the developmental status of the country 
(Fontaine et al., 2008).  Still, it is important to highlight that these deviations do not 
influence the overall structure across nations, which retains its main features. 
In sum, the PVQ and SVS have been used in hundreds of studies, in diverse 
samples (e.g., religiously, culturally, geographically), and in 82 countries around the 
world (Schwartz, 2012). These studies provided strong evidence for the structure cross-
culturally, with the value types emerging as expected in at least 90% of the samples.  
Some small deviations occur in some cultures (e.g., value types from the same higher 
order merging; Bilsky et al., 2011; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995), but do not influence the 
whole structure. 
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Values and other variables. 
As previously mentioned, values have an important role in predicting various 
important psychological variables. These associations were assessed through a range of 
studies over the years. Some relevant findings are summarized in a meta-analysis 
examining the associations between personality traits and values (n = 9.935, from 14 
countries): the results showed the strongest correlations between openness traits and 
conservation values, and agreeableness traits and self-transcendence values (Fischer & 
Boer, 2015). In another meta-analysis examining personality traits and human values 
across 60 studies, it was found that more cognitively based traits (e.g., openness to 
experience, agreeableness) present a stronger relation to values than more emotionally 
based traits (e.g., extraversion, emotional stability) (Parks-Leduc et al., 2015). 
The association between values and well-being has also been studied over the 
years. Boer (2017) examined how cultural factors and environmental threats could 
facilitate\inhibit the influence of personal values on affective experiences. The results 
indicated that the influence of values on affective well-being is culturally and 
environmentally constrained, with cultural factors moderating the impact of threats on 
the associations between the variables.  Maio (2016) and Schwartz and Sortheix (2018) 
pointed out three theoretical perspectives regarding the relations between values and 
well-being. The first perspective aims to explain the direct relations between well-being 
and values. The second perspective aims to assess if the congruence between people's 
values and the ones endorsed by their peers are a determinant for their subjective well-
being. Finally, the third perspective aims to understand if the achievement of value-
related goals serves as a source for greater well-being. 
Values are also frequently associated with attitudes. For instance, I led a study 
that assessed relations between human values and attitudes towards drugs, alcohol, and 
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marijuana (Coelho et al., 2018). Results indicated reliable associations between 
excitement (stimulation, hedonism) and normative (tradition, conformity) values and 
favorable vs unfavorable attitudes towards these substances, respectively.  When 
assessing the relations between values and attitudes towards genetically modified and 
organically grown food products, results showed that individuals who rated power 
values as more important rated genetically modified food more positively, and 
organically grown food more negatively (Dreezens, Martijn, Tenbült, Kok, & de Vries, 
2005).  Also, individuals who rated universalism values as more important were more 
positive toward organically grown food. 
The previously mentioned variables are just a few in a range of psychological 
phenomena that have been associated with human values. However, this thesis has yet 
to consider the links between values and overt human behaviour. Analogous to long-
standing research on relations between attitudes and behaviour, researchers have 
recognized the role of values in predicting behaviour (Gouveia et al., 2014; Rokeach, 
1973), while recognizing the use of values as post-hoc rationalizations for behaviour 
(Eiser, 1987; Haidt, 2001; Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996).  The implications of values for 
human behaviour have been seen in different activities, such as voting (Caprara et al., 
2006), work (Schwartz, 1999), and environmental conservation (Evans et al., 2013; 
Schultz et al., 2005).   
However, despite the long-standing interest in value-behaviour connections, 
empirical studies of these connections are far fewer than one might expect (Fischer, 
2017).  One explanation for this paucity is that value-behaviour connections do not 
occur specifically from one value to one behaviour: multiple values may influence any 
given behaviour in a complex interplay.  Diverse values influence a range of behaviours 
across situations (Schwartz, 1992).  This complexity makes any examination of values 
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and behaviour inherently multifaceted.  Consequently, a vital first step in examining 
value-behaviour relations is to consider their diverse theoretical interconnections, 
because behaviours can relate to multiple values.   
Consider behaviours related to the value of freedom.  This value can be 
expressed when animal-rights activists are trying to save animals trapped in zoos or 
circuses, and when striving for a region’s independence from a perceived occupier.  
Both examples, however, can also express different values.  Saving animals may also 
help to protect the environment, and regional independence may be perceived as a threat 
to values of peace or national security.  In theory, many values can relate to any single 
behaviour, regardless of whether we are looking at influences of values on the 
behaviour or influences of behaviours on values.  Therefore, to provide a robust 
assessment of how these relations occur, a key puzzle is knowing a priori which values 
link to which behaviours.  These value-behaviour associations are relevant for the 
present thesis, and will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
Concepts and Categorization 
When facing something new, it is a natural human impulse to interpret it as part 
of a category (Goldstone, Kersten, & Carvalho, 2012).  Our cognitive system supports 
the classification of new objects in terms of concepts, placing them together with 
previously encountered items.  In other words, we cognitively assess if the new object is 
similar to old ones (Hahn & Chater, 1997).  For instance, when trying an exotic type of 
meat (e.g., crocodile, snakes) for the first time, we might associate its taste to something 
we have had in the past (e.g., chicken).  A concept can therefore be understood as a 
"mental representation of a class or individual and deals with what is being represented 
and how that information is typically used during the categorization" (Smith, 1989, p. 
502).  According to Goldstone et al. (2012), concepts work as a filter that help to 
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provide informative or diagnostic ways to structure the world. In other words, concepts 
attribute meaning to things, allowing a better understanding and differentiation between 
the objects.  The authors mention several crucial features of concepts.  For instance, it is 
possible to generalize our experiences with an object to others from the same group.  
Concepts also help to facilitate communication by sharing common concepts, 
discriminating between stimuli, and generating an infinity variety of thoughts, based on 
their combined cognitive elements. 
Despite their obvious connection, it is important to distinguish between concept 
and category.  While a concept refers to an idea or notion that is mentally assimilated by 
an individual regarding a specific thing (e.g., a dog, a shark, a flower), a category refers 
to a set of these things that are grouped together (Goldstone et al., 2012).  For instance, 
the concept of Italian cuisine is whatever mental representation of Italian food, while its 
category is consisted by all dishes that can be classified as from the Italian cuisine in the 
real world.  As another example, in school concepts help children to attribute a meaning 
to mathematical terms (e.g., adjacent angle, acute angle, obtuse angle), which they 
organize in a way that makes sense to them (e.g., geometry, trigonometry).  The process 
of how these ideas are stored and organized by individuals is known as conceptual 
representation (Markman, 2006). 
Many theories from the categorization literature (Prototype Theory; Examplar 
Theory), are specified in terms of similarity (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Minda & Smith, 
2001; Murphy, 2004).  Thus, when presented with a putative new instance of a 
category, the similarity of that instance to the relevant representations (e.g., a single 
prototype, a set of examples) is used as a basis for assigning that instance to a category 
(Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Minda & Smith, 2001; Murphy, 2004; Oden, 1987).   
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Conceptual representation of values and behaviours.  
One possible explanation for why people from different countries endorse or 
interpret values in a different way is that values might have different (and implicit) 
meanings (Maio, 2010). That is, people attach different meanings to the same values. 
Because values are abstract concepts (Maio, 2016), understanding their mental 
representations as concepts and categories can help to understand their varied meaning.  
For example, when asked to group values that represent the welfare of others, it is likely 
that an individual whom was exposed to different situations wherein the value equality 
was related to others’ well-being (e.g., fair income distribution, respect in workplace 
regarding people’s differences) will group this value with other values that promote the 
welfare of others, such as social justice, helpful, and honest.  Alternatively, an 
individual may have experiences that relate a particular value to motives associated with 
the opposing value domain in Schwartz’s theory.  For instance, some individuals might 
think of wealth, a self-enhancement value, as similar to self-transcendence values (e.g., 
equality, social justice) due to past experiences that pair wealth with motives to help 
others, perhaps as a result of engaging in a profession that pairs the person’s livelihood 
with success in helping others (e.g., earning money to save lives as a doctor, saving 
money to work abroad as a volunteer).  Thus, even if Schwartz (1992) predicts that two 
values possess opposing underlying motivations, these might be mentally represented 
together if the individual’s experiences relate the opposing values. The use of similarity 
judgments to make categorizations might benefit value research, which can deeply 
explore the mental representations of values based on their content, and consequently be 
useful for theory development. 
An important question is whether value structure based on conceptual 
similarities is empirically distinct from importance ratings.  For instance, the values of 
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freedom and national security are in opposing areas in Schwartz's structure, due to 
putatively opposing motivations. However, freedom and national security are often 
combined in political rhetoric, wherein defense advocates stress the role of a strong-
armed forces and intelligence service in protecting freedoms, while critics of national 
security measures (e.g., intelligence data monitoring) stress threats to personal 
freedoms.  Such differences make it important to discover how people conceptualize 
such abstract ideals.   
There is also a theoretical distinction between conceptual and motivational 
similarity.  Regardless of whether or not individuals consider a pair of values to be 
highly similar, people can interpret them as high or low in importance as guiding 
principles in their lives. That is, the values may share low or high conceptual similarity, 
while sharing low or high motivational force. Therefore, focusing on more direct 
comparisons (e.g., similarity ratings) regarding their meaning enables a more direct 
probe of values’ role in human concept categorization, and the results can be useful for 
theory development. The assessment of conceptual similarities between values will be 
examined in Chapter 2. 
An interesting and important offshoot of this research question is the potential to 
learn more about links between values and behaviour.  One of the main reasons of the 
popularity of human values is their ability to predict human behaviour, with extensive 
research investigating the link between values and behaviour (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; 
Roccas & Sagiv, 2017).  However, behaviours can be influenced by more than one 
value at time (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2013), and behaviours are also 
influenced by many other variables (e.g., social norms, practical constraints).  For 
example, an individual who is constantly presenting new project ideas can be seen as 
valuing both intelligence and creativity, values from different dimensions in Schwartz’s 
34 
 
 
 
model.  These influences can complicate predictions about value-behaviour relations, 
because it is not known a priori how different values (e.g., intelligence, creativity) 
relate to the same behaviour (e.g., new project ideas) and how much this depends on the 
motivational and conceptual similarities between values.  
The role of values as concepts and categories may be important for better 
understanding the link between values and behaviours, particularly given how multiple 
values can influence the same behaviours (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Roccas & Sagiv, 
2017). When plotting values and behaviours together, prior research has examined 
correlations between value importance and the frequency with which related behaviours 
were performed (for more information, see chapter 3; Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; 
Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).  However, a critical limitation of this approach is that, as 
noted above, individuals may judge the same behaviours as expressing different values. 
For instance, an individual in a vibrant winter sports community might believe that 
snowboarding fulfils the values of stimulation and tradition, but not hedonism, because 
the person does not enjoy snowboarding.  This pattern would make it difficult to detect 
a sinusoidal pattern of relations between Schwartz’s values and this behaviour, because 
the mental representations of these values include the behaviour in surprising ways.  
This complexity can be reduced if we learn about how people conceptually map 
value-relevant behaviours alongside the values. Specifically, if we ask people to rate 
similarities between value-relevant behaviours, will we obtain the same conceptual 
mappings as found for the values themselves?  Where would the behaviours fall in 
relation to the values that they are intended to serve?  Can behaviours be represented in 
the same space as the values? Or is the space defining behaviours fundamentally 
different?  It is important to consider that in addition to values, behaviours are under 
varied influences (e.g., norms, perceived control; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  It is an 
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open question whether or not spatially mapping behaviours that are generated through 
human values would exhibit the same circular pattern as seen for the values themselves. 
If not replicated, this finding would show that even the most closely related behaviours 
have determinants (e.g., goals, abilities) that are not isometric with the motivations 
underpinning values in the abstract (perhaps due to the non-value relevant other factors 
that shape behaviour). In contrast, if behaviours that are prototypical of values do 
exhibit the same circular pattern, then this finding would support the model and suggest 
that any departures from sinusoidal patterns in value-behaviour relations stem largely 
from atypicality in the mental representation of the particular behaviours within the 
values. This thesis explores these possibilities. 
Overview of the thesis 
This thesis aims to assess the structure of human values through their conceptual 
representations, using MDS analysis of multiple structural assessments.  In addition, I 
assess a behavioural structure for values (generated from Schwartz’s value types).  Each 
aim is addressed in a separate empirical chapter. 
In Chapter 2, I present seven studies from nine samples that were collected 
across two countries (seven from the United Kingdom, two from Brazil).  In these 
studies, I examined Schwartz’s value structure by asking participants to make 
comparisons across different value levels (e.g., value items, value types, value 
dimensions), and using different methods (e.g., direct comparisons, pile sorting, Spatial 
Arrangement).  The work in Chapter 2 appears in Coelho, Hanel, Johansen and Maio 
(2018). 
In Chapter 3, I present four studies using British samples. In these studies, I 
assess the relations between behaviours and mental representations of values (using 
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different levels: value types and dimensions). An overview of the empirical studies can 
be seen in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1. 
 
Overview of empirical studies 
 
Brief Description 
Countries 
(Samples) 
Chapter 2   
Study 1 
Participants performed direct comparisons between 16 
value items from Schwartz’s model. 
UK (109) 
Study 2 
Participants performed direct comparisons between the 10 
value types from Schwartz’s model. 
UK (111) 
Brazil (69) 
Study 3 
Participants performed direct comparisons between all 57 
value items and the 10 value types from Schwartz’s model. 
UK (156) 
Study 4 
Participants performed direct comparisons between all 57 
value items and the four high order values from Schwartz’s 
model. 
UK (107) 
Study 5 
Participants were asked to position all 57 value items into 
the two dimensions from Schwartz’s model. 
UK (167) 
Brazil (86) 
Study 6 
Participants were asked to group all 50 value items into 
groups\piles, based on their similarities. 
UK (129) 
Study 7 
Participants performed a Spatial Arrangement task, 
developing a structure based on how similar they 
interpreted the 57 value items are to them. 
UK (152) 
Chapter 3   
Study 8 
Participants rated how related are a set of 40 behaviours to 
the respective value types from which they were originated. 
UK (105) 
Study 9 
Participants performed direct comparisons between the 40 
behaviours and Schwartz’s 10 value types. 
UK (123) 
Study 10 
Participants were asked to position the 40 behaviours 
among Schwartz’s two dimensions. 
UK (113) 
Study 11 
Participants were asked to perform direct comparisons 
between all 40 behaviours, one to another. 
UK (131) 
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Finally, in Chapter 4, I summarize the results across both empirical chapters and 
discuss the conclusions that hold across them.  I will highlight what the results mean for 
our understanding of the mental representations of values, and how these mental 
representations connect to different behaviours. Little attention has been given to how 
individuals interpret and understand values, which is vital because of their abstract 
nature. Hence, the novelty of these studies can provide important evidence regarding 
how individuals mentally represent the values, which will help to reach a deeper 
understanding of them. Also, because of the influence of multiple values on a single 
behaviour, it has been difficult to link values to behaviour a priori. Therefore, mapping 
behaviours using their similarities to mental representations of values might help 
address this problem. Finally, I will also discuss the limitations of the current designs, 
and describe potential directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Representations of 
Human Values 
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As abstract concepts, values can be construed in diverse ways that have 
implications for how we use them as self-regulatory devices (see Maio, 2016) and as 
tools to justify or explain our behaviour (e.g., Eiser, 1987; Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988).  
To some extent, progress in understanding these construals has been made by models 
distinguishing between motives expressed by values (see e.g., Gouveia et al., 2014; 
Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart, 1977; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz et al., 2001), while 
articulating their connections to human attitudes (Maio, Olson, & Bernard, 2006) and 
actions (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). Research has also shown how value differences are 
related to idiosyncratic social experiences and the socio-cultural context of each person 
(Gouveia et al., 2014), in addition to biological and neurological factors (Leszkowicz, 
Linden, Maio, & Ihssen, 2017; Schermer et al., 2011; Zacharopoulos et al., 2016; Zahn 
et al., 2009).  However, despite these advances, research has not examined the crucial 
question of how people conceptually map their values. Value studies have focused on 
motivational representations of values and side-stepped the issue of conceptual 
similarity and diversity. The present chapter provides the first direct empirical 
examination of people’s conceptual representations of values using tasks that explicitly 
ask about mental representations of values.   
To assess how human values are structurally related, a test that is frequently 
used to assess conceptual representations has instead been used to examine the 
motivational interrelations between values.  Specifically, the motivational relations have 
been tested by subjecting correlations between ratings of value importance to 
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) (e.g., Bilsky et al., 2011). Using MDS analysis of 
value correlations (see Figure 2.1 for an example), Schwartz’s (1992) circular structure 
of values has been found in common space plots of correlations between value ratings 
in different samples (e.g., students, teachers, clinicians) from around the world.  Data 
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from the UK and Brazil are particularly relevant here because they are sites for data 
collection in my research.  For instance, in the UK, Bilsky et al. (2011) found support 
for the circular structure across three representative samples.  The structure was also 
replicated in Brazil (Sambiase et al., 2010; Tamayo & Porto, 2009; Tamayo & 
Schwartz, 1993), although some minor deviations emerged.  For example, some value 
types merged (e.g., hedonism and stimulation, Tamayo & Schwartz, 1993; stimulation 
and self-direction, Sambiase et al., 2010), or swapped positions (e.g., stimulation and 
benevolence; Tamayo & Porto, 2009).  Consistently, the value types universalism and 
benevolence tended to occupy the same region across studies in Brazil.  Fontaine et al. 
(2008) point to several possible explanations for deviations in values structure, 
including sample differences (e.g., general population and student sample), the meaning 
attributed to values cross-culturally, and national development. 
The structure has also been presented in data describing the perceived values of 
other people (e.g., perceived familial and societal values) and in a variety of assessment 
techniques (e.g., self-reports, response latencies; Fontaine et al., 2008; Hanel et al., 
2018; Pakizeh, Gebauer, & Maio, 2007; Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Boehnke, 
2004). For more information regarding these structural studies using MDS, please see 
Chapter 1.   
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Figure 2.1. An example of MDS applied to human values (from Schwartz, 
1992). Values that are placed more distant from the centre are typically "more abstract, 
less close to one's self-concept, and less often implicated in daily interaction" (Levy, 
1985, cited in Schwartz et al., 2012, p. 678). 
 
Notwithstanding this support for Schwartz’s model, MDS is more commonly 
used to analyse people’s explicit judgments of the conceptual similarity of objects (Borg 
et al., 2012), with these judgments providing a spatial representation wherein item 
proximity can be interpreted as an indicator of conceptual similarity: similar items are 
positioned more closely together than dissimilar items (Hout et al., 2013).  The focus on 
more direct comparisons of the abstract concepts enables a more direct probe of their 
role in human concept categorization, because human value concepts arise from 
abstractions or generalisations from previous experiences.  Thus, when presenting 
different pairs of value concepts to individuals, people are able to make categorizations 
based on their understanding of these values. 
The focus on similarity ratings affords a closer look at the conceptual 
representations of the meaning of the values, without scrutiny of the aforementioned 
42 
 
 
 
motives.  This analysis can be important for theory development, as was recently 
illustrated by Koch et al. (2016).  These investigators applied multidimensional scaling 
to similarity judgements in the context of Fiske, Glick, and Xu’s (2002) highly 
influential model of stereotype content and found that the model can be improved with 
an added dimension.   
This ability to tap meaning judgments is vital for models of values because of 
the abstract nature of value concepts.  Many theories of values, including Schwartz’s 
perspective, recognize the importance of diverse affective, cognitive, and behavioural 
components of values (see also Rokeach, 1973), which are also directly tied to specific 
contexts and actions that people use in mental representations of values (Maio, 2010).  
A number of experiments have shown that the concrete cognitive content (i.e., beliefs, 
arguments) that people provide for values makes a difference in how values relate to 
subsequent action (e.g., Maio, Hahn, Frost, & Cheung, 2009; Maio, Olson, Allen, & 
Bernard, 2001).  Therefore, it is important to consider whether the cognitive 
categorizations of values yield different interrelations between them than is showed 
through analysis of motivational compatibility, as showed through analysis of 
correlations between value importance ratings.  
It is possible that the relations between values as inferred from value-concept 
assessments, such as similarities, may be different from those inferred from motive 
endorsement.  For example, some values might be more conceptually related to 
opposing or adjacent value types, depending on individuals’ mental representations of 
the values.  Indeed, prior research by Pakizeh et al. (2007) noted empirical differences 
between conceptual similarity and similarities in value importance judgements.  These 
researchers found only a modest association between participants’ judgments of the 
semantic similarity of pairs of values and discrepancies in value importance (r = -.26, p 
43 
 
 
 
< .001).  However, Pakizeh et al. did not attempt to map conceptual representations of 
values using the similarity judgments and test whether the circular structure of values 
held in these representations.    
Fortunately, the use of similarity and categorization judgments in MDS is well-
suited to revealing conceptual representations with relatively high precision.  This 
precision arises because the MDS matrix provides similarity judgments for all pairs of 
items, generating a spatial map of values based on a more direct task.  This approach 
allows a within-subject assessment of the value space, because participants directly 
compare the similarities between values.  In contrast to reliance on between-subject 
covariance in value importance judgements, this approach generates a more valid plane 
because each participant provides more data, explicitly considering the relations of each 
item (e.g., value) to all other items, rather than merely using a single set of between-
participant correlations to furnish the proximity data.  
Prior research supports the utility of this within-person approach.  Across 17 
European countries, Gollan and Witte (2014) replicated the circular structure.  The 
proposed structure was also found within-persons across countries (e.g., United 
Kingdom, United States, Iran), and across value measures (e.g., Schwartz values survey, 
portrait values questionnaire;(Borg et al., 2017).  However, these studies relied on 
importance ratings to assess the motivational structure of Schwartz’s model, while my 
studies assess conceptual categories through direct comparisons. 
The Present Research 
Unlike the past research using value correlations, the aim of my research was to 
provide a direct analysis of conceptual representations of values by applying MDS 
analyses (Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7) and common space plots (Study 5) to different 
categorization tasks.  These methods were applied to similarity judgements of values 
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through seven studies and nine samples across two countries (seven samples from UK, 
two from Brazil).  Furthermore, I assessed all three conceptual levels in Schwartz’s 
model of values.  That is, I asked participants to make comparisons involving specific 
values, value types, and value dimensions.  In Study 1, participants judged the similarity 
between specific values from Schwartz's model.  In Study 2, participants judged the 
similarities of the ten value types, and, in Study 3, participants were asked to compare 
all 57 values from Schwartz's theory to the 10 value types.  In Study 4, participants 
compared how similar the value items are to the four high order values.  Study 5 elicited 
judgments of the meaning of values by asking participants to position the human values 
along Schwartz's two motivational dimensions.  To provide an even more diverse 
assessment, Studies 6 and 7 assessed the structure of all value items with a pile sorting 
task and a Spatial Arrangement task.  Together, these methods provided the first 
assessment of values based on their perceived similarities.   
Finally, I assessed the fit between the data and the locations in Schwartz’s model 
using a Procrustean superimposing approach (Peres-Neto & Jackson, 2001).  Study 1 
describes how this analysis works.  This method can be applied to the outcome of a 
MDS, such as the axes of a spatial configuration, but also on an individual level, as I 
demonstrate in Study 7.  
Study 1 
The purpose of this study was to use similarity judgments between values to 
derive a MDS spatial plane describing conceptual representations of the values.  
Specifically, I aimed to test whether my approach would reproduce the circular 
structure, using a subset of all 57 values in Schwartz’s model.  Comparing all 57 values 
from Schwartz’s model would yield 1,596 comparisons, which would require a long 
period of time, leading to boredom or loss of concentration.  Consequently, my first 
45 
 
 
 
study asked participants to consider only 16 values, which were selected as being well-
spaced among all the quadrants from Schwartz’s (1992) theory.  The relations between 
all values in Schwartz’s model were investigated using different methods in Studies 6 
and 7. 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 109 psychology students (n = 93 women; n = 16 
men; Mage = 19.78; SD = 3.05), who took part in exchange for course credit.  
Materials and procedure.  Participants were asked to rate the similarity of 16 
values (e.g., social order) across the four higher-order value quadrants in Schwartz’s 
model, using items from the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS, 1992). The values in the 
self-enhancement quadrant were wealth, ambition, intelligent, and preserving my public 
image; the values in the self-transcendence quadrant were social justice, helpful, and 
equality; the values in the conservation quadrant were obedient, respect for tradition, 
national security, and social order; the values in the openness to change quadrant were 
independent, self-respect, exciting life, pleasure, and freedom.  
Participants were presented with one value and then asked to rate how similar 
they personally thought this value was to a list of other values.  This rating was made 
using a sliding scale from 0 (completely different) to 100 (extremely similar).  They 
were instructed to click on the slider and move it towards the rating that more accurately 
indicated the answer that best described the similarity between the pair of values.  
Participants began by comparing one value with the other 15 values on one screen, and 
then a new screen appeared.  The new screen asked participants to compare another of 
the 15 values with the other 14 values, and so on until just two values were remaining 
for comparison, with a total of 120 comparisons between values.  Value items appeared 
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in alphabetical order (ambition, equality, exciting life, and so on…).  One example of 
the task can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2. Example of task (Study 1). 
Results and Discussion 
MDS methodology. The means of all 120 comparisons were calculated, creating 
a half-matrix dataset, also known as a triangular matrix.  Next, an ordinal MDS on the 
half-matrix was performed using the PROXSCAL algorithm.  This algorithm creates a 
geometric representation of the data, respecting the proximity of the items (Hout et al., 
2013).  The Torgerson configuration was selected as the initial configuration.  This 
configuration is also known as classical MDS and aims to create a two-dimensional 
representation of high-dimensional data (Brandes & Pich, 2007). Two-dimensional 
representations were chosen for this and the further studies, based on scree plots of their 
Stress-I values across four different configurations (From one to four dimensions). A 
graphic with these scree plots is available in the appendix. The Stress-I was used to 
indicate the model’s goodness of fit, considering the difference between the input 
proximities and output distances in the Cartesian plane (Jaworska & Chupetlovska‐
Anastasova, 2009).  Lower values indicate a better model fit. In all of my studies using 
MDS, I employed the cut off values proposed by Sturrock and Rocha (2000); these cut-
offs consider the number of points and dimensions presented in the analyses. The cut-
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offs were generated after analysing 587,200 random matrices, and the final results 
match those obtained by Spence and Ogilvie (1973).  For this study, with 16 values in 
two dimensions, a Stress-I lower than .24 is recommended. Therefore, my results 
indicate a good model fit using this criterion (Stress-I = .14; cf. Figure 2.3). I also tested 
the stress-per-point of the model – the extent to which each one of the values 
contributes to the total stress. That is, I considered the normalized raw stress (√𝑛. 𝑟. 𝑠 = 
Stress-I) scores. In this study, self-respect and wealth were the values with higher 
individually stress. The full stress-per-point table for this and further studies are 
available on the Appendix (p. 134).  
However, these indices indicate only how well the data can be characterized in a 
two-dimensional space and not whether the data are consistent with the specific two-
dimensional space in Schwartz's proposed structure.  The data could fit into a two-
dimensional space with values positioned very differently from Schwartz’s model.  To 
assess this fit to Schwartz’s model, we used Procrustes analysis (“Protest”; Peres-Neto 
& Jackson, 2001), which tests the degree to which two sets of points align.  Specifically, 
Protest “compares two ordinations using symmetric Procrustes analysis” (Oksanen, 
2015) by minimizing the sum-of-squared differences through re-scaling the 
configurations to a common size, mirror reflecting (if necessary), and rotating (Peres-
Neto & Jackson, 2001).  In other words, using Protest in my studies compared the 
theoretical spatial arrangement of values from Schwartz's model with the spatial 
arrangements in my data, and assessed how good their alignment was.  Protest is also 
known as an analysis of congruence (Oksanen, 2015).   
To perform the analysis, I needed two configurations whose congruence we 
assessed through superimposition.  The data were one configuration, and hypothetical 
coordinates for Schwartz’s (1992) model were the other configuration.  I specified the 
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coordinates of Schwartz’s model by approximating them through visual inspections to 
the MDS output coordinates from Schwartz (1992).  For example, the four self-
enhancement values were expected to be on x (axis) = 0 and y (axis) = 0.5, and the four 
conservation values on x = 0.5, and y = 0, as shown in Figure 3.  For a better 
visualization, I also used the convex hull (the dashed lines connecting the values) in 
Figure 2.3, which provides the smallest convex set of values to each higher order value. 
This method was also applied to the spatial planes derived in the other studies I 
conducted.  Note that it is not necessary to match the starting coordinates to the model 
fit, because the protest function rotates and mirror reflects the coordinates if necessary, 
but some starting configurations that are in line with Schwartz’s model are needed.  
Further, I focused on fit to the four higher order values rather than breaking the analysis 
down to the 10 value types because I was only interested in a fit to the overall model 
rather than small deviations within each value type.   
Data were analysed with the R package “vegan” (version 2.5-1; Oksanen et al., 
2018), which has a Protest function based on Peres-Neto and Jackson (2001).  The 
Protest returns a correlation-like effect size and estimates its statistical significance.  
Although the correlation-like effect size, which is called “correlation in a symmetric 
Procrustes rotation”, is often labelled as r (e.g., Oksanen, 2015), I will refer to it as rm to 
avoid confusion with the Pearson’s correlation coefficient r.  Larger correlations imply 
a better fit, and significant results indicate a match between the two sets of points.  
Procrustes Rotation assumes that two different configurations with the same number of 
points are being compared.  In our case, however, these points are from different levels: 
My data is from the value item level, while the hypothetical configurations use 
coordinates from the four higher order values.  This difference regarding the nature of 
the points means that I did not expect to find a perfect fit, because the values items of 
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one higher order value were not all expected to be in the same position.  For Study 1, 
the fit of the data to the model was significant: rm = .86, p ≤ .001. 
 
Figure 2.3. Structure based on similarity judgements between value items (Study 1). 
Self-enhancement (filled diamonds), self-transcendence (squares), openness to change 
(hollow diamonds), and conservation (triangles). Convex hull: dashed lines connecting 
behaviour groups. 
 
The conceptual arrangement of human values from the similarity judgment task 
resembled the spatial plane in Schwartz’s (1992) analysis of value importance ratings.  
The values that were predicted to be on opposing sides of the value circle were in 
opposition in all cases, and most of the values serving related motives appeared near 
each other in the plots.  Overall, then, the application of MDS to the similarity ratings 
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showed a conceptual representation matching the motivational patterns elucidated in 
Schwartz’s model.  
 Nonetheless, a few exceptions were noted.  First, if we compare the spatial 
planes displayed in Figure 1 to the one from Schwartz (1992) studies, it can be noticed 
that some values changed position with other values that belong to the same higher-
order value type, resulting in minor deviations: pleasure (a hedonism value) switched 
places with independent and self-respect (self-direction values).  In addition, there was 
an alteration in adjacent motivational value types: the security values changed position 
with tradition\conformity.  Again, this change occurred in the same higher order values.  
Thus, the conceptual map does not differ substantially from the motivational patterns in 
in Schwartz’s model at the level of values.  This conclusion is further assessed in 
Studies 6 and 7 using different methods.  In the next study, I aim to check these patterns 
through a focus on the lower-order value types. 
Study 2 
The aim of Study 2 was to evaluate conceptual representations of values using 
similarity judgments between each of the 10 value types in Schwartz’s (1992) model 
(e.g., stimulation, benevolence).  That is, participants were asked to compare the value 
types, rather than individual value items, resulting in a total of 45 comparisons between 
the 10 value types.   This was a smaller set of comparisons than in Study 1, but it 
enabled examination of the conceptual representation of values at the level of value 
type, instead of focusing only on a small number of specific values in each type.  This 
study also evaluated culturally distinct samples, one in in United Kingdom and the other 
in Brazil. 
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Method 
Participants.  British participants included individuals from a community 
research panel who took part in exchange for a prize draw and undergraduate 
psychology students who took part for course credit. They responded to an Instructional 
Manipulation Check (IMC; (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), which is a 
task created to see if participants spend time reading instructions, and two "test items" 
(e.g., “please, rate everything 'extremely'”) within the study.  In total, 11 participants 
failed (four students and seven from general population) the IMC twice and were 
excluded1 from the analysis, leaving 111 participants in the sample (n = 84 women; n = 
27 men), with a mean age of 23.54 (SD = 8.99).  Brazilian participants were recruited 
from the general population, with nine of them failing the IMC twice and/or both test 
items, resulting in a final sample of 69 (n = 34 women; n = 34 men; 1 missing; Mage = 
32.15, SD = 13.39). 
Materials and procedure.  In this task, participants were instructed to rate the 
similarities between the ten value types (e.g., benevolence, achievement) taken from 
Schwartz's (1992).  Specifically, they rated how similar they personally thought two 
value types were, using a slider scale, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).  
One pair was presented at a time and in a random order. Participants rated similarity by 
clicking on the slider and move it towards the rating that best indicated their opinion 
regarding the similarity of the items. All the value types were followed by a short 
definition (e.g., Universalism [Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection 
for the welfare of all people and for nature]), in order to make all value types clear to 
participants. An example of the task can be seen in Figure 2.4. 
                                                 
1 These exclusions did not affect the findings, neither in this study or the others.   
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Figure 2.4. Example of task (Study 2). 
Results and Discussion 
As in Study 1, two half-matrix datasets containing the means of all comparisons 
were created.  Again, ordinal MDSs were performed on each half-matrix, using the 
PROXSCAL algorithm with Torgerson configuration.  With 10 values, a Stress lower 
than .13 is recommended (Sturrock & Rocha, 2000).  Results indicated a good fit in 
both samples (UK, Stress-I = .04, rm = .89, p ≤ .001; BR, Stress-I = .05, rm = .92, p ≤ 
.001).  The values types that contributed most to the model stress were conformity and 
security in UK, and security and hedonism in Brazil.  
53 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Value types along two dimensions (Study 2). Note: Green diamonds 
represent my UK sample; blue squares represent my Brazilian sample; Grey circles 
represent value type positions expected from Schwartz’s model. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2.5, some small deviations were noted. For instance, 
security positioned adjacent to power, instead of proximal to self-transcendence value 
types. These deviations do not affect the overall structure, with the value types from the 
same higher-order value positioned broadly in the same space (e.g., self-transcendence 
values: universalism and benevolence). Also, the opposing higher order values were 
again in opposite positions (self-enhancement\self-transcendence and 
conservation\openness to change), supporting Schwartz’s model. Thus, the two-
dimensional spatial plane retained the separation and ordering of the higher order value 
types (Bilsky et al., 2011). In the next study, I mixed the levels of abstraction in values 
54 
 
 
 
considered in Studies 1 and 2, performing direct similarity judgments tasks between 
value items and value types. 
Study 3 
The prior studies used a limited number of value comparisons (up to 120) per 
participant to prevent participant fatigue. Study 3 examined similarity judgments 
between all 57 values and the 10 value types.  This required 570 comparisons, which is 
far more than the number of comparisons made in the prior studies.  Thus, to attenuate 
participant fatigue, these comparisons were divided into two blocks, with each 
participant responding to half of the randomly selected items, resulting in a total of 285 
comparisons. The answers were further aggregated across participants, forming a single 
matrix based on the means between each pair of items. 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 181 psychology students, who took part in 
exchange for course credits.  Participants answered the IMC (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) 
and five "test items" (e.g., "please, rate everything extremely"), which were added in a 
random location among the other items.  Participants who failed the IMC twice and/or 
two or more test items were excluded from the analyses.  In total, twenty-five 
participants were excluded from the analyses.  The remaining sample contained 156 
participants (n = 144 women; n = 12 men), and the sample’s mean age was 19.59 years 
(SD = 2.38). 
Materials and procedure.  Participants were asked to rate the similarity between 
each of the 57 human values (e.g., equality, freedom) and the 10 value types (e.g., 
stimulation, conformity) from Schwartz’s (1992) theory.  In this study, participants 
were presented with all 57 values, one by one, and compared each one to five randomly 
selected value types.  Participants rated the similarity of each pair using a slider scale, 
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ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).  They moved a slider towards the score 
that best represents the extent to which they personally think each pair is similar. See 
Figure 2.6 below for one example of the task. 
 
Figure 2.6. Example of task (Study 3). 
Results and Discussion 
First, the means of all comparisons were calculated, creating a full matrix (value 
items x value types).  Next, an ordinal MDS (PROXSCAL) was performed, using the 
Torgerson configuration.  The resulting Stress-I of .10 indicated a good model fit 
(recommended lower than .37, for 57 objects; Sturrock & Rocha, 2000).  Privacy and 
sense of belonging contributed most to the stress. Protest indicate a good fit to Schwartz 
model: rm = .80, p ≤ .001. Figure 2.7 shows the spatial plane of the human values 
according to their similarities to the value types.  Overall, there were high similarities 
between the value items and their expected or adjacent value types.  As in the prior 
studies, the spatial plane still retained the correct separation and ordering of the higher 
order value types (Bilsky et al., 2011).   
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Figure 2.7. Value positions according to their similarities to the value types (Study 3). 
Only three of the 57 values were positioned in unexpected places: healthy, 
privacy, and responsible. In previous research, these values also emerged in inconsistent 
positions (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2012; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). For example, healthy 
can be often found next to hedonism, achievement, self-direction and, as in this case, 
benevolence (Schwartz, 1992).   
Study 4 
The results to this point yielded support for a model of values’ semantic 
meaning that closely matches Schwartz’s model.  To further probe the reliability of this 
mapping, Study 4 asked participants to rate the similarities between Schwartz's (1992) 
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values and the four higher order values. As in Study 3, I attempted to attenuate 
participant fatigue by presenting them with a randomly chosen subsample composed of 
30 of the 57 human values.  
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 126 individuals who were recruited online 
through Prolific Academic.  However, 19 of these participants failed the IMC 
(Oppenheimer et al., 2009) twice and\or three test items, which were added in random 
parts of the main task. The remaining sample contained 107 participants (n = 57 
women; n = 50 men), with a mean age of 37.11 years (SD = 12.56). 
Materials and procedure.  Participants were instructed to rate the similarities 
between Schwartz’s human values (e.g., authority, loyal), and the four higher order 
values (e.g., self-enhancement, conservation). Participants were presented with one 
main value on the top of the screen, and then asked to rate the extent to which this value 
is similar to each of the four higher order values, using a slider scale from 0 (not at all) 
to 100 (extremely).  Participants clicked and moved the slider towards the response 
option that best indicated their personal answer regarding the similarity of each pair. An 
example of the task can be seen below (Figure 2.8). 
 
Figure 2.8. Example of Task (Study 4) 
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Results and Discussion 
The matrix was created using the means from all value comparisons (value items 
x higher order values). Once again, an ordinal MDS (PROXSCAL; Torgerson 
configuration) indicated good model fit (Stress-I = .05; recommended lower than .37; 
Sturrock & Rocha, 2000). Accepting my portion in life and sense of belonging 
contributed most to the total stress.  The final spatial plane can be seen in Figure 2.9. 
Protest analysis indicated a good fit to Schwartz’s model, rm = .68, p ≤ .001. 
Notwithstanding this replication, the spatial plane indicates that openness and 
self-enhancement values exhibited better fit to their respective higher order values, 
being more clustered together, whereas self-transcendence and conservation values were 
more widely separated in the special plane.  One possible explanation for these findings 
was provided in Schwartz’s refined theory (Schwartz et al., 2012), in which the authors 
divided the 10 value types of the original model into 19 value types.  Both self-
transcendence and conservation were divided into more subcategories than the other 
two higher order values, indicating a higher diversity.  Therefore, their spread of 
positions in my results might indicate more diverse concepts in these higher order 
values.  
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Figure 2.9. Value positions according to their similarities to the value types (Study 4). 
Study 5 
Study 5 asked participants to use the dimensions from Schwartz’s theory to plot 
the values.  Unlike the prior studies, this method did not ask participants to rate 
similarities between items, but rather to pin their location onto the self-enhancement vs 
self-transcendence and the openness vs conservation dimensions.  If a value is placed 
closer to one end in either or both dimensions, this end would be considered more 
characteristic or similar to the value.  This method enabled us to examine the conceptual 
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map when participants think about the dimensions themselves.  The method was useful 
because the dimensions are important core features of the model, as it relies on a two-
dimensional space with implicitly contrasting motives.  In addition, the method is more 
direct insofar as it plots participants’ responses without any further transformation, 
unlike MDS.  Study 5 also probed whether the findings can be replicated in Brazil. 
Method 
Participants.  In the United Kingdom, participants were 180 psychology 
students, who took part for course credit.  Thirteen participants were excluded from the 
analyses: participants who failed the IMC (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) twice and/or two 
or more of four test items (e.g., "please, select the first option in the scale") that were 
added in random parts of the study.  The remaining sample contained 167 participants 
(n = 150 women; n = 17 men) and the mean age was 19.82 (SD = 3.12).  In Brazil, 
participants were 94 individuals from the general population.  Those who failed the 
IMC twice and/or the test items were excluded from the analysis.  The remaining 
sample included 86 Brazilians (n = 40 women; n = 46 men) and the mean age was 27.21 
(SD = 9.08).  
Materials and procedure.  Participants read a brief summary of Schwartz’s 
(1992) theory to ensure they understood the dimensions described in the model.  Next, 
they were instructed to position the human values (e.g., an exciting life) on each 
dimension of Schwartz’s model (e.g., self-enhancement vs self-transcendence), based on 
their personal understanding of these dimensions.  Participants used a 9-point bipolar 
scale, with the opposing higher order value domains identified at each end.  Values 
placed closer to one end of the dimension should be more representative of that end, 
while values placed in the middle should share information from both ends.  The values 
were presented one at a time. An example can be seen in Figure 2.10. 
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Figure 2.10. Example of task (Study 5). 
Results and Discussion 
In this study, the spatial plane was specified directly from the means of the 
values for both dimensions, with self-enhancement versus self-transcendence as the X 
axis and openness to change versus conservation as the Y axis.  This method allowed us 
to check the coordinates directly in the respective quadrants without needing an 
optimization function.  Self-enhancement values should be located in one half of the X 
axis, while self-transcendence values should be located in the other half.  Similarly, 
openness to change values should be located in one half of the Y axis, while 
conservation values should be located in the other half.  Due to the nature of this task, I 
expected the values to be positioned in their half of their respective axes, but not 
necessarily in specific quadrants – which visually would not represent the circular 
structure.  For example, some self-enhancement values may be more related to values of 
openness to change than to conservation, causing these self-enhancement values to fall 
outside of their putative quadrant.   
United Kingdom 
I present the findings for the UK and Brazil separately because they were 
somewhat different.  In the UK, the fit was acceptable, rm = .73, p ≤ .001.  However, as 
noted in Study 1, the rm does not replace a qualitative assessment of the common space 
plot, as is commonly used in the literature (e.g., Bilsky et al., 2011, Schwartz, 1992).  
Figure 2.11 shows all 57 human values from Schwartz (1992) theory positioned along 
the two dimensions in the model.  Eight (ST: Inner Harmony, Meaning in Life, Mature 
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Love, A Spiritual Life, Wisdom, True Friendship; CO: Sense of Belonging; OP: 
Privacy) of the 57 values were positioned in the opposite half of the higher-order value 
dimension.  Of importance, in Schwartz and Sagiv’s (1995) research assessing value 
structure cross-culturally, six of these eight values were highlighted as presenting an 
inconsistent position across the spatial maps. Therefore, some of the deviations were 
replicated in my study. 
Of interest, six of the eight shifts in location occurred for self-transcendence 
values.  One shift arose for a conservation value, and one openness to change value.  
Although some of these eight exceptions were near the middle of the scale (sense of 
belonging, true friendship, a spiritual life, privacy), indicating only small deviations, 
many of the self-transcendence values were much further from their predicted side of 
the dimension.  This finding may indicate more conceptual variability in self-
transcendence values. 
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Figure 2.11. Values placed along Schwartz’s value dimensions (UK; Study 5). 
Brazil 
Once again, the fit was acceptable, rm = .72, p ≤ .001.  As Figure 2.12 reveals, 
nine (ST: Inner Harmony, Meaning in Life; CO: Healthy, Sense of Belonging, Humble, 
Reciprocation of Favors, Politeness; OP: Privacy, Self-respect) of the 57 values were 
positioned in the opposite of the predicted side of the higher order value dimension.  
Five of these values were also considered inconsistent in Schwartz and Sagiv’s (1995) 
cross-cultural research. Four of the nine mispositioned values were also misplaced in 
the British sample (sense of belonging, inner harmony, meaning in life and privacy).   
 
Figure 2.12. Values placed along Schwartz’s value dimensions (BR; Study 5). 
Overall, the findings showed clusters of the four higher order values, but with 
some of their items spread to unexpected positions in the UK and Brazil.  As a result, 
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the oppositions between the higher order values were not clearly supported, perhaps 
because participants positioned the values along both dimensions simultaneously and 
had therefore potentially made a trade-off when they saw a value fitting equally well to 
both opposing higher order value types.  For example, the value pleasure (openness to 
change value) might be considered by some participants to be more closely related to 
self-enhancement, while for other participants this value may relate more to self-
transcendence (e.g., some might conceptualise pleasure as as something personal, 
whereas others might see it as something social). Thus, their individual knowledge and 
interpretations of the values and the value dimensions matter when making the 
associations.   
Study 6 
In Study 6, I investigated the structure of all 57 values (Schwartz, 1992) with 
Pile Sorting, a method that has not been used before in value research.  Pile Sorting 
(also known as card sorting) is a powerful technique to assess relations between items 
(Yeh et al., 2014).  In my study, participants sorted the values into a number of 
piles\groups chosen by each participant individually, based on how similar they judged 
the values to be.  Through the piles\groups, a distance\proximity matrix can be created, 
allowing me to perform a MDS to assess the structure of conceptual relations between 
values. 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 129 individuals (Mage = 37.85; SD = 12.80) who 
were recruited from Great Britain online through Prolific Academic (n = 64 women; n = 
56 men; 9 missing).  All participants passed the IMC (Oppenheimer et al., 2009).  
Materials and procedure.  Participants were presented a list of all 57 values 
(e.g., responsible, moderate) from Schwartz’s (1992) value model, and were asked to 
65 
 
 
 
arrange these values into categories, based on how similar they personally think the 
values are.  Participants arranged the values using a drag-and-drop method, freely 
creating as many groups\piles as they saw fit to place the values, in a way that made 
most sense to them.  Participants were asked to place the values that they judged to be 
more similar in the same group\pile, and they could also move values between groups, 
if necessary.  This task was presented through the website https://www.usabilitest.com/. 
An example can be seen in Figure 2.13, wherein the space on the right is used to order 
the values listed on the left-hand side. 
 
Figure 2.13. Example of the value pile sorting task (Study 6). 
Results and Discussion 
In the first step of the analysis, a matrix was created based on how many times 
the values were grouped\piled together by the participants.  This matrix was composed 
of 57 rows and columns, representing each combination of values. For instance, if the 
values freedom and obedient were placed into different groups\piles by one participant, 
one point would be added to the total score of this combination into the matrix.  If they 
were placed together, no point would be added.  In sum, lower scores indicate higher 
similarities (or a higher number of times placed together).  Based on this similarity 
matrix, an interval MDS (PROXSCAL; Torgerson configuration) was performed. 
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Results indicated a moderately good model fit (Stress-I = .27; recommended lower than 
.37; Sturrock & Rocha, 2000). Accepting my portion in life and reciprocation of favors 
contributed most to the total stress.  Protest showed a relatively poor fit rm = .49, p ≤ 
.001, because openness and self-enhancement values, and conservation and self-
transcendence values were mixed.  The final spatial plane of values can be seen in 
Figure 2.14. 
 
Figure 2.14. Value positions according to value similarities (Study 6). 
This study was the first to assess the structure of all 57 values simultaneously 
using a method that has not been used previously in values research. Instead of using 
direct similarity judgments between all 57 values, I asked participants to group\pile the 
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values based on their perception of how similar the values are. The MDS spatial plane 
indicates an interesting structure. Instead of the two dimensions spread across the four 
quadrants, values were grouped into a single wide dimension. Self-transcendence and 
conservation values were positioned together into one end, with self-enhancement and 
openness to change values in the other. Although the findings support Schwartz’s model 
less than the previous studies, the grouping of values is still meaningful: Self-
transcendence and conservation have a social focus, relating to how individuals socially 
relate to and affect others; self-enhancement and openness to change have a more 
personal focus, regulating how the individuals express their personal interests and 
characteristics (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2012). 
One possible explanation for this clustering in two groups is the Luster-Splitter 
Problem (Weller & Romney, 1988). This is a problem commonly seen in a free pile 
sorting method, where participants are asked to create as many piles as they want, as 
long as the groups have more than one item. Some participants create just a few 
groups\piles, while others create many. This may lead to lower complexity in the final 
model, resulting in few conceptual distinctions than seen with other methods. 
Study 7 
In Study 7, I investigated the structure of all 57 values (Schwartz, 1992) with the 
Spatial Arrangement method (SpAM), another method that has not been used before in 
values research.  Participants were asked to arrange the values in a spatial plane using a 
technique developed by Goldstone (1994)) to measure similarity between items.  This 
efficient technique was also used in previous social psychological research, where it 
provided innovative results suggesting a substantial modification of the stereotype 
content model (Koch et al., 2016).  
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In addition, Study 7 included value importance ratings.  These ratings enabled 
me to test the motivational structure of values in the same sample as used to test the 
conceptual structure of values.  In this manner, I could do a within-study comparison of 
the findings to ensure that any differences between the models are not due to between-
study differences in samples.  
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 154 individuals recruited online through Prolific 
Academic. Two of them were excluded because they failed the IMC (Oppenheimer et 
al., 2009) and\or test items, resulting in a total of 152 participants (Mage = 37.93; SD = 
11.15; n = 105 women; n = 47 men), mostly from Great Britain (n = 146).  
Materials and procedure.  Participants were instructed to arrange the 57 values 
(e.g., honest, influential) of Schwartz’s (1992) model based on their similarities in a 
two-dimensional space.  The values were positioned together in the centre of an 
otherwise black screen.  The participants’ task was to spatially arrange the values using 
drag-and-drop.  Specifically, the task was to draw a value map where a greater 
proximity would indicate a greater similarity and greater distance would show greater 
dissimilarity, in a way that makes most sense to the participant.  Thus, participants drew 
their own value model in a two-dimensional space.  All values had to be moved at least 
once to finish the task.  One screenshot of the initial screen can be seen below (Figure 
2.15). 
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Figure 2.15. Initial screen from the Spatial Arrangement task (Study 7). 
Participants also completed the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992), 
containing all 57 value items from Schwartz’s theory. Participants rated the importance 
of each value using a 9-point scale (-1 = opposed to my values; 0 = not important; 3 = 
important; 6 = very important; 7 = of supreme importance).  
Results and Discussion 
Spatial Arrangement 
To analyse the data, I followed Koch et al’s (2016) script for SpAM.  Several 
steps were necessary before proceeding to the MDS.  First, the Euclidian distance 
between the values were calculated - that is, the distance between all the pairs of stimuli 
were considered.  As participants have different screen resolutions, I also divided 
pairwise sorting distance by the greatest possible distance (the diagonal of the screen).  
Thus, this division relates actual distance to available distance to account for screen size 
varying between participants.  Then, I averaged sorting distance separately for each 
stimulus pair across all participants who sorted that pair, resulting in an N*N (stimuli) 
matrix that I then subjected to MDS.  All these steps were fully supplied by Koch’s 
script.  The results indicated a good model fit (Stress-I = .20; recommended lower than 
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.37; Sturrock & Rocha, 2000), and an acceptable Protest value, rm = .71, p ≤ .001.  The 
final structure can be seen in Figure 2.16. 
 
Figure 2.16. Value positions according to value similarities (Study 7).  
The spatial structure (Figure 2.16) resembled the structure from Schwartz’s 
(1992) model: The opposing positions of the two dimensions emerged clearly across the 
four quadrants.  However, openness to change values were more clustered, while 
conservation values were more spread across the spatial map, merging partly with self-
transcendence values.  This mix might have occurred due to the social focus in these 
values, as happened in Study 6. 
Finally, I assessed the structure for each participant individually.  For 90 out of 
the 152 participants (59.21%), the Protest was significant; that is, the majority of 
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participants created Schwartz’s structure at least partly.  Examples for a very good, a 
medium (i.e., just about significant), and a very poor fit can be seen in Figures 2.17, 
2.18, and 2.19.  Following Gollan and Witte (2004), who found that “persons whose 
value profiles show a poor fit to the model are (a) younger than the majority and (b) 
endorse values that are usually considered less important” (p. 1), I also tested for 
moderators.  Specifically, I correlated the model fit index rm with the 10 value types as 
measured by the SVS, age, gender, and level of education.  Of these correlates, only 
education significantly predicted model fit, r(150) = .28, p < .001.  Higher educated 
participants were more likely to arrange the values in a manner that followed 
Schwartz’s structure.  This interesting finding may reflect effects of education on 
conceptual sophistication with values, or it may reflect effects of greater verbal ability 
on comprehension.  The latter speculation is in line with the reasons for Schwartz’s 
development of the PVQ (Schwartz et al., 2001), an alternative and more 
comprehensible measure of values as compared to the SVS (Schwartz, 1992).  Use of 
the PVQ has replicated the proposed structure better in less developed (and hence less 
educated in a Western sense) countries (Schwartz et al., 2001).  Thus, it is possible that 
this effect of education would be removed if the Spatial Arrangement task were applied 
to PVQ items instead of SVS items. 
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Figure 2.17. Example of good fit from a participant in Study 7 (rm = .72, p ≤ .001) 
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Figure 2.18. Example of medium fit from a participant in Study 7 (rm = .26, p = .049). 
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Figure 2.19. Example of poor fit from a participant in Study 7 (rm = .05, p = .99). 
 
Schwartz Value Survey 
 The spatial plane was also assessed using value importance ratings as typically 
used in prior research.  I followed the syntax provided by Bilsky et al. (2011), in which 
the MDS (PROXSCAL) is performed using a matrix of correlations between the value 
items, together with a restrictions file.  Results indicated a good model fit (Stress-I = 
.22; recommended lower than .37; Sturrock & Rocha, 2000).  Its spatial plane can be 
seen in Figure 2.20.  Finally, I assessed the fit between the similarity judgments and 
importance ratings spatial planes, with results showing good correspondence (rm = .74, 
p ≤ .001). This Procrustes plot can be seen in Figure 2.21.  These findings provide the 
first direct empirical evidence for correspondence between individuals’ conceptual 
mapping of values and their motivational structuring of their interrelations. 
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Figure 2.20. Value positions according to participants’ value importance ratings (Study 
7).  
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Figure 2.21. Procrustes rotation between importance ratings and similarity judgments 
(rm = .68, p ≤ .001). 
Chapter Discussion 
 The studies described in this chapter provided the first direct examination of the 
conceptual representation of values using similarity judgements, across a range of 
methods.  Using Schwartz’s (1992) value model as a basis, I asked participants to judge 
the similarity between his value items, value types, and value dimensions through direct 
comparisons (Studies 1- 4), to position the values among the two dimensions using a 
bipolar scale (Study 5), and to provide similarity judgments of all 57 values through two 
methods – pile sorting (Study 6) and spatial plane (Study 7).  Additionally, in Study 7, I 
found that 59 percent of the participants replicated Schwartz’s structure when asked to 
arrange the values based on their similarities. 
 Prior research has extensively assessed value structure cross-culturally (e.g., 
Bilsky et al., 2011; Borg et al., 2017; Hanel, Wolfradt, et al., 2018, 2018, Schwartz, 
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1992, 2012; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; Struch et al., 2002), with results providing strong 
evidence for Schwartz’s circular model.  However, these studies relied on participants’ 
ratings of the values’ importance as guiding principles in their lives, not considering the 
conceptual differences that may emerge between individuals.  It is possible that one can 
endorse two values (e.g., honest, influential) at different levels and at the same time see 
these two values as similar based on their content.  Therefore, it is crucial to assess how 
individuals interpret these values and compare them regarding their abstractness, as 
these semantic relations could have resulted in different value locations across the 
circular model.  To illustrate: the values honesty and influence might be judged as 
similar because it is (sometimes) easier to influence others while being honest.  
However, if we consider the spatial plane based in value importance in Schwartz’s 
circular model, these values are in opposing ends (self-enhancement vs self-
transcendence).  It is conceivable that the motives underlying the values lead to different 
locations from potential content similarities. 
 Despite the potential independence of the motivational and conceptual 
structures, the seven studies (using different methods) and nine samples (from United 
Kingdom and Brazil) described in this chapter showed broad consistency with 
Schwartz’s model.  In fact, when directly comparing the spatial planes derived in my 
studies to Schwartz’s value structure, results indicated a significant match.  Importantly, 
the structure was also consistent across the different value levels assessed in my studies.  
For instance, when comparing value items to value types, or when asking participants to 
place the values on Schwartz’s dimensions, the locations derived from the data were 
broadly consistent with the circular model.  This consistency also happened when using 
different methods to perform my studies.  Besides being the first direct examination of 
conceptual representation of values using similarity judgements, my studies also used 
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direct methods to collect data and develop a proximity matrix, such as pile sorting (Yeh 
et al., 2014) and Spatial Arrangement (Goldstone, 1994; Koch et al., 2016).  Despite 
some minor deviations across these methods, the results were also broadly convergent 
with Schwartz’s model. 
In fact, most of the deviations that arose from these studies were also found in 
previous research.  For instance, in Study 3, three values (health, privacy, and 
responsibility) were positioned closer to values from other higher order value types.  
These values exhibited deviations from Schwartz’s structure in prior research as well 
(e.g., Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2012; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).  Other 
deviations can be explained based on theoretical features.  In Study 4, for example, self-
transcendence and conservation values were widely spread across the spatial plane, 
while openness and self-enhancement values were more clustered. In Schwartz's refined 
theory (Schwartz et al., 2012), both self-transcendence and conservation values were 
divided into more categories, which could suggest a higher conceptual diversity than the 
other higher order values. Another example can be seen in Study 6, in which values 
were clustered based on their focus, rather than the four higher order values. Openness 
and self-enhancement values have a personal focus on how individuals express their 
personal interests and characteristics, and conservation and self-transcendence values 
have a social focus on how individuals socially relate to and affect others (e.g., 
Schwartz et al., 2012). 
One open research question is whether participants would replicate their 
individual spatial planes if they completed the tasks of Studies 6 and 7 a second time. 
Essentially a retest would allow a direct assessment of the stability and clarify the 
relations of the reported results with the underlying cognitive structures. This is in 
contrast to the more indirect evidence of stability between participants. In comparison to 
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the other studies of this chapter, these two studies are slightly more complicated.  While 
in the other studies participants had to simply make direct similarity judgments based on 
values’ content, in Studies 6 and 7 they had to create different groups\piles of values 
(values in the same groups are more similar) and to position the values in a blank spatial 
plane.  Therefore, if they had a chance to answer to the task again a few hours or days 
later, it is possible that they would have structured the values in an even stronger 
alignment with Schwartz’s structure. However, the extent to which the retest produced 
differences would potentially constitute evidence of instability in the underlying 
constructs. Given the evidence of agreement between participants, it seems likely that a 
retest would more strongly replicate Schwartz’s structure.  
The results from these studies are further discussed in Chapter 4. There, I 
explore cross-cultural comparisons with importance ratings in Brazil and United 
Kingdom as well as the overall findings across these studies and examine the locations 
of value-expressive behaviours.   
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Chapter 3: Mapping Value-Expressive 
Behaviours Through Similarity Judgments 
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Values and behaviours are closely related across a range of contexts.  For 
instance, Peterson (2013) found that values are associated with deviant behaviour in a 
work environment, such as being frequently late or disrespecting other co-workers.  
Indeed, highlighting and tackling values that lead to these behaviours might be a more 
efficient method to deal with the problems than changing relevant attitudes 
(Blankenship, Wegener, & Murray, 2012).  Similarly, Dov Seidman, CEO of the global 
firm LRN, stated that maintaining sustainable values (such as friendship, respect, 
loyalty) is the best way to show employees which behaviours are celebrated by a 
company (Confino, 2013).  Also, in 2014, the Department for Education in Britain 
emphasized the learning of “British values” in schools, including democracy, law, 
liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance, allowing students to challenge opinions or 
behaviours that are in opposition to these principles (Adams, 2014). Even research with 
artificial intelligence has shown the link: when reading stories, robots can learn about 
human values and appropriate social behaviours (Flood, 2016).   
Researchers have shown the role of values in predicting behaviours (Rokeach, 
1973) and also have recognized the use of values as post-hoc rationalizations for these 
actions (Eiser, 1987; Haidt, 2001; Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996).  Therefore, knowing the 
values to predict behaviour, and aiming to provide a better understanding of how these 
associations happen, in the present chapter I aim to elaborate a “map” of human 
behaviours, created based on abstract concepts of human values, and assess in which 
way the behaviours interact between them. 
Complexities in Linking Values to Behaviour   
As discussed in the Introduction (see topic “Values and other variables”, p. 28, 
despite the interest in studying the connections between value and behaviours, there is a 
lack of empirical studies assessing why these connections occur (Fischer, 2017).  One of 
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the possible explanations for this scarcity of research is that behaviours can be 
influenced by multiple values.  For instance, consider activists of a non-profitable pro-
environmental organization that aims to raise awareness of the use of pesticides in 
organic food.  The actions of the activists can be driven by the value ‘protecting the 
environment’ (universalism value), as they have their motivations based on saving the 
nature from perceived harms (pesticides).  But it can also relate to a range of other 
values, such as health (security value), or ‘ambition’ (achievement value), because 
activists might want their organization to grow and attract money from donors.  These 
motivations can also change across individuals, as some might endorse highly one 
specific value more than other individuals.  In sum, several values can influence a single 
behaviour, and these influences can also change from person to person, as they might 
have different motivations. 
These multiple possible relations between behaviours and values can also occur 
because of the different interpretations individuals attribute to them.  According to 
Vallacher and Wegner (1987, 2014), in their Theory of Action Identification, 
individuals are able to provide different alternative identities for common actions of 
every sort, because of psychological and social processes.  For instance, imagine that a 
friend of yours is climbing a mountain.  One individual that is not familiar with the 
activity, can generically define this action as an adventure, or simply climbing the 
mountain.  One more experienced in climbing, can say that the action represents an 
extreme and dangerous activity to test body limits.  However, if you ask your friend, 
s\he can simply say that it is just a way to relax and enjoy nature.  These multiple 
interpretations for specific actions have been a limitation in psychological studies that 
involve human behaviours, because of the variability across individuals.  Therefore, it is 
important to provide stable identities that offer reliable representations of what the 
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actors are doing (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 2014).  One approach that has been 
commonly used in value-behaviour research is to first ask individuals of a given culture 
to provide a list of what they consider to be typical examples of behaviours of a set of 
values (e.g., Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).  For instance, for a 
Brazilian a typical behaviour that expresses the value of "pleasure", could be holiday on 
the beach, or a Sunday playing football (cf. Hanel, Maio, et al., 2018).  Despite the 
significant results, this approach is not without limitations. Within-country variability is 
usually substantial.  Therefore, it is crucial to elaborate an extensive list with several 
typical examples of behaviours, as it will be more likely that the final list of actions will 
offer more reliable representations.  This approach was also applied in the studies of this 
Chapter and are further discussed. 
A further open question regarding the relations between values and behaviours is 
whether the possible outcomes are understood as personally interesting.  This is 
addressed in the expectancy-value theory, which attempts to encompass the gap 
between knowing and doing (Feather, 1982).  Basically, this approach refers to the 
expectations and subjective valuation of the outcomes (i.e., whether attractive, aversive, 
or mixed) that may follow a specific behaviour (Feather, 1992).  In other words, how an 
action can be understood regarding the means-end structures.  For instance, imagine that 
a man was invited to go out on a Sunday afternoon by a woman he is interested in. 
However, he has some work to get done by Monday.  Whatever action he decides to 
perform will result in different outcomes.  If he decides to go out with the woman, he 
could have a good time and further develop a relationship.  However, it could risk 
problems at work.  If he decides to get his work done, he might never get a second 
chance with the woman.  In this case, the behaviour chosen will depend on his own 
expectations about whether the action can be properly performed, its potential 
85 
 
 
 
outcomes, and the subjective values linked to the action and the possible outcomes 
(Feather, 1990).  Therefore, if the man in the example has high endorsement levels of 
values such as responsible and self-discipline, expect to have a higher chance of success 
on the work, and see that outcomes as more attractive, it is likely that he will choose to 
perform such action.  When making direct comparisons of similarity, it is unlikely that 
the possible outcomes would present an influence, because these comparisons are not 
based on personal importance attributed to the behaviours, neither their benefits.  
However, it should be emphasized the impact of expectations and subjective valuation 
of the outcomes when linking human values to behaviours.  
In prior research, Bardi and Schwartz (2003) asked participants in three studies 
to rate the importance of diverse values measured in Schwartz’s model, in addition to 
the frequency with which they performed a large set of related behaviours in a one-year 
interval, in an attempt to map behaviours along Schwartz’s motivational continuum.  
Results showed an interesting pattern of correlations.  For example, the frequency with 
which participants performed behaviours extracted from the value types of tradition 
(e.g., observe traditional customs on holidays) and stimulation (e.g., do unconventional 
things) were highly correlated with the importance participants attributed to the 
behaviours' respective values (e.g., devout, a varied life).  Behaviours extracted from 
hedonism, self-direction, universalism, and power values showed moderate correlations 
with their respective values, whereas behaviours extracted from security, conformity, 
benevolence, and achievement values showed only weak correlations with their 
respective behaviours.  In fact, the latter sets of values and behaviour also exhibited 
some minor deviations from expectations: for example, conformity values did not 
correlate with their respective behaviours, but correlated with behaviours from tradition 
values, an adjacent value type.  When assessing the correlations between the behaviours 
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and the 10 value types, the sine wave (see p. 32) was worst for behaviours derived from 
universalism and benevolence, but good for all other behaviours, especially from 
tradition, stimulation, and hedonism (Hanel, Zacharopoulos, et al., 2017).  This pattern 
suggests that behaviours associated with universalism and benevolence values are not 
associated with many of the other value types in the predicted fashion (i.e., lower 
correlations with orthogonal values and lowest correlation – more toward -1 – with 
opposing values). For example, the benevolence behaviours were positively associated 
with benevolence values, as predicted, but negatively associated with universalism and 
self-direction values, adjacent value types, and uncorrelated with achievement, the 
opposing value type.  
In other research (this time using the refined theory; Schwartz et al., 2012), 
Schwartz and Butenko (2014) assessed the relations between values and everyday 
behaviours from a Russian sample. These behavioural items were created based on 
those previously used by Bardi and Schwartz (2003), with the addition of others 
suggested by participants in a pilot study as appropriate for the context. The authors 
expected the values to be higher related to the behaviours that were chosen a priori as 
more likely to express them. For instance, hedonism values should primarily motivate 
the behaviours that were chosen to represent this value type, more than the other 
behaviours. Of the 19 value types, 18 showed stronger associations with the expected 
behaviours. When assessing the associations to opposing value types, 76 of the 85 
correlations showed a negative association (p < .0001).  
Interestingly, the MDS spatial plane between values and behaviours broadly 
replicated Schwartz’s motivational continuum with its congruence and conflict 
assumptions (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).  Also, the authors 
pointed out that it can be hard to explain the behavioural structure without taking their 
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underlying motivations into consideration.  As in previous research assessing value 
structure (see Introduction, p. 26), these studies considered the intercorrelations between 
value importance and the frequency with which the behaviours were performed 
recently, but did not consider the different interpretations participants can attribute to a 
value or a behaviour.  
Despite the positive results when structurally assessing the relations between 
behaviours and values, some complexities need to be considered. Behaviours from 
adjacent values do not necessarily occur together, and behaviours from opposing values 
do not necessarily exhibit the same motivational conflict as their underlying values 
(Bardi & Schwartz, 2003).  Another interesting complexity occurs because of the 
different levels of abstraction of the values (Hanel, 2016).  For instance, consider the 
values forgiving and meaning in life, both benevolence values. While the first is limited 
to a range of concrete actions, the second has a more abstract meaning. And with a 
greater abstraction, it might be difficult to obtain good concrete exemplars of 
behaviours for these values result in greater variation in how individuals interpret them.  
Also, as noted earlier, behaviours can express more than one value (Bardi & Schwartz, 
2003; Schwartz, 2013) and can also express other determinants (e.g., social and 
practical constraints).  Finally, as pointed out by Feather (1995), values not only 
influence the valence of actions and goals, but also help to identify whether the goals 
have attractive or aversive outcomes for the individual over a long-time frame. These 
complexities can complicate value-behaviour prediction, making it vital to investigate 
how abstract mental representations of values are instantiated in people’s minds (Maio, 
2010). 
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Value Instantiations 
Maio (2010, 2016) suggests that values are mental representations of ideals that 
can be examined at three levels: (1) a system level, which is about the relations of the 
values with each other, as in Schwartz’s (1992) model; (2) an abstract level, tapping 
how values are construed in relation to feelings and cognitions across situations, and 
refers to the importance that individuals give to value abstract concepts (e.g., pleasure, 
social order); and (3) an instantiation level, where a value is conceptualized in terms of 
concrete judgments and actions specific to situations.  For instance, the value of 
freedom can be examined according to its relations with other values (system level), the 
experience of individuals regarding the value’s own semantic meaning (abstract level) 
and, finally, the specific behaviours that people regard as promoting and threatening 
freedom (instantiation level). 
Because any value can circumscribe numerous behaviours (cf. Kruglanski et al., 
2013), a priori predictions about whether a value can predict a behaviour require a 
systematic investigation of which behaviours are the strongest instantiations of a  
particular values (Hanel, 2016; Hanel, Vione, Hahn, & Maio, 2017).  The importance of 
this is shown in past research (Maio et al., 2009) that exposed participants to stories 
about typical (e.g., discrimination against women) or atypical instances (e.g., 
discrimination against left-handed people) of behaviour violating the value of equality.  
Participants who thought about typical instances exhibited less discrimination in a 
subsequent experimental task than participants who thought about equality in the 
context of atypical instances, which did not differ from the control condition. The 
results supported the hypothesis that the impact of value instantiations on subsequent 
behaviour depends on the extent to which the instantiations are typical exemplars of the 
value (Maio et al, 2009). Therefore, it is important not only to assess how the 
89 
 
 
 
connections between values and behaviours occur, but also to assess how concrete these 
relations are, in terms of typicality. In other words, how good a behaviour is as an 
instance of a value. Not using a behaviour that is a typical example of a specific value 
can result in weak predictions (Maio et al., 2009). 
Of importance, the context can influence the instantiations that people include in 
their mental representations of values. Hanel, Maio, et al. (2018) found that individuals 
from different countries (United Kingdom, Brazil, and India) presented meaningful 
between-country differences in the behaviours used to concretely instantiate the human 
values, alongside high within-country variability. The authors also found that the 
individuals were able to match the instantiations presented to their respective human 
value, even if those were produced by individuals from different countries or created by 
the researchers. Therefore, although the participants had similar ideas regarding the 
abstract meaning of the values, as they were able to match them with the behaviours, 
they differed in which instantiations were most typical of the values. Thus, contextual or 
cultural variability is an important factor influencing value instantiations. 
The Present Research  
The aim of the present research is to generate spatial planes based on direct 
comparisons between the abstract level of values and behavioural examples. These 
behaviours were generated from values. These spatial planes enable a graphical 
overview of how the behaviours are related in the two-dimensional space embodied to 
Schwartz (1992) model.  In prior research, Bardi and Schwartz (2003) indirectly 
indicated that there may even be systematic exceptions to the pattern predicted by 
Schwartz’s model, because of the stronger value-behaviour relations exhibited by some 
types of values (e.g., tradition, stimulation) than for other value types (e.g., 
benevolence, security).   
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I employed different research methods across a pilot study (to generate the 
behavioural exemplars) and four empirical studies.  Prior research that investigated the 
relations between values and behaviours relied on correlations between value 
importance ratings and (usually self-reported) frequencies of specific behaviours 
(Fischer, 2017).   In contrast, I decided to examine the relations of value-expressive 
behaviours and (a) behaviours, (b) Schwartz’s 10 value types, and (c) Schwartz’s four 
higher order values.  As in Chapter 2, I explored the abstract nature of values, using 
judgments of similarity.  These judgments are commonly used in cognitive psychology, 
especially in categorization tasks (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Murphy, 2004; Oden, 1987; 
for more information, see Introduction). The use of similarities provides an alternative, 
and arguably more fundamental assessment of the mental representations of values and 
behaviours. 
In a pilot study, participants were asked to create hypothetical 
situations/behaviours for each of the ten value types from Schwartz’s model, following 
a methodology developed previously (Hanel, Maio, et al., 2018, Study 1). I asked 
participants from the general public to provide situations in which they find each of 
Schwartz’s (1992) ten value types relevant.  The situations were composed of different 
people (participants), actions (behaviours), and places (locality).  Based on the most 
frequent answers, I created a list of value-expressive behaviours to be used in the 
studies performed in this Chapter. The final list of behaviours can be seen in Table 3.1 
(Study 8). The full Pilot Study, with the most frequent words mentioned for each one of 
the value types can be seen in the Supplementary Studies (p. 150).  
Moreover, in Study 8 participants indicated to what extent the value-expressive 
behaviours related to their respective value types, providing an overview of how good 
the behaviours are as examples of the values. In Study 9, participants were asked to rate 
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the similarities between all the examples of value-expressive behaviours and the ten 
value types from Schwartz’s model. In Study 10, they were asked to position the value-
expressive behaviours among Schwartz’s two value dimensions, using bipolar scales. In 
Study 11, they were asked to make direct judgments of similarities between all value-
expressive behaviours.  If the behaviours are unrelated to the underlying motives and 
values, the spatial planes should be unrelated to Schwartz’s value model.   
Also, I replicated Studies 8-11 using a different set of behaviours, generated 
based on Hanel’s (2016) findings. These were applied to student samples and are 
available in the Supplementary Studies (p. 159). 
Study 8 
In this study, I asked participants to rate the extent to which the behaviours 
derived from the values match with their respective value types, using the methodology 
in Hanel, Maio et al., (2018).  In total, I used a list of four behaviours per value type in 
each sample, resulting in 40 behaviours.  In addition, I assessed the correlations 
between participants’ ratings of values importance and how important they considered 
performing the behaviours.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 114 British citizens. However, nine of them were 
excluded from analyses because they failed the IMC twice (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) 
and\or test items spread across the main task. The mean age of the remaining 105 
participants was 35.87 (SD = 11.85), with 54 men (51.4%) and 51 women (48.6%). 39% 
of the participants had an undergraduate degree as their highest education level. The 
study was run online at Prolific.  
Material and Procedure. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which 40 
behavioural examples relate to the values from which they were generated, using a 
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slider scale ranging from 0% (Not at all) to 100% (Extremely). They had to click on the 
slider and move it towards the answer that best represented how well the behaviour 
related to the main value. An example can be seen in Figure 3.1.  In addition to the 
behaviours used, nine situations were assigned to random value types (e.g., “feeling 
depressed” to the value type hedonism), to avoid eliciting high automatic agreement 
with items.  
 
Figure 3.1. Example of task performed in Study 8. 
Next, participants completed the Short Schwartz Value Survey (Lindeman & 
Verkasalo, 2005), which measures the importance of Schwartz’s (1992) ten value types.  
The measure includes one item per value type (e.g., “Power (social power, authority, 
wealth),” and participants rated the importance of each value as a life-guiding principle 
for them, using a 9-point scale ranging from 0 (opposed to my principles) to 8 (of 
supreme importance). Also, participants were shown the list of behaviours and asked to 
rate the importance of each one (e.g., "couples getting married at church"), using a scale 
from 1 (Not at all important) to 6 (Extremely Important).  
Results and Discussion 
The main objective of this study was to evaluate the fit of the behaviours to their 
respective values.  As can be seen in Table 3.1, most of the instantiations were 
described as more than 50% related to their respective value types. In fact, the only 
93 
 
 
 
exception was “Children eating healthy food at home”, which was described as 35% 
similar to the value type Conformity. Also, as expected, most of the value-expressive 
behaviours assigned to random value types were rated as less than 50% related.  
Table 3.1.  
 
How good the situations\behaviours are as examples of the value types 
Situations CODE Mean SD 
Benevolence    
Nurses taking care of patients in hospital BE1 80.60 15.30 
Mothers looking after their children at home BE2 80.60 20.68 
Volunteers providing food for homeless people in 
the community 
BE3 77.68 20.95 
Workers helping each other at workplace BE4 74.01 17.79 
Universalism    
Environmentalists planting new trees in the forest UN1 80.82 18.51 
Social workers helping people in their local 
communities 
UN2 75.38 18.20 
Zookeepers taking care of animals UN3 71.55 20.73 
Teachers helping students at school UN4 60.66 25.25 
Self-Direction    
Artists creating a new painting design SD1 83.42 13.77 
Authors writing a new book SD2 81.15 15.19 
Children drawing a picture at home SD3 76.70 17.40 
Students learning at school SD4 57.21 24.96 
Stimulation    
Skydivers jumping from a plane ST1 91.24 11.14 
Adventurers climbing a mountain ST2 86.21 14.79 
Children playing at the park ST3 72.26 21.02 
Athletes running on a track ST4 67.22 21.30 
Hedonism    
People going to a club or beach HE1 73.78 22.95 
Gamers playing at home HE2 72.28 23.43 
Teenagers having a drink in a pub HE3 68.50 26.38 
People eating at a restaurant HE4 64.71 22.64 
Achievement    
Athletes winning the Olympics AC1 90.01 13.33 
Students graduating from university AC2 87.56 12.69 
Employees getting a promotion at work AC3 84.28 13.95 
Teachers accomplishing their duties at school AC4 71.61 18.19 
Power    
Prime-ministers or presidents making decisions at 
parliament 
PO1 84.55 15.87 
Politicians giving speeches in town halls PO2 72.30 18.82 
Managers chairing a meeting at the workplace PO3 69.04 20.35 
Teachers disciplining students at school PO4 67.26 23.17 
Security    
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Police officers arresting criminals in the streets SE1 85.47 13.11 
Police officers patrolling the streets SE2 84.94 13.43 
Parents taking care of their children at home SE3 78.68 19.10 
Security guards locking doors in a bank SE4 75.28 20.92 
Tradition    
Couples getting married at church TR1 82.97 17.22 
Religious people praying at home TR2 81.42 17.03 
Priests giving sermons at church TR3 79.99 19.41 
Individuals visiting family at home TR4 67.64 21.93 
Conformity    
Students following a dress-code at school CO1 73.88 22.67 
Prisoners following prison rules CO2 72.89 25.64 
Workers respecting colleagues CO3 65.49 24.68 
Children eating healthy food at home CO4 34.93 28.53 
Test Items    
Cheat in a board game (Power) TEST1 46.94 26.41 
Gossiping about friends (Conformity) TEST2 36.99 31.85 
Disrespecting others' opinion[s] (Hedonism) TEST3 34.95 27.23 
Complaining about different points of view (Trad.) TEST4 27.21 26.40 
Constantly talk about your own life (Conformity) TEST5 25.77 22.51 
Criticizing another's religion (Benevolence) TEST6 15.66 18.78 
Feeling depressed (Hedonism) TEST7 13.29 22.84 
Finish coursework late (Tradition) TEST8 11.83 15.65 
Sleeping late (Universalism) TEST9 11.12 16.01 
 
Next, the correlations between the value types from the Short Schwartz Value 
Survey (centered) and the importance that participants attributed to each group of value-
expressive behaviours were assessed. As shown in Table 3.2, most of the value types 
presented significant and positive correlations with their respective group of behaviours. 
Indeed, a Welch's t test (t[10.57] = 11.408, p < .001] indicated that the correlations in 
the main diagonal of Table 3.2 were on average higher (M = .34, SD = .14) than those 
off the diagonal (M = .18, SD = .12).  However, the self-direction behaviours did not 
significantly correlate with their respective value type. But, as can be seen once again in 
Table 3.1, these behaviours were still considered representative of self-direction (> 
57%).  
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Table 3.2.  
 
Correlations between group of behaviours and value types  
Val\Beh BEN UNI SD STI HED ACH POW SEC TRA CON 
BEN .46 .31 .33 .27 .05 .25 .14 .34 .20 .38 
UNI .30 .44 .31 .21 .15 .24 .01 .03 -.02 .26 
SD .17 .30 .09 .19 .11 .20 .07 .12 .02 .12 
STI .20 .21 .16 .26 .26 .17 .01 .02 .07 .07 
HED .15 .13 .12 .14 .21 .07 .19 .00 .00 .15 
ACH -.03 .03 .15 .31 .24 .24 .27 .00 .22 .06 
POW -.10 -.06 .05 .22 .29 .18 .29 .00 .25 .13 
SEC .33 .30 .39 .28 .12 .27 .30 .39 .37 .39 
TRA .21 .03 .23 .21 .04 .22 .09 .24 .53 .37 
CON .22 .16 .24 .27 .13 .38 .36 .28 .50 .48 
Note. Numbers in bold: p < .05; Orange = Self-transcendence; Yellow = Openness to 
Change; Blue = Self-enhancement; Grey = Conservation. 
 
It is important to point out that some behaviours were more highly associated 
with different value types, even though these behaviours were created and judged as 
good exemplars of their original values. For instance, stimulation behaviours. Despite a 
significant association to their respective value type, they were higher associated to 
achievement, an adjacent value type.  At the same time, the correlations with adjacent 
values tended to be similar in magnitude.  For instance, conformity behaviours were 
strongest associated with their value type, r = .48, p < .001, but also correlated with 
adjacent value types (benevolence, tradition, security). This finding demonstrates the 
importance of recognizing the role of multiple values in behaviour, even when the 
behaviour is chosen as an exemplar of another, different value. 
One possible limitation of these correlational results should be highlighted. 
Unlike previous research, I did not assess how frequently the participants performed 
these behaviours.  In my study, participants were presented situations including 
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characters and places that might not be common to them, and participants rated how 
important these situations were to them. For instance, let’s consider the behaviour 
“Couples getting married at church” (a tradition example). One can value tradition, but 
at the same time not consider this behaviour important, because it is not relevant to the 
person individually (e.g., if not religious) and therefore unlikely to occur in their 
lifetime. The main goal of this study was to see how strongly the behaviours related to 
their respective values, with results indicating them as being more than 50% related. 
Given this support, I considered them for further studies. In the next study, I assessed 
their spatial plane through direct comparisons to the ten value types from Schwartz’s 
model. 
Study 9 
In the previous study I established how well a set of value-expressive behaviours 
related to the respective value from which they were derived. This was an important 
foundation for beginning to look at the principal aim of this chapter, which was to see 
how the behaviours are spatially arranged based on their relations to value concepts. 
Therefore, this study assessed the relations between these 40 value-expressive 
behaviours and Schwartz’s ten value types.  
Method 
Participants. One hundred twenty five participants completed an online 
questionnaire on Prolific, with two failing the IMC twice (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) 
and\or test items. Therefore, 123 participants were included in the analysis, including 54 
men (43.9%) and 69 women (56.1%), with mean age of 38.93 (SD = 11.32). 42.3% of 
the participants reported having an undergraduate degree as highest education level. 
Material and Procedure. Participants were asked to rate the similarity between 
40 instantiations (e.g., Working hard to get something; Solving logical problems) and 
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Schwartz's (1992) 10 value types (e.g., universalism, hedonism).  They rated the 
similarity of each pair using a slider scale from 0% (Not at all) to 100% (Extremely).  
To avoid boredom and fatigue, participants only rated the similarities of each one of the 
behaviours to five of the ten value types, randomly selected, yielding a total of 200 
comparisons. An example of the task can be seen in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2. Example of task performed in Study 9. 
Results and discussion 
To perform the Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), the mean similarity ratings of 
all 200 comparisons were calculated.  An ordinal MDS was performed using the 
PROXSCAL algorithm.  This algorithm creates a geometric representation of the data, 
respecting the proximity of the items (Hout et al., 2013).  The Torgerson configuration 
was selected as the initial configuration, also known as classical MDS. It creates a two-
dimensional representation of high-dimensional data (Brandes & Pich, 2007). To assess 
the model fit, Stress-I was used (Jaworska & Chupetlovska‐Anastasova, 2009), 
following Sturrock and Rocha’s (2000) suggested cut-offs. For this study, with 40 
behaviours spread across a two-dimensional plane, a cut-off lower than .35 is 
recommended. Results indicate a good model fit (Stress-I =.13).  Also, I assessed how 
this spatial plan matches a hypothetical spatial plane of Schwartz’s model, using 
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Procrustes rotation (for more information about the method, see Study 1, Chapter 2).  
Results indicated a good match between the spatial planes (rm = .79, p ≤ .001).  
As in the studies from Chapter 2, I used the convex hull (dashed lines connecting 
the behaviours) to facilitate data interpretation by providing the smallest convex set of 
behaviours for each higher order value from Schwartz’s model.   As can be seen in 
Figure 3.3, most value-expressive behaviours from the same higher order value were 
clustered together. In addition, the putatively opposing behaviours (based on the values 
from which they were derived) were in opposite positions on their respective 
dimensions, easily seen in the conservation vs openness to change dimensions. 
However, some deviations must be highlighted. The spread of the behaviours derived 
from self-enhancement values is large, with some of them visually opposing each other 
in the spatial set (AC1 - PO4), rather than being adjacent in line with Schwartz’s (1992) 
model.  Also, some behaviours derived from self-transcendence values were mixed with 
conservation behaviours, including "Teachers helping students at school" (UN4) and 
"Mothers looking after their children at home" (BE2).   
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Figure 3.3. MDS structure for similarities ratings between behaviours and value types  
 (Study 9). Convex hull: dashed lines connecting behaviour groups.2 
                                                 
2 Athletes winning the Olympics, AC1; Students graduating from university, AC2; Employees 
getting a promotion at work, AC3; Teachers accomplishing their duties at school, AC4; Nurses taking care 
of patients in hospital, BE1; Mothers looking after their children at home, BE2; Volunteers providing food 
for homeless people in the community, BE3; Workers helping each other at workplace, BE4; Students 
following a dress-code at school, CO1; Prisoners following prison rules, CO2; Workers respecting 
colleagues, CO3; Children eating healthy food at home, CO4; People going to a club or beach, HE1; Gamers 
playing at home, HE2; Teenagers having a drink in a pub, HE3; People eating at a restaurant, HE4; Prime-
ministers or presidents making decisions at parliament, PO1; Politicians giving speeches in town halls, 
PO2; Managers chairing a meeting at the workplace, PO3; Teachers disciplining students at school, PO4; 
Artists creating a new painting design, SD1; Authors writing a new book, SD2; Children drawing a picture 
at home, SD3; Students learning at school, SD4; Police officers arresting criminals in the streets, SE1; 
Police officers patrolling the streets, SE2; Parents taking care of their children at home, SE3; Security 
guards locking doors in a bank, SE4; Skydivers jumping from a plane, ST1; Adventurers climbing a 
mountain, ST2; Children playing at the park, ST3; Athletes running on a track, ST4; Couples getting 
married at church, TR1; Religious people praying at home, TR2; Priests giving sermons at church, TR3; 
Individuals visiting family at home, TR4; Environmentalists planting new trees in the forest, UN1; Social 
workers helping people in their local communities, UN2; Zookeepers taking care of animals, UN3; 
Teachers helping students at school, UN4. 
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In sum, most of the value-expressive behaviours were clustered with behaviours 
from the same value type, indicating that behaviours derived from values mirror the 
structure of the values when directly compared to them.  However, the abstractness of 
values and the potential for behaviours to express different values at once (Bardi & 
Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2013) also led us to expect some deviations.  The deviations 
I observed illustrate these issues.  For example, "Teachers helping students at school" 
was generated in response to a self-transcendence value type (Universalism; UNI04), 
but the content of the value can also imply, for instance, conservation motives, because 
it involves doing his\her job.  This might help to explain why this specific behaviour 
mixed with conservation across the MDS solution.  All such instances of intermixing 
between the behaviours and other values show that even the behaviours generated to 
represent particular values can be to other value concepts. 
Study 10 
In Study 10, I asked participants to place the behaviours along Schwartz’s two 
dimensions, self-enhancement vs self-transcendence and openness vs conservation. A 
value-expressive behaviour placed closer to one end of the dimension indicated that it is 
more characteristic of this end.  The method is useful because the two dimensions are 
important core features of the model, reflecting the contrasting motives.  In addition, the 
method is a more direct assessment of the value space in Schwartz’s mode insofar as it 
plots participants’ responses on the two dimensions directly rather indirectly inferring 
them via MDS. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 113 British citizens, including 65 women 
(57.5%) and 48 men (42.5%), with a mean age of 37.48 (SD = 12.21), 40.7% of the 
participants had an undergraduate degree as their highest level of education. No 
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participants failed the IMC (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and\or test items. The study was 
run online at Prolific.  
Material and procedure. Before engaging in the task, participants were 
presented to a one-paragraph summary of Schwartz’s (1992) theory, explaining how the 
two dimensions are specified.  Next, they were asked to position the behaviours 
between the opposing ends on each of his two dimensions. As shown in Figure 3.4, 
participants used a 9-point bipolar scale, with the opposing higher-order value domains 
identified at each end. Behaviours that participants place closer to one end should be 
more representative of that end of the dimension.  
 
Figure 3.4. Example of task performed in Study 10. 
Results and discussion 
The spatial plane (Figure 5) was plotted from the means of the values for both 
dimensions, with self-enhancement versus self-transcendence on the x-axis and 
openness to change versus conservation on the y-axis.  This method allows the 
coordinates of values in the model to be directly checked without needing any 
optimization of fit.  Value-expressive behaviours originating from self-enhancement 
values should be on the left of the x-axis, while those originated from self-
transcendence values should be on the right. Similarly, the openness to change 
behaviours should appear in at the top the y-axis, with conservation behaviours at the 
bottom.  
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Most of the behaviours aligned with the dimensions from Schwartz’s theory, as 
can be seen in Figure 3.5.  That is, (1) most of the behaviours promoting self-
enhancement values were more likely to occur on the self-enhancement end of the self-
enhancement-to-self-transcendence value dimension than on the other end, which 
comprised most of the behaviours promoting self-transcendence values, and (2) most of 
the behaviours promoting conservation values were more likely to occur on the 
conservation end of the conservation-to-openness dimension than on the other end, 
which comprised most of the behaviours promoting openness values. However, the 
positions of the behaviours only slightly resembled Schwartz’s model, despite of the 
significant match with Schwartz’s hypothetical configuration (rm = .71, p ≤ .001). 
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Figure 3.5. Behaviours placed among Schwartz’s dimensions (Study 10).3 
Regarding the deviations of the value-expressive behaviours from the model, six 
behaviours were positioned at the opposite end of the dimension from the values they 
were derived from. Three from self-enhancement end positioned slightly towards self-
transcendence, and three conservation behaviours positioned towards openness to 
change. Thus, individuals might think of the behaviours through different motivations. 
For example, "Teachers disciplining students at school" (PO4) is supposed to be an 
example from self-enhancement.  However, one can interpret this behaviour as with a 
self-transcendence motivation, seeing this disciplining as something that aims to help 
the students, instead of seeing it as a demonstration of power or authority from the 
teacher. Another example is "Children eating healthy food at home" (CO4), which was 
previously seen as not well related to its respective value type (see Study 8). Despite 
this behaviour example derived from conservation value types, one can think of that as 
an opportunity to try new and alternative types of food, pursuing innovative ways. The 
other behaviours were "Prime-ministers or presidents making decisions at parliament" 
(PO1), "Teachers accomplishing their duties at school" (AC4), "Workers respecting 
colleagues" (CO3), and "Individuals visiting family at home" (TR4). 
                                                 
3 Athletes winning the Olympics, AC1; Students graduating from university, AC2; Employees 
getting a promotion at work, AC3; Teachers accomplishing their duties at school, AC4; Nurses taking 
care of patients in hospital, BE1; Mothers looking after their children at home, BE2; Volunteers providing 
food for homeless people in the community, BE3; Workers helping each other at workplace, BE4; 
Students following a dress-code at school, CO1; Prisoners following prison rules, CO2; Workers 
respecting colleagues, CO3; Children eating healthy food at home, CO4; People going to a club or beach, 
HE1; Gamers playing at home, HE2; Teenagers having a drink in a pub, HE3; People eating at a 
restaurant, HE4; Prime-ministers or presidents making decisions at parliament, PO1; Politicians giving 
speeches in town halls, PO2; Managers chairing a meeting at the workplace, PO3; Teachers disciplining 
students at school, PO4; Artists creating a new painting design, SD1; Authors writing a new book, SD2; 
Children drawing a picture at home, SD3; Students learning at school, SD4; Police officers arresting 
criminals in the streets, SE1; Police officers patrolling the streets, SE2; Parents taking care of their 
children at home, SE3; Security guards locking doors in a bank, SE4; Skydivers jumping from a plane, 
ST1; Adventurers climbing a mountain, ST2; Children playing at the park, ST3; Athletes running on a 
track, ST4; Couples getting married at church, TR1; Religious people praying at home, TR2; Priests 
giving sermons at church, TR3; Individuals visiting family at home, TR4; Environmentalists planting new 
trees in the forest, UN1; Social workers helping people in their local communities, UN2; Zookeepers 
taking care of animals, UN3; Teachers helping students at school, UN4 
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Study 11 
The aim of Study 11 was to examine the relations among behaviours by having 
participants compare 40 behaviours pairwise. Comparing behaviours with behaviours, 
allows a direct assessment of whether they result in the same motivational space as 
values, even without participants’ explicit considerations of the values. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 135 British citizens. Four failed the IMC twice 
(Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and\or test items, leaving 131 participants with a mean age 
of 39.48 (SD = 11.43), including 71 women (54.2%) and 60 men (45.8%). 44.3% of the 
participants had an undergraduate degree as highest education level. The study was run 
online at Prolific.  
Material and Procedure. Participants were asked to rate to the extent to which 
all forty behaviours are similar, one to another, using a slider scale ranging from 0% 
(Not at all) to 100% (Extremely). One example can be seen in the Figure 3.6. Because 
the total number of comparisons was high (780), participants were only presented with a 
randomly selected one-third of them (260).  
 
Figure 3.6. Example of task performed in Study 11. 
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Results and discussion 
An ordinal MDS was performed using the PROXSCAL algorithm, and 
Torgerson configuration.  Once again, the results indicated a good model fit (Stress-I = 
.23; which is lower than the recommended level of .35; Sturrock & Rocha, 2000). The 
structure of the behaviours (Figure 3.7) was in line with Schwartz’s model (rm = .59, p ≤ 
.001).  
 
 
Figure 3.7. MDS spatial plane based on behaviours similarities (Study 11). 
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Although these behaviours originated from values in Schwartz’s model and the 
significant congruence to a hypothetical Schwartz’s spatial plane, the behaviours were 
not always consistent with the model.  As can be seen, openness to change and 
conservation (i.e., the grey and yellow dots in a triangle and diamond shape), were 
opposing each other. However, self-transcendence behaviours were mixed with both 
conservation and self-enhancement, in a position near the middle of the plane.  Some 
self-transcendence and conservation values were already mixed in Chapter 2 (Studies 3, 
4, 6, 7, and 9). This may have occurred because these two higher order values have a 
social focus, representing how individuals socially relate to and affect others (e.g., 
Schwartz et al., 2012).  Of importance, despite this deviation, the self-transcendence 
behaviours were more clustered, in comparison to the other three higher order value-
expressive behaviours, indicating a greater similarity between its behaviours.  
Interestingly, when assessing the content of these value-expressive behaviours 
without the influence of their value groups, one rational explanation for the structure 
can be based on the focus of these behaviours. For instance, most of the behaviours that 
are positioned at the left of the spatial plane showed a higher social focus (e.g., "police 
officers arresting criminals", "zookeepers taking care of animals"). The behaviours more 
to the right of the space tend to correspond to personal gains (e.g., "People eating at a 
restaurant", "Teenagers having a drink in a pub"). Another possible interpretation of the 
spatial plane can be based on how familiar the participants were with these behaviours. 
Despite their notable importance, the behaviours from the left might not be common to 
daily life ("Security guards locking doors in a bank", "prime-ministers making 
decisions"), while the ones from the right are more likely to be performed frequently 
("Gamers playing at home", "People going to a club or beach").   
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In sum, when removing any explicit influence of values, and making direct 
comparisons between behaviours, the alignment of the data with Schwartz’s model 
wasn’t as strong as for prior studies.  Openness to change and conservation behaviours 
were in opposing ends of the plane, however self-transcendence behaviours were placed 
in the center of the plane, mixed with conservation and self-enhancement behaviours.  
Post-hoc interpretations suggested that the behaviours are ordered along their focus 
(social or personal) or their familiarity. 
Chapter Discussion 
The set of studies performed in this chapter provided the first direct examination 
of the relations between human values and a set of behaviours generated based on these 
values.  The studies also provided the first spatial plane based on similarities between 
behaviours, removing explicit influence that values might have in the final 
configuration of behaviours.  I performed four studies using British participants from 
the general public.  In Study 8, I asked participants to rate how related they think a set 
of behaviours were to their expected value types.  Then, in Studies 9 and 10, I directly 
examined the similarities between the behaviours and the ten value types of Schwartz's 
(1992) model, and how would they be positioned among the dimensions from his 
theory. In Study 11, the spatial plane was used to assess similarities between 
behaviours, without the influence of human values.   
Previous research has replicated Schwartz's circumplex structure when plotting 
values and behavioural importance together (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz & 
Butenko, 2014), but these relied on intercorrelations of items and also restricted an 
initial configuration to both.  Some complexities should be taken into account when 
evaluating these relations, such as the fact that the assumptions of congruence and 
conflict do not necessarily apply to behaviours (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003) and the fact 
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that multiple values can be relevant to the same behaviours (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; 
Schwartz, 2013).  Therefore, assessing behaviours purely based on their similarities to 
abstract concepts of values is useful to provide a spatial plane of behaviours that 
considers how people interpret and understand the behaviours.  Also, asking people to 
judge the similarities between values and behaviours might help to reduce social 
desirability, as individuals are just giving their opinion about how they interpret two 
items, instead of making judgments of importance to their lives and how frequently they 
perform the behaviours.  All these things considered, it was an empirical question if 
these associations would replicate Schwartz's model or would result in a different 
spatial plane for behaviours than for values. 
The value-expressive behaviours used in my studies were originated from 
examples given by participants in a Pilot Study (p. 136). I used words (characters, 
places, actions) that were more frequently mentioned by the participants to generate a 
set of 40 value-expressive behaviours that were further considered as good examples of 
their respective value types (Study 8).  Using examples created by the participants is a 
crucial step to assess value-behaviour relations, because the behaviours were directly 
generated from mental representations of values (Maio, 2010).   
I used these value-expressive behaviours in direct judgments of similarities in 
three studies (9-11).  Consistently, the spatial planes showed congruence to a 
hypothetical distribution of Schwartz’s circular model.   However, deviations were seen 
in the position of some behaviours.  For instance, the behaviour “Teachers 
accomplishing their duties at school” (AC4) was originated from mental 
representations of the value type achievement and was rated as a good exemplar to this 
value type; however, when participants were asked to position it among Schwartz’s 
dimensions, it was placed closer to the self-transcendence end, instead of self-
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enhancement.  This finding may indicate that, when interpreting the behaviours, 
participants could be attributing different motivates to their performance.  In this case, 
some might think of teachers accomplishing their duties as a way to achieve personal 
success at school, demonstrating competence and hard work – characteristics typical of 
achievement.  However, others might think of it as a way to help students to develop 
their abilities and strengths, showing teachers’ concern for the students.   
It is also relevant to consider whether the value spaces generated in my studies 
are the result of the specific behaviours used.  First, it is important to highlight that the 
value-expressive behaviours used in my studies were generated based on participants' 
interpretation about what would be good examples of the values.  In prior research, 
using typical behaviours similarly generated resulted in spatial planes congruent to 
Schwartz's model (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).  Therefore, if 
new studies were conducted with a different set of behaviours - and these behaviours 
were reliably generated as good examples of values within the same type of sample, it 
would be likely that their spatial planes would consistently reproduce the main features 
of Schwartz's model (e.g., opposing higher order values).  Alternatively, the use of less 
representative behaviours seems likely to produce a space that correspond less well.  
Even though my studies used a different methodology, the behaviours also showed 
congruence with Schwartz’s model, with some small deviations, because of participants' 
different interpretations. Support for this prediction can be found in my supplementary 
studies (p. 159), in which I replicated the method used in this chapter with students as 
participants.  Even using a different set of behaviours, the results (further discussed in 
the General Discussion, Chapter 4, and Supplementary studies) were congruent with 
Schwartz's model, and even exhibited a similar pattern of deviations to those reported in 
this chapter (e.g., behaviours mixing with others from adjacent higher order values, or 
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being widely spread across the value space).  Therefore, it seems likely that using 
different methods and sets of behaviours will reproduce the main features of Schwartz’s 
model to the extent that the behaviours are representative of the values. 
The results from these studies are further discussed in Chapter 4. There, I link 
the findings of Chapters 2 and 3 chapter and then I further explore the direct 
comparisons between behaviours and values, the importance of motivations to value-
behaviour research, limitations of this research, and future research possibilities. 
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Chapter 4: General Discussion 
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What does it mean when people say that abstract ideals, such as freedom, 
creativity, equality, and power are important guiding principles in their lives? In 
psychological research, among other disciplines (e.g., political science), values are 
treated as essential guidelines to attitudes and behaviour, which require thought and 
contemplation.  In psychology, values are modelled as desirable, trans-situational goals 
that vary in importance (Schwartz, 1992).  Crucially, however, this trans-situational 
focus brings a level of complexity to the concept of values.  
For this reason, it is important that researchers have paid relatively little 
attention to how individuals interpret and understand values.  Models of values have 
attempted to map their conceptual space by plotting correlations between ratings of 
value importance.  It was an empirical question in this thesis whether the new tasks 
performed in my studies would generate the same value space as previously derived 
from correlations between value importance given the difference in theoretical basis 
between the two.  The tasks asked for judgments of value concepts (Chapter 2) and 
behaviours (Chapter 3), which should be less influenced by social desirability than 
personal value importance ratings.  I was therefore interested in discovering whether 
these tasks would reveal maps of values and value-expressive behaviours that closely 
aligned with our current understanding of values or differed from the dominant 
zeitgeist.  The results predominantly supported prevalent thinking about the motivations 
that interconnect values, while revealing important caveats. 
Prior to discussing the results, it is important to consider Pakizeh et al. (2007) 
who assessed semantic relatedness of human values, and whether they are empirically 
different to similarities in value importance judgments. In their study, participants were 
presented with pairs of values, and asked which of the values were more important to 
them. In another task, participants were asked to what extent pairs of values shared a 
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similar meaning. In addition, Pakizeh et al. assessed whether the discrepancy in 
importance attributed to each pair of values is related to their perceived semantic 
relatedness and found a significant association (r = -.26, p < .001). Despite the modest 
correlation, Pakizeh et al.’s research provided the first association between importance 
ratings and conceptual similarity.  
Mapping of Value Concepts 
My Chapter 2 focused on mapping value concepts.  My concept-focused tasks 
generally produced results similar to those from motivation-focused tasks (e.g., Bilsky 
et al., 2011; Schwartz, 1992).  When assessing how my value spaces match the 
configuration in Schwartz’s model using Procrustes rotation, results showed significant 
congruence across all studies. Also, across two cultures (United Kingdom and Brazil), I 
obtained a two–dimensional spatial plane that resembled Schwartz’s model, and which 
accentuates the assumptions of motivational synergies and conflict between the values.  
These consistent findings indicate that the conceptual representations of the values 
within Schwartz’s (1992) model align with the past evidence of their motivational 
interconnections, suggesting deep underlying relations between the two. 
It is important to highlight that my research utilized a range of methods to 
directly map the meaning of values.  When making similarity judgements, people are 
required to think beyond the motivational importance of each value and to explicitly 
compare their understanding of the meaning of the values.  I asked participants to make 
explicit comparisons at different levels (values, value types, and value dimensions), to 
group values according to their understanding, or to freely position the values across a 
spatial plane.  Thus, I was able to introduce different judgmental reference points, which 
is important for diverse social constructs. For instance, many decades ago, Asch (1946) 
observed how social traits like “cold” could take on new meaning depending on the 
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traits presented alongside them.  Also, when presenting different and new stimuli to 
individuals, concepts are triggered in memory, allowing people to draw conclusions 
about similarity between the items (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Minda & Smith, 2001; 
Murphy, 2004).  This concept mapping exercise explicitly builds these shifting 
perspectives into the derivation of the conceptual model. 
Cross-cultural comparisons: Importance ratings x similarities. 
Although I replicated Schwartz’s structure across a range of methods, there are 
some differences between my findings and previous research that investigated value 
structure in the United Kingdom and in Brazil.  In the United Kingdom, using 
importance ratings, the circular structure was consistently replicated across three 
samples (Bilsky et al., 2011).  For Brazil, previous research showed only minor 
deviations (value types merging or swapping positions; Sambiase et al., 2010; Tamayo 
& Porto, 2009; Tamayo & Schwartz, 1993).  The structure was similar in most of my 
studies, with the two opposing bipolar dimensions clearly arising.  However, some 
structural differences occurred.  For instance, in Study 2, the self-transcendence value 
types emerged closer to each other than the value types of the other higher order values.  
This finding is in line with previous findings based on importance ratings, which also 
found that universalism and benevolence tended to occupy the same region (e.g., 
Sambiase et al., 2010; Tamayo & Porto, 2009).  Also, in Study 4, self-enhancement and 
openness values were more tightly clustered than the other two higher order values.  
This finding might indicate that self-enhancement and openness values are composed by 
less diverse concepts.  Indeed, Study 6 found that self-enhancement and openness 
values were mixed together, opposing the self-transcendence and conservation values, 
which were also intermixed.  In this case, the structure indicated an organization based 
on the personal and social focus of the values.  Together, these comparisons show that 
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the conceptual clustering of values can differ from their motivational clustering, despite 
broad alignments between the conceptual and motivational structure of values. 
Deviations. 
Notwithstanding the support for Schwartz’s value structure across the seven 
studies, I also observed small deviations that warrant consideration.  For example, some 
values swapped positions with adjacent values (Studies 1, 2, and 3), some values 
clustered more than others (Study 4), some were grouped based on their focus (personal 
and social; Study 6), and some values were categorised differently in different nations 
(Study 5). These swapping and fluctuations in values positions have also been shown in 
previous research that assessed the circular structure (e.g., Bilsky et al., 2011; Fontaine 
et al., 2008; Schwartz et al., 2012; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).  For example, in the UK 
sample of Study 5, six of the eight values positioned in the unexpected end of the 
dimension are known for their inconsistency across cultures (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).  
Nonetheless, it is worth emphasising that my designs are better suited to drawing 
conclusions about the broad patterns of relations between values than about specific 
deviations, because I would need larger samples to provide more systematic conclusions 
about the reliability of specific deviations.  In this respect, the consistency of support for 
the circular model across all seven studies is more noteworthy. 
It may nevertheless be useful to consider whether there are patterns in the 
deviations that reflect inherent properties of the values.  Consider the findings in Study 
5.  In the British sample, six self-transcendence values were positioned closer to the 
opposite end of the dimension.  Specifically, inner harmony, meaning in life, mature 
love, wisdom, true friendship, and a spiritual life appeared in the self-enhancement side, 
even though the last value was next to the centre of the scale.  In the Brazilian sample, 
there were similar deviations for two self-transcendence values, and five conservation 
116 
 
 
 
values (healthy, humble, reciprocation of favors, politeness, sense of belonging) were 
found at the wrong end of the conservation-to-openness dimension.  These exceptions 
might have been more evident in Study 5 because of the way the task was structured.  
Whereas Studies 1 to 4 asked participants to rate similarities between the items, Study 5 
asked participants to place the values inside the two-dimensional space proposed by 
Schwartz.  By asking participants to make a choice inside the two-dimensions, they 
might have been more likely to notice instances where the values can serve varied 
motives.  In this respect, it is interesting that the six self-transcendence values may be 
relatively broad, inward facing, and focused on balance (e.g., inner harmony, true 
friendship, meaning in life, mature love, wisdom, a spiritual life) compared to other self-
transcendence values, such as equality, honesty, forgiving, and loyalty.  The relative 
focus on inward insight and balance may help to explain their flexibility in motivational 
construals.  For example, wisdom can be useful for one’s own career.  Similarly, the 
conservation values that deviated in the Brazilian sample may be relatively broad, 
indicating personal characteristics that are considered important to individuals, 
especially when compared to more concrete values from this higher order value (e.g., 
family security, national security, social order, respect for tradition).  Despite being 
exceptions and not the rule, these values indicate interesting ways in which particular 
values may readily encompass behaviours that simultaneously map onto opposing 
values. 
Overall, the multiple structure assessment methods used across my studies in 
Chapter 2 indicate that the conceptual interrelations between values and the 
motivational interrelations currently embodied in Schwartz’s model are closely aligned.  
It is relevant to recognize the importance of motivational relations between values and 
their role in understanding relations between values and other variables.  This 
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importance can be seen when assessing the sine wave (see p. 23) that emerges when 
relating the values to other psychological variables (e.g., political attitudes, personality 
traits; Caprara et al., 2006; Parks-Leduc et al., 2015).  For instance, why would 
universalism and benevolence both positively predict altruism when they are only 
conceptually similar (Hanel et al., 2018)?  We expect that they both predict altruism 
because of similar underlying motivation.  Also, as can be seen in Study 7, results 
indicate a correlation (after Procrustes rotation) between the spatial planes provided 
through similarity judgments and importance ratings.  Thus, my findings do not 
undermine the importance of the motivational interrelations.  Instead, they show for the 
first time that the conceptual and motivational aspects of value interrelations are distinct 
and convergent.  
In prior research, Maio and Olson (1998) assessed the hypothesis that values are 
cultural truisms.  That is, beliefs that are widely shared but rarely questioned.  This 
hypothesis was supported and raises questions on what basis people rate some values as 
important and others as less important.  Maio and Olsen suggested that importance 
ratings are mainly influenced by affective information, because of the strong feelings 
the participants attached to the more important values.  Further, by behavioural 
information (recollections of value-affirming behaviour), because participants often 
listed past behaviours (e.g., "I go to church each Sunday") as reasons to endorse their 
values.  However, one finding is particularly important to my research.  When the 
values were provided with cognitive support (which people usually lack of), 
participants' values were strengthened against value change.  As a result, this cognitive 
support for a value not only makes the value endorsement stronger, but also might be 
relevant to guide attitudes and behaviours.  Of course, in this research participants were 
asked to make personal judgments of importance, while in my thesis, they were asked to 
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make similarity judgments.  The point is, even though they were presented with 
pairwise comparisons, and asked to make judgments based on their understanding about 
values and behaviours, the cognitive support provided is likely to strengthen their 
judgments.  That is, when asked to think about the content of values and behaviours, 
and make judgements based on their cognitive understanding, it is likely that they 
would provide more reliable judgments. 
Mapping of Value-Expressive Behaviours 
The variability in conceptual locations of values across methods and cultures 
provides clues about their potential for variation in application to attitudes and 
behaviours.  Knowing how similar values are to each other might help to delineate 
future studies that focus on understanding their predictive power.  This has been a 
difficult task so far, because any particular attitude or behaviour can express different 
values at time (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2013). For instance, one might think 
of influential, a self-enhancement value, as relevant to some self-transcendence values 
(e.g., protecting the environment, equality), because the values may be interconnected in 
real-world contexts (e.g., using one's influence to promote recycling, making public 
speeches to end the gender pay gap). Therefore, the investigation of these mental 
representations can facilitate better understanding of the value relations based on their 
content, but also their associations to attitudes and behaviours in the real world.  
In fact, assessing the mental representations of values and behaviours can also 
lead to theory development. For example, in a prior research, using importance ratings, 
Aavik and Dobewall (2017) assessed whether the value health, simply defined in 
Schwartz's model as the avoidance of disease, could be broadly represented across his 
structure if further divided into subcomponents of health (e.g., mental health, physical 
health, social health). Using a large sample (N = 1818), they found that the health 
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subcomponents were spread across a third dimension, operating together with other 
value types and not limited to the location of the original value in the conservation area 
of the space– which doesn’t seem consistent with the assumptions of conflict and 
compatibility from Schwartz's model.  Their results can benefit any further research that 
might attempt to assess the relations of health to different variables, such as attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviours.  Following this idea, when introducing the mental 
representations of value-expressive behaviours, we are exploring concrete examples of 
these values, not limiting the interpretation to their abstract definitions.  The use of 
these examples can lead to a structure different from the one proposed by Schwartz, 
once the behaviours can interact with other value types from his structure rather than 
being limited to the position of the original value.  Making a parallel to Aavik and 
Dobewall (2017) research, these examples would work as the subcomponents of health 
(e.g., mental health, physical health, social health). 
One important thing to be considered is that to avoid general interpretations of 
the behaviours, it is vital to assess which of them are more typical to a specific culture.  
According to Vallacher and Wegner (2014), the identification of an action goes through 
multiple psychological and social processes, creating connections between the 
behaviour and mind. Therefore, it is important to provide stable examples of what the 
actors are doing. If a behaviour is not reliably typical of a culture, it is more likely that 
participants would provide more diverse judgments about them.  To avoid these general 
interpretations, instances of behaviours were generated based on individuals’ opinion of 
good situations that could represent the ten value types from Schwartz’s model (See 
Pilot study, appendix).  Specifically, participants were asked to present different 
characters, actions, and places, creating a full scenario.  The most frequent words helped 
to select common behaviours.  For all the studies in Chapter 3, I ensured that all 
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participants were British citizens and living in United Kingdom, to avoid any cross-
cultural influence over the behaviours (Hanel, Maio, et al., 2018).  Study 8 showed how 
these behaviours related to their respective value types. Participants’ answers showed 
that 39 of the 40 generated behaviours were rated as more than 50% related to the 
values types from which they were originated, except for one conformity example.  
Also, in this study, participants were asked to rate how important they judged the ten 
value types to be in their lives, and how important they considered each one of the 
behaviours.  The results of analyses of these importance ratings were not fully in line 
with my expectations.  For instance, self-direction behaviours did not significantly 
relate to their respective value type.  Likewise, some behaviours were more highly 
related to adjacent value types, instead of their own.  However, these unexpected results 
might have occurred because the participants were not necessarily used to engaging in 
the behaviours they were presented, despite the behaviours being considered typical of 
their context.  To illustrate, consider the behaviour “Athletes winning the Olympics” 
(AC1). This behaviour was considered to be typical for achievement.  Even for 
participants with a high score on achievement, this behaviour might be low in 
importance because they see it as an unrealistic behaviour in their daily life.  However, 
when simply assessing how these are directly related, based on their content and 
removing any judgment of importance, different results could emerge: winning an 
Olympic medal is one of the highest honours a professional athlete can achieve in 
his\her career, and therefore the behaviour and value are highly related based on their 
content.  With this in mind, I considered the findings that these behaviours are good 
exemplars for the values and used them in subsequent studies. 
When assessing the relations between values and behaviours, we need to 
consider the influence of expectations and subjective valuation of the outcomes that 
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individuals’ might develop regarding a specific action (Feather, 1992, 1995).  When I 
opted to learn statistics during my undergraduate degree, I had the expectation that it 
would be useful for a further career as a researcher, helping me to get a MSc. and a 
Ph.D.  When using similarity judgments instead of importance ratings, it is uncertain the 
role of expectations and subjective valuation of the outcomes.  For instance, consider 
the behaviour "People going to a club or beach" (HE1).  If we consider importance 
ratings, one might think of hedonism as highly important, but could judge the example 
as not at all important, as it might have several aversive outcomes (e.g., not enjoy loud 
music, do not like to dance, afraid of sunburns).  That is, the outcomes would influence 
the importance attributed to the behaviour.  However, when asked about the similarities 
between hedonism and such an action, it is unlikely that the outcomes would influence 
participants' answer, as I am not considering how important they might judge this for 
their personal life, but only their general interpretations.  Of course, s\he can still think 
of the outcomes of a specific situation when making these interpretations, but once the 
task simply requires direct comparisons to different values, these outcomes influence 
are expected to be minimized. 
Direct comparisons: behaviours and values. 
 Direct comparisons between values and behaviours were made in Studies 9 and 
10, using different methods and value levels.  In Study 9, participants rated the 
similarities between behaviours and all ten value types.  The resulting spatial map 
showed significant congruence with Schwartz’s model, with most of the behaviours 
clustered together with behaviours from the same higher order value.  Also, the map 
visually reproduced the assumptions of congruence and conflict, with conservation 
opposing openness to change behaviours, and self-enhancement opposing self-
transcendence.  Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that self-enhancement 
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behaviours were widely spread across the two-dimensional plane, which might indicate 
more variation in the way individuals interpret these behaviours, associating them with 
other value types.  Another interesting finding is how behaviours derived from self-
transcendence values mixed with behaviours derived from conservation values.  Some 
studies reported in Chapter 2 also found that self-transcendence and conservation values 
were mixed (Studies 3, 4 and 7), especially in Study 6, in which they merged into a 
single higher order value.  This mix might have occurred because of the social focus of 
these two higher order values (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2012). This social focus can be 
clearly seen in some of the behaviours from self-transcendence and conservation (e.g., 
"Nurses taking care of patients in hospital", BE1; "Parents taking care of their children 
at home", SE3). 
The spatial plane from Study 10 also showed significant fit to Schwartz’s model. 
One interesting finding is that both openness to change and self-transcendence 
behaviours were highly clustered, indicating high congruence between their value-
expressive behaviours.  In contrast, conservation and self-enhancement behaviours were 
spread across the plane, and even appeared at the opposing end.  One possible 
explanation relies on the motivations people attribute to these behaviours.  Consider the 
behaviour "Prime-ministers making decisions at parliament" (PO1), which was rated in 
Study 8 as a good example of power.  This behaviour can also be considered to express 
concerns for the welfare of others - and therefore, a good example of self-transcendence 
behaviour.  The multiple motivations potentially underlying the behaviours raised the 
question how the structure would look like if behaviours were only compared among 
themselves. 
Moreover, In Study 11, I removed the explicit influence of values, and 
performed direct comparisons of similarity to all 40 behaviours created. It was an open 
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question whether it would generate a new spatial plane or replicate Schwartz's structure. 
The results showed some congruence and some differences. Conservation and openness 
to change behaviours were in opposing sides of the spatial plane, but self-transcendence 
behaviours were positioned close to the centre of the spatial plane, mixing with self-
enhancement and conservation behaviours.  
It is also important to highlight that these studies directly comparing behaviours 
to values and between themselves were replicated using student samples, using a 
different set of behaviours. Consistently, behaviours were mainly clustered with other 
behaviours from the same higher order value.  However, some deviations were also 
noted.  For instance, behaviours mixing with others from adjacent higher order values 
(based on their focus: social or personal) or being widely spread across the value space. 
One interesting finding was noted in the replication of Study 11 (Supplementary Study 
4).  In both studies, despite of the significant alignment with Schwartz's model when 
considering the Protest analysis, the circular structure was not clearly present. However, 
a holistic interpretation of the findings suggests that behaviours more to the left of the 
spatial planes corresponded to a higher social focus and were less concrete examples of 
daily behaviours. The behaviours more to the right of the spatial plane had a more 
personal focus and are more common to daily life. These results indicate that, when 
removing the explicit influence of values in direct comparisons, Schwartz’s model is not 
fully replicated, even though the structure of value-expressive behaviours presented 
some features of his model (a division based on personal and social focus).  
Integrating Value Concepts and Value-Expressive Behaviours 
The motivational aspects of human values are central to understanding their 
implications, but conceptual representations of values are equally fundamental. The 
present research addresses a longstanding deficit in our knowledge of the conceptual 
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representation of values. By examining how these values are organised as concepts, I 
have shown about how people categorize and interpret values. This novel analysis 
showed conceptual links between values that are broadly consistent with the 
motivational relations predicted by Schwartz’s model, alongside small differences that 
warrant further investigation.   
I also assessed how these value conceptual representations were related to 
behaviours that were found to be good exemplars of values.  Using behaviours that were 
directly originated from people's mind is important to assess the value-behaviour 
relations, and to reduce any potential complexity that might influence them (Bardi & 
Schwartz, 2003; Hanel, 2016; Schwartz, 2013).  It was uncertain whether the structure 
from Schwartz’s value model would be replicated by the spatial plane composed of 
value-expressive behaviours.  These associations provided a novel point of view of how 
values and behaviours are related based on how people interpret them, without using 
personal judgements of importance. 
Together, the findings helped to reveal many of the subtle complexities that 
should be considered when tackling questions about the role of values in human social 
cognition and behaviour.  In the cognitive literature, the classification in terms of 
concepts occur based on the features that compose these concepts, grouping new items 
to similar old ones (Hahn & Chater, 1997).  This can happen in different ways, because 
these classifications are based on personal experiences and interpretations.  For 
example, think of different animals, such as cats, tigers, dogs, and wolfs.  Some might 
classify these examples as types of felines and canines, while others can classify them 
as pets and wild animals.  These, of course, are more concrete examples.  As abstract 
concepts, values are fluid in construals, despite being trans-situational in nature.  
Fortunately, it turns out that people can nonetheless map these abstract concepts in 
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systematic ways that reflect extant assumptions about their motivational relations.  This 
suggests that, despite the tremendous range of behaviours that may relate to values, 
there are core characteristics that enable people to detect their conceptual similarities 
and dissimilarities.   
Yet, values can predict behaviours, and my findings showed that behavioural 
connections to values are not as straightforward as the conceptual mapping of values 
suggests.  In fact, some complexities underlying the relations between values and 
behaviours were clear in my research.  Despite reproducing and being congruent to 
Schwartz’s model, the spatial planes presented some deviations from the behaviours 
expected positions.  For example, some value-expressive behaviours were judged as 
similar to values from both ends of Schwartz’s dimensions.  This model-inconsistency 
raised questions about the reasons for these associations.  One possible explanation 
regards to the underlying motivations that lead people to perform such acts.  In other 
words, individuals interpret these behaviours in different ways, seeing different values 
being more or less associated to the behaviours.  For instance, one might interpret the 
daily actions of a medic as associated to self-transcendence motivations, because of the 
intentions to help other individuals.  However, some can also interpret these actions as 
self-enhancement motivated, as a way to improve the medic's professional skills or to 
get more money from the patients.  Prior research has also alluded to the role of 
motivations in behaviour, (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz & Butenko, 2014), but 
research has not tried to model this effect. 
Therefore, while values are ordered along underlying motivations, the results of 
my research suggest that behaviours might also be ordered along value dimensions.  
Individuals generally consider the underlying motivations of the behaviours as well, 
rather than solely their consequences. If people would not take the underlying 
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motivations of behaviours into account, a behaviour spatial plane that aligns with 
Schwartz’s value model would be difficult to be obtain.  Of course, not everyone 
focuses on the motive of a behaviour to the same extent. Some people might focus more 
strongly on the consequences instead. These differences in judging behaviours are 
expressed in the deontological and utilitarianism inclinations of people.  In the 
deontological inclination, the individual cares about the intention or motive of an action.  
Thus, morality depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (Conway & Gawronski, 
2013).  In the utilitarianism inclination, the individual cares about the consequences of 
the actions.  The morality of an action is a result of its consequences (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013).  Therefore, the results of Studies 8-11 would presumably be more in 
line with Schwartz’s model (i.e., have fewer deviations) for deontologists, as they place 
more importance to the motive and intention of behaviours.  Individuals with a higher 
utilitarianism inclination would present more heterogeneous results. 
In sum, my research may be useful for future research that attempts to assess the 
associations between values and behaviours. Despite the congruence to Schwartz's 
structure, some associations between the value-expressive behaviours with values from 
opposing higher order values were found, suggesting multiple interpretations regarding 
these associations.  Most studies simply assume a priori that a behaviour has a 
connection to a value or set of values that is plainly evident, without empirically 
querying the motivations that individuals see as underpinning the behaviours.  Thus, 
one way to test which behaviours present a higher variation in their association to 
human values is assessing their relations through direct judgments of similarity, 
reducing potential desirability, and focusing on mental representations of values and 
behaviours. 
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Limitations 
First, one key consideration is whether there is an overlap between similarity 
judgements and importance ratings.  To judge the importance of different objects or to 
make comparisons regarding their similarities, we are subject to a cognitive 
understanding of what these objects represent.  Therefore, the similarity judgments 
performed would depend on individual knowledge, which can also help to attribute a 
higher or lower importance to something.  Imagine, for instance, that an individual, 
disappointed with his\her religion, decided to abandon it.  This change is likely to lower 
his\her endorsement of tradition values.  However, when presented with similarity 
judgments between these values and behaviours such as "Couples getting married at 
church" (TR1) and "Priests giving sermons at church" (TR3), it is likely that s\he will 
attribute a higher similarity, because of the content of these values and behaviours, and 
this is likely to be independent of his\her endorsements. However, although it seems 
likely to happen this way, the exact nature of the relations between importance ratings 
and similarity judgments is still only partly clarified.  In fact, prior research (Maio & 
Olson, 1998) has suggested that the cognitive underpinning of values is weak, which 
could raise questions about whether the structures found in my studies, using similarity 
judgments, are driven by importance after all.  If a participant rates the value of equality 
as very important to him\her, it is possible that s\he might want to rate broad-
mindedness or social justice as also very important, because they are similar, and s\he 
would like to appear consistent.  This could suggest that importance ratings are driven 
by similarity judgments.  Still, the importance attributed to some values can contribute 
to the way individuals interpret different situations, which can result in a partial overlap 
with similarities.  In prior research, Pakizeh et al. (2007) attempted to assess how 
semantic relatedness and importance ratings of values were related, finding a significant 
128 
 
 
 
association.  If the importance ratings had a major influence on similarities judgments, 
we would expect higher associations between them.   
Another possible limitation that can be pointed out is regarding the inequity in 
participants’ gender.  For instance, some of my samples in Chapter 2 had 
disproportionally more women than men.  However, Struch et al. (2002) provided 
evidence that the circular structure from Schwartz and its ideas of congruence and 
conflict are consistent across gender. The authors assessed data from eight cultural 
regions (e.g., Eastern Europe, Latin America, United States; N = 11,244), and results 
consistently showed no gender effects on value meaning through three levels of 
Schwartz's model (e.g., value items, value types, higher order values).  Therefore, 
although the discrepancy in the distribution, it is unlikely that this limitation affected 
my results.  Furthermore, three of my studies (4, 6, and 7) recruited from more general 
populations with more gender balance in the samples, and they showed no noteworthy 
differences from my other results.  
A small limitation of Chapter 2 is the fact that not all studies were replicated 
cross-culturally – only Studies 2 and 5. Similarly, in Chapter 3, I used solely British 
participants, which limits the conclusions we can draw to this population only. It is 
known that there are cross-cultural differences in how people understand different 
values (Hanel, Maio, et al., 2018), and behaviours (Hanel, 2016), and future research 
can benefit of collecting data in different countries. Also, these replications are 
necessary to provide further support to the methodology novelty. However, given the 
extensive cross-cultural similarities in value importance ratings (Hanel, Maio, & 
Manstead, in press; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), value structure (Schwartz, 1992; 
Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995, Schwartz et al., 2012), and some similarities in value 
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instantiations (Hanel, Maio, et al., 2018), I expect that my findings will be replicated in 
the future. 
Finally, one important question that can be raised is regarding the number of 
participants in the studies of my thesis, ranging from 69 to 167. Although a higher 
number is always desired, because of limited resources, the samples had to be restricted 
to these numbers.  However, the fact that prior results have been replicated indicates 
that the sample sizes were sufficient, and the participants were representative. 
Future studies  
Future studies could test whether my findings are moderated by individual 
differences. For instance, consider that in a hypothetical study, I divided the sample 
regarding individual levels of need for cognition (NFC), low and high. Need for 
cognition refers to the individuals' inclination towards activities that demand cognitive 
effort (e.g., playing chess, resolving math problems; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). It is 
possible that, when mapping values or behaviours dividing the sample based on the 
NFC levels, the spatial planes could present slightly different distributions.  Individuals 
higher in NFC could present a spatial plane with the values distributed in a more 
systematic way (i.e., according to Schwartz’s model).  These differences can also 
happen regarding how individuals relate to others, with some preferring to act 
individually rather than in a group (individualism and collectivism). More collectivist 
people could highly relate the value wealth to helpful and\or social justice, something 
not necessarily expected from individualistic individuals. Therefore, while I did not test 
for individual differences in this thesis – the sample sizes were too small –, it is 
important to highlight that the use of such variables could result in different spatial 
planes, and that this could benefit further studies.  Research could investigate whether 
such individual differences would generate distinct patterns of value similarities, and 
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consequently, novel spatial planes. In importance ratings, however, these differences are 
unlikely to influence the final spatial distribution, only influencing the value 
endorsement levels. 
Another important point that can be useful for future research is how some 
group of behaviours were more clustered than others across the studies.  For instance, 
despite their spatial mixing with behaviours from other higher order values, self-
transcendence behaviours (e.g., Nurses taking care of patients in hospital, BE1; Social 
workers helping people in their local communities, UN2) were consistently positioned 
together, more clustered, suggesting a higher congruence between the behaviours that 
constitute this higher order value.  Therefore, the variability when assessing good 
examples of such value types is smaller when compared to others, suggesting they have 
more solid core features.  Is this an influence of the behaviours in isolation, or are self-
transcendence characteristics more well formed in comparison to the other higher order 
values?  In my studies, individuals interpreted the behaviours derived from other higher 
order values more broadly, which could suggest more general characteristics to them.  
As a result, these behaviours were less clustered in their position.  These differences in 
how clustered the behaviours are can raise some interesting points. For instance, 
whether the higher order value from the behaviours are more widely spread could be 
further divided into other value types.  Is it possible that these less clustered behaviours 
present specific characteristics that differentiate them and that could be useful to 
distinguish a new value type?  Such findings could contribute with Schwartz’s refined 
theory (Schwartz et al., 2012).  Future research can also benefit from this clustered 
consistency presented by self-transcendence exemplars of behaviours.  It is likely that 
different behaviours would show higher congruence when assessing the predictive 
power of different values.  For instance, imagine that we want to assess the predictive 
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power of wealth (self-enhancement) to two self-enhancement behaviours.  Not 
necessarily will the predictive power be high for both, as the behaviours from this value 
type were widely spread across the spatial planes.  Now imagine that we want to assess 
the predictive power of helpful (self-transcendence), and two behaviours corresponding 
to this higher order value.  Differently from the previous example, it is more likely that 
the predictive power will be somewhat similar for both behaviours, once they were 
more clustered across the spatial planes – and therefore, are more alike in their core 
characteristics.  These may be useful questions for future research. 
Future research can also benefit by the fact that the use of direct judgments of 
similarities can aid theory development. This methodology can be applied not only 
using Schwartz’s value model, but also other (circular) models, such as the circumplex 
model of goal content (Grouzet et al., 2005), the interpersonal circumplex (Wiggins & 
Pincus, 1989), the circumplex model of affect (Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005), or 
personality traits (McCrae & Costa, 2003). It might also lead to the identification of a 
new dimension, as previously done by Koch et al. (2016), who modified the stereotype 
content model also using SPaM.  
In fact, similarity judgments can also be used to compare different constructs, 
like I did in Chapter 3.  For instance, one can focus on the emotional aspect linked with 
attitudes, instead of behaviours linked with values.  Imagine a task where participants 
would be presented with different emotions (e.g., love, happiness, fear), and asked to 
make comparisons to attitudes towards different types of animals.  One that might have 
positive attitudes towards dogs or cats that could indicate a higher similarity of these 
attitudes to emotions such as happiness or love, because of a hypothetical personal 
attachment in the past, while others could have negative attitudes towards them, and 
associate them to fear, because of being bitten when a kid.  Therefore, it is possible to 
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map different constructs based on cognitive interpretations of how similar they are.  In 
this example, it would be expected there would separation between positive and 
negative attitudes and emotions, and within these there could also be further distinctions 
– but this would need further exploration. 
Take the Big-5 personality traits as an example of how the methods proposed in 
Chapter 2 might advance our understanding of important psychological constructs. The 
five dimensions are usually confirmed through factor analysis based on ratings of how 
accurately people describe themselves on various attributes such as bold, creative, 
imaginative, or selfish (e.g., Goldberg, 1992; Saucier, 1994). However, the self-ratings 
of the Big-5 are influenced by social desirability (e.g., Bäckström, 2007); even 
rephrasing the items more neutrally did not fully eliminate social desirability 
(Bäckström, Björklund, & Larsson, 2009). Using similarity judgements would eliminate 
social desirability because participants are not asked to make statements about 
themselves, rather about how words are connected.  
Finally, similarity judgements could also be used to further integrate different 
personality constructs such as values and traits (Fischer & Boer, 2015; Parks-Leduc et 
al., 2015) to avoid problems with social desirability and also to test to what extent 
participants distinguish between values and traits. If participants distinguish between 
values and traits on an abstract level (abstract ideals that ostensibly help to guide 
behaviour vs how a person regularly acts; Maio, 2016), values and traits will form two 
more distinct regions in a spatial plane. In contrast, if participants do not distinguish 
between them, values and traits will be more mixed. 
Conclusion 
My research provided the first direct assessment of value similarity based on 
their conceptual representation, and how these are associated to value-expressive 
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behaviours. That is, the similarities underlying values and behaviours based on how 
individuals interpret them. With an exploratory character, it was unclear whether these 
judgments would generate a spatial plan that resembled the structure from Schwartz’s 
model of human values.  Results provided direct and indirect support for it.  Across a 
range of new methods, I found that Schwartz’s model can be directly replicated across 
and within participants.  When I assessed Schwartz’s model indirectly by investigating 
the structure of value-expressive behaviours, I found that participants made similar 
distinctions between behaviours that were based on the two value dimensions as they 
did for the value themselves. Thus, not only values can be structured based on their 
underlying motivations but also value-expressive behaviours.  
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Appendix 
Table of Contents 
- Scree Plots 
- Study 1 (Stress-per-point and Shepard Plots) 
- Study 2 (Stress-per-point and Shepard Plots) 
 - United Kingdom 
 - Brazil 
- Study 3 (Stress-per-point and Shepard Plots) 
- Study 4 (Stress-per-point and Shepard Plots) 
- Study 6 (Stress-per-point and Shepard Plots) 
- Study 10 (Stress-per-point and Shepard Plots) 
- Study 11 (Stress-per-point and Shepard Plots) 
 
Overview 
The Scree Plot was used to assess the number of dimensions across the studies 
performed in my thesis. For that, I considered the Stress-I values over four different 
configurations, of the spatial planes with one to four dimensions. 
The Stress-per-point tables indicate the contribution of each value\behaviour 
individually to the normalized raw stress (√𝑛. 𝑟. 𝑠 = Stress-I).  
The Shepard plots (also known as Shepard diagrams) indicate how far the data 
points are from each other before versus after being transformed in space. Ideally, these 
points should be placed on a straight ascending line (x=y). 
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Scree plots (1D, 2D, 3D, 4D) 
 
 
Figure a.1. Scree plots based on the Stress-I points over the studies multiple 
configurations (1D, 2D, 3D, 4D). 
 
Chapter 2: Study 1 
Table a.1. 
 
Stress-per-point values. 
 
Source 
Mean SRC_1 
Object Ambition ,0076 ,0076 
Equality ,0108 ,0108 
Exciting_Life ,0139 ,0139 
Freedom ,0292 ,0292 
Helpful ,0204 ,0204 
Independent ,0159 ,0159 
Intelligent ,0261 ,0261 
National_Security ,0234 ,0234 
Obedient ,0231 ,0231 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0,45
0,5
1D 2D 3D 4D
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 (UK) Study 3 (BR)
Study 4 Study 6 Study 9 Study 11
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Pleasure ,0188 ,0188 
Preserving_Public_Ima
ge 
,0184 ,0184 
Respect_Tradition ,0180 ,0180 
Self_Respect ,0430 ,0430 
Social_Justice ,0070 ,0070 
Social_Order ,0186 ,0186 
Wealth ,0401 ,0401 
Mean ,0209 ,0209 
 
 
Figure a.2. Shepard plot, Study 1. 
Chapter 2: Study 2 
United Kingdom. 
 
Table a.2. 
 
Stress-per-point values. 
 
Source 
Mean SRC_1 
Object Universalism ,0009 ,0009 
Self_Directio
n 
,0024 ,0024 
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Stimulation ,0019 ,0019 
Hedonism ,0007 ,0007 
Achievement ,0024 ,0024 
Power ,0018 ,0018 
Security ,0023 ,0023 
Tradition ,0030 ,0030 
Conformity ,0032 ,0032 
Benevolence ,0009 ,0009 
Mean ,0020 ,0020 
 
 
Figure a.2. Shepard plot, Study 2 (UK). 
Brazil. 
Table a.3. 
 
Stress-per-point values. 
 
Source 
Mean SRC_1 
Object Universalism ,0019 ,0019 
Self_Directio
n 
,0016 ,0016 
Stimulation ,0021 ,0021 
Hedonism ,0030 ,0030 
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Achievement ,0015 ,0015 
Power ,0026 ,0026 
Security ,0033 ,0033 
Tradition ,0027 ,0027 
Conformity ,0024 ,0024 
Benevolence ,0020 ,0020 
Mean ,0023 ,0023 
 
 
Figure a.3. Shepard plot, Study 2 (BR). 
Chapter 2: Study 3 
 
Table a.4. 
 
Stress-per-point values. 
 
Source 
Mean SRC_1 
Object A_spiritual_life ,0169 ,0169 
A_varied_life ,0048 ,0048 
A_world_at_peace ,0094 ,0094 
A_world_of_beauty ,0170 ,0170 
Accepting_my_portion
_in_life 
,0076 ,0076 
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Ambitious ,0030 ,0030 
An_exciting_life ,0047 ,0047 
Authority ,0090 ,0090 
Broadminded ,0125 ,0125 
Capable ,0042 ,0042 
Choosing_own_goals ,0038 ,0038 
Clean ,0312 ,0312 
Creativity ,0054 ,0054 
Curious ,0079 ,0079 
Daring ,0070 ,0070 
Devout ,0175 ,0175 
Enjoying_life ,0050 ,0050 
Equality ,0074 ,0074 
Family_security ,0072 ,0072 
Forgiving ,0048 ,0048 
Freedom ,0046 ,0046 
Healthy ,0150 ,0150 
Helpful ,0078 ,0078 
Honest ,0047 ,0047 
Honoring_of_parents_a
nd_elders 
,0040 ,0040 
Humble ,0078 ,0078 
Independent ,0032 ,0032 
Influential ,0193 ,0193 
Inner_harmony ,0072 ,0072 
Intelligent ,0072 ,0072 
Loyal ,0060 ,0060 
Mature_love ,0085 ,0085 
Meaning_in_life ,0046 ,0046 
Moderate ,0062 ,0062 
National_security ,0177 ,0177 
Obedient ,0055 ,0055 
Pleasure ,0053 ,0053 
Politeness ,0061 ,0061 
Preserving_my_public_
image 
,0169 ,0169 
Privacy ,0262 ,0262 
Protecting_the_environ
ment 
,0059 ,0059 
Reciprocation_of_favor
s 
,0046 ,0046 
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Respect_for_tradition ,0138 ,0138 
Responsible ,0154 ,0154 
Self_discipline ,0156 ,0156 
Self_respect_ ,0053 ,0053 
Self_indulgent ,0082 ,0082 
Sense_of_belonging ,0227 ,0227 
Social_justice ,0114 ,0114 
Social_order ,0096 ,0096 
Social_power ,0135 ,0135 
Social_recognition ,0094 ,0094 
Successful ,0029 ,0029 
True_friendship ,0094 ,0094 
Unity_with_nature ,0163 ,0163 
Wealth ,0059 ,0059 
Wisdom ,0203 ,0203 
Mean ,0098 ,0098 
 
 
Figure a.4. Shepard plot, Study 3. 
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Chapter 2: Study 4 
Table a.5. 
 
Stress-per-point values. 
 
Source 
Mean SRC_1 
Object Ambitious ,0012 ,0012 
Capable ,0007 ,0007 
Influential ,0023 ,0023 
Intelligent ,0010 ,0010 
Successful ,0018 ,0018 
A_spiritual_life ,0015 ,0015 
Forgiving ,0014 ,0014 
Helpful ,0010 ,0010 
Honest ,0014 ,0014 
Loyal ,0030 ,0030 
Mature_love ,0007 ,0007 
Meaning_in_life ,0009 ,0009 
Responsible ,0016 ,0016 
True_friendship ,0013 ,0013 
Honoring_of_parents_a
nd_elders 
,0021 ,0021 
Obedient ,0047 ,0047 
Politeness ,0019 ,0019 
Self_discipline ,0071 ,0071 
Enjoying_life ,0012 ,0012 
Pleasure ,0009 ,0009 
Self_indulgent ,0007 ,0007 
Authority ,0008 ,0008 
Preserving_my_public_
image 
,0026 ,0026 
Social_power ,0023 ,0023 
Social_recognition ,0072 ,0072 
Wealth ,0021 ,0021 
Choosing_own_goals ,0030 ,0030 
Creativity ,0024 ,0024 
Curious ,0016 ,0016 
Freedom ,0012 ,0012 
Independent ,0024 ,0024 
Privacy ,0026 ,0026 
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Self_respect_ ,0013 ,0013 
Clean ,0024 ,0024 
Family_security ,0026 ,0026 
Healthy ,0042 ,0042 
National_security ,0025 ,0025 
Reciprocation_of_favor
s 
,0106 ,0106 
Sense_of_belonging ,0149 ,0149 
Social_order ,0028 ,0028 
A_varied_life ,0015 ,0015 
An_exciting_life ,0019 ,0019 
Daring ,0065 ,0065 
Accepting_my_portion
_in_life 
,0171 ,0171 
Devout ,0024 ,0024 
Humble ,0028 ,0028 
Moderate ,0053 ,0053 
Respect_for_tradition ,0043 ,0043 
A_world_at_peace ,0022 ,0022 
A_world_of_beauty ,0009 ,0009 
Broadminded ,0036 ,0036 
Equality ,0020 ,0020 
Inner_harmony ,0007 ,0007 
Protecting_the_environ
ment 
,0031 ,0031 
Social_justice ,0015 ,0015 
Unity_with_nature ,0093 ,0093 
Wisdom ,0011 ,0011 
Mean ,0031 ,0031 
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Figure a.5. Shepard plot, Study 4. 
Chapter 2: Study 6 
Table a.6. 
 
Stress-per-point values. 
 
Source 
Mean SRC_1 
Object A_spiritual_life ,1000 ,1000 
A_varied_life ,0840 ,0840 
A_world_at_peace ,0601 ,0601 
A_world_of_beauty ,0741 ,0741 
Accepting_my_portion
_in_life 
,1323 ,1323 
Ambitious ,0494 ,0494 
An_exciting_life ,0712 ,0712 
Authority ,1115 ,1115 
Broadminded ,0740 ,0740 
Capable ,0414 ,0414 
Choosing_own_goals ,0701 ,0701 
Clean ,0661 ,0661 
Creativity ,0873 ,0873 
Curious ,0582 ,0582 
Daring ,0540 ,0540 
Devout ,1176 ,1176 
Enjoying_life ,0787 ,0787 
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Equality ,0884 ,0884 
Family_security ,1060 ,1060 
Forgiving ,0354 ,0354 
Freedom ,0963 ,0963 
Healthy ,1083 ,1083 
Helpful ,0569 ,0569 
Honest ,0335 ,0335 
Honoring_of_parents_a
nd_elders 
,0695 ,0695 
Humble ,0273 ,0273 
Independent ,0317 ,0317 
Influential ,1113 ,1113 
Inner_harmony ,0952 ,0952 
Intelligent ,0375 ,0375 
Loyal ,0417 ,0417 
Mature_love ,1005 ,1005 
Meaning_in_life ,1015 ,1015 
Moderate ,1048 ,1048 
National_security ,0853 ,0853 
Obedient ,0698 ,0698 
Pleasure ,0547 ,0547 
Politeness ,0436 ,0436 
Preserving_my_public_
image 
,0879 ,0879 
Privacy ,1137 ,1137 
Protecting_the_environ
ment 
,0650 ,0650 
Reciprocation_of_favor
s 
,1312 ,1312 
Respect_for_tradition ,0971 ,0971 
Responsible ,0396 ,0396 
Self_discipline ,0830 ,0830 
Self_respect ,0728 ,0728 
Self_indulgent ,0446 ,0446 
Sense_of_belonging ,0797 ,0797 
Social_justice ,0716 ,0716 
Social_order ,0962 ,0962 
Social_power ,0770 ,0770 
Social_recognition ,0891 ,0891 
Successful ,0573 ,0573 
True_friendship ,0778 ,0778 
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Unity_with_nature ,0758 ,0758 
Wealth ,0694 ,0694 
Wisdom ,0718 ,0718 
Mean ,0760 ,0760 
 
 
Figure a.6. Shepard plot, Study 6. 
Chapter 3: Study 10. 
Table a.7. 
 
Stress-per-point values. 
 
Source 
Mean SRC_1 
Object AC01 ,0061 ,0061 
AC02 ,0042 ,0042 
AC03 ,0093 ,0093 
AC04 ,0155 ,0155 
BE01 ,0118 ,0118 
BE02 ,0058 ,0058 
BE03 ,0204 ,0204 
BE04 ,0110 ,0110 
CO01 ,0216 ,0216 
CO02 ,0143 ,0143 
CO03 ,0041 ,0041 
CO04 ,0082 ,0082 
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HED01 ,0083 ,0083 
HED02 ,0050 ,0050 
HED03 ,0137 ,0137 
HED04 ,0195 ,0195 
PO01 ,0126 ,0126 
PO02 ,0163 ,0163 
PO03 ,0097 ,0097 
PO04 ,0109 ,0109 
SD01 ,0047 ,0047 
SD02 ,0070 ,0070 
SD03 ,0095 ,0095 
SD04 ,0156 ,0156 
SE01 ,0153 ,0153 
SE02 ,0134 ,0134 
SE03 ,0054 ,0054 
SE04 ,0113 ,0113 
ST01 ,0039 ,0039 
ST02 ,0065 ,0065 
ST03 ,0092 ,0092 
ST04 ,0053 ,0053 
TR01 ,0687 ,0687 
TR02 ,0666 ,0666 
TR03 ,0184 ,0184 
TR04 ,0254 ,0254 
UN01 ,0296 ,0296 
UN02 ,0255 ,0255 
UN03 ,0427 ,0427 
UN04 ,0273 ,0273 
Mean ,0160 ,0160 
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Figure a.7. Shepard plot, Study 10. 
Chapter 3: Study 11. 
Table a.8. 
 
Stress-per-point values. 
 
Source 
Mean SRC_1 
Object SD01 ,0418 ,0418 
SD03 ,0727 ,0727 
SD04 ,0417 ,0417 
SD02 ,0428 ,0428 
UN02 ,0344 ,0344 
UN04 ,0238 ,0238 
UN03 ,0619 ,0619 
UN01 ,1011 ,1011 
ST02 ,0332 ,0332 
ST03 ,0347 ,0347 
ST01 ,0403 ,0403 
ST04 ,0514 ,0514 
HED04 ,0675 ,0675 
HED03 ,0723 ,0723 
HED02 ,0643 ,0643 
HED01 ,0321 ,0321 
148 
 
 
 
AC02 ,0602 ,0602 
AC01 ,0520 ,0520 
AC03 ,0745 ,0745 
AC04 ,0204 ,0204 
PO03 ,0457 ,0457 
PO01 ,0376 ,0376 
PO04 ,0319 ,0319 
PO02 ,0668 ,0668 
SE02 ,0507 ,0507 
SE03 ,0412 ,0412 
SE04 ,0448 ,0448 
SE01 ,0507 ,0507 
TR02 ,1033 ,1033 
TR03 ,0805 ,0805 
TR01 ,1347 ,1347 
TR04 ,0501 ,0501 
CO04 ,0843 ,0843 
CO01 ,0690 ,0690 
CO02 ,0484 ,0484 
CO03 ,0544 ,0544 
BE04 ,0371 ,0371 
BE01 ,0385 ,0385 
BE03 ,0652 ,0652 
BE02 ,0344 ,0344 
Mean ,0548 ,0548 
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Figure a.8. Shepard plot, Study 11. 
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Supplementary Studies 
Chapter 3: Pilot Study 
To provide the behaviours used in the set of studies in Chapter 3, I performed 
this pilot study. Participants were asked to generate examples of hypothetical situations 
for each of the ten value types from Schwartz’s (1992) model (e.g., Achievement, 
Benevolence), following the method previously used by Hanel, Maio, et al., 2018 (Study 
1). Participants were asked to provide different actors to the situation (participants), 
actions (behaviours), and places (locality). Not all this information was used to develop 
the behaviours used in the studies, but they were used as a basis to specify the most 
typical situations. Knowing the typical behaviours for a culture is an important step to 
further assess their relations with human values.  
Method. 
Participants. One hundred four British citizens with mean age of 36.14 (SD = 
12.63), with 65 women (62.5%) and 39 men (37.5%). More than half (56.7%) of the 
participants had finished at least an undergraduate university program.  The study was 
run online on Prolific and participants were compensated with approximately the 
minimum wage.  All participants successfully passed the Instruction Manipulation 
Check (IMC; Oppenheimer et al., 2009), which tests whether participants read 
instructions. 
Material and Procedure. Participants were asked to give two examples of 
hypothetical situations in which they considered the value types from Schwartz theory 
(e.g., Benevolence, Universalism, Power) to be relevant.  For each situation, 
participants listed examples of individuals (people), an action (behaviour), and a place 
(locality).  They were randomly presented with five of the ten value types to avoid 
fatigue or boredom. One example can be seen in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Example of task performed in the pilot study. 
Results. 
To summarize the frequency of different words used for each value type, a free 
online text analysis tool was used (http://textalyser.net/index.php?lang=en#analysis). I 
analysed words with two or more characters, not considering English stop words (e.g., 
are, am, be, some, and).  I only discuss and list words that were mentioned at least three 
times.  These frequency tests were performed for each value type, separately for all 
three sections (characters, action, and place).  
Next, I generated examples that were used in the following studies. For this 
purpose, I considered the most frequently mentioned words, aiming for a total of four 
examples of each value type. When a word did not seem appropriate to me in the 
context of the value type, less frequently mentioned words were considered.  
Participants sometimes mentioned nouns or adjectives in the action section (e.g., child, 
new, mountains), but these words occasionally helped to clarify the context of the 
situations better and facilitated generating examples.  Also, because I was primarily 
seeking actions, the generated examples did not always contain people or places.  
Finally, because the characters and places given by the participants were sometimes 
quite regular or general across the value types (e.g., school, hospital, teacher, child, 
doctor, person), I also considered less frequently mentioned situations and actions to 
avoid repetition in the final example set. 
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The study generated approximately 100 examples for each value type. Due the 
length of the tables and results, below I only report the most frequently mentioned 
words, and the four behaviours\instantiations generated, separately for each value type. 
Self-direction (independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring) 
The most frequently mentioned characters were child (9 times), artist (8 times), 
student (7 times), and author (4 times). School (8 times), studio (7 times), home (6 
times), and office (6 times) were the most frequently mentioned places. The most 
frequently mentioned action word, new (11 times), is an adjective and was therefore not 
considered as central for the examples. Choosing (7 times), creating (7 times), writing 
(6 times), and travelling (5 times) were the most often mentioned actions. However, to 
develop a more comprehensive example with the participants and place, drawing (5 
times) and painting (4 times) were considered, instead of choosing and travelling. The 
examples for future studies were (1) Artists creating a new painting design, (2) Children 
drawing a picture at home, (3) Students learning at school, and (4) Authors writing a 
new book. 
Participants Entries (%) Pos. Action Entries (%) Pos. Place Entries (%) Pos. 
child 9 8.3% 1 new 11 4.6% 1 school 8 6.3% 1 
artist 8 7.3% 2 choosing 7 2.9% 2 studio 7 5.6% 2 
student 7 6.4% 3 creating 7 2.9% 2 home 6 4.8% 3 
author 4 3.7% 4 writing 6 2.5% 3 office 6 4.8% 3 
traveler 4 3.7% 4 travelling 5 2.1% 4 mountains 4 3.2% 4 
musician 3 2.8% 5 drawing 5 2.1% 4 shop 3 2.4% 5 
architect 3 2.8% 5 painting 4 1.7% 5 library 3 2.4% 5 
person 3 2.8% 5 book 4 1.7% 5 university 3 2.4% 5 
teacher 3 2.8% 5 making 4 1.7% 5     
    picture 3 1.3% 6     
    climbing 3 1.3% 6     
    play 3 1.3% 6     
    learning 3 1.3% 6     
    art 3 1.3% 6     
    mountain 3 1.3% 6     
 
Universalism (understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the 
welfare of all people and for nature) 
For Universalism, worker and teacher (7 times each) were the most frequently 
mentioned characters, followed by doctor and environmentalist (5 times each).  School 
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and home (7 times), centre (6 times), and hospital, garden, university, local, and park (4 
times each) were the most frequently mentioned places.  For the actions, caring (6 
times), and planting, protesting, giving, and helping (5 times) were the most often cited. 
The examples generated were (1) social workers helping people in their local 
communities, (2) teachers helping students at school, (3) zookeepers taking care of 
animals, and (4) environmentalists planting new trees in the forest. 
Participants Entries (%) Pos. Action Entries (%) Pos. Place Entries (%) Pos. 
worker 7 5.1% 1 caring 6 2.2% 1 school 7 4.7% 1 
teacher 7 5.1% 1 planting 5 1.9% 2 home 7 4.7% 1 
doctor 5 3.7% 2 protesting 5 1.9% 2 centre 6 4% 2 
environmentalist 5 3.7% 2 helping 5 1.9% 2 hospital 4 2.7% 3 
police 4 2.9% 3 animals 5 1.9% 2 garden 4 2.7% 3 
conservationist 4 2.9% 3 giving 5 1.9% 2 university 4 2.7% 3 
social 4 2.9% 3 trees 4 1.5% 3 local 4 2.7% 3 
zookeeper 3 2.2% 4 people 4 1.5% 3 park 4 2.7% 3 
carer 3 2.2% 4 meeting 4 1.5% 3 parliament 3 2% 4 
nurse 3 2.2% 4 looking 4 1.5% 3 forest 3 2% 4 
    community 3 1.1% 4 office 3 2% 4 
    listening 3 1.1% 4 zoo 3 2% 4 
    performing 3 1.1% 4 church 3 2% 4 
    elderly 3 1.1% 4     
 
Stimulation (excitement, novelty, and challenge in life) 
The most frequently mentioned characters were climber (9 times), child (8 
times), skydiver (6 times), and student (5 times). Mountain (17 times), park (7 times), 
home (5 times), and university (4 times) were the most frequently mentioned places. For 
the actions, climbing (10 times), playing (7 times), jumping (7 times), and running (6 
times) were cited the most often. For a better diversity of examples, driver (3 times) was 
also considered as a character, and plane and track (3 times each) were considered as 
places. The examples generated were (1) Adventurers climbing a mountain, (2) 
Children playing at the park, (3) Skydivers jumping from a plane, and (4) Athletes 
running on a track.  
Participants Entries (%) Pos. Action Entries (%) Pos. Place Entries (%) Pos. 
climber 9 6.3% 1 climbing 10 4.2% 1 mountain 17 
10.3
% 
1 
child 8 5.6% 2 playing 7 2.9% 2 park 7 4.3% 2 
skydiver 6 4.2% 3 jumping 7 2.9% 2 home 5 3% 3 
student 5 3.5% 4 mountain 6 2.5% 3 university 4 2.4% 4 
gamer 4 2.8% 5 running 6 2.5% 3 house 3 1.8% 5 
woman 3 2.1% 6 new 6 2.5% 3 high 3 1.8% 5 
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driver 3 2.1% 6 skydiving 5 2.1% 4 plane 3 1.8% 5 
thrillseeker 3 2.1% 6 going 4 1.7% 5 school 3 1.8% 5 
rock 3 2.1% 6 plane 4 1.7% 5 track 3 1.8% 5 
teenager 3 2.1% 6 rollercoaster 3 1.3% 6 office 3 1.8% 5 
footballer 3 2.1% 6 learning 3 1.3% 6 new 3 1.8% 5 
runner 3 2.1% 6 starting 3 1.3% 6     
athlete 3 2.1% 6 swimming 3 1.3% 6     
mountain 3 2.1% 6         
 
Hedonism (pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself) 
The most common characters were myself (7 times), person (5 times), student (5 
times), and woman (4 times). The common places were home (12 times), anywhere (5 
times), restaurant (4 times), and studio (4 times). For the actions, eating (9 times), 
drinking (8 times), and having, winning, and playing (4 times) were most often cited. 
Gamer\teenager (3 times each) were common characters, going (3 times) was also a 
frequent action and club\beach\pub (3 times each) were other common places. The 
examples generated were (1) people eating at a restaurant, (2) teenagers having a drink 
in a pub, (3) gamers playing at home, and (4) people going to a club or beach. 
Participants Entries (%) Pos. Action Entries (%) Pos. Place Entries (%) Pos. 
myself 7 6% 1 eating 9 4.3% 1 home 12 9% 1 
person 5 4.3% 2 drinking 8 3.8% 2 anywhere 5 3.7% 2 
student 5 4.3% 2 having 4 1.9% 3 restaurant 4 3% 3 
woman 4 3.4% 3 winning 4 1.9% 3 studio 4 3% 3 
gamer 3 2.6% 4 playing 4 1.9% 3 club 3 2.2% 4 
teenager 3 2.6% 4 going 3 1.4% 4 beach 3 2.2% 4 
man 3 2.6% 4 life 3 1.4% 4 pub 3 2.2% 4 
child 3 2.6% 4 chocolate 3 1.4% 4     
adult 3 2.6% 4 living 3 1.4% 4     
    taking 3 1.4% 4     
    shopping 3 1.4% 4     
    painting 3 1.4% 4     
    massage 3 1.4% 4     
    music 3 1.4% 4     
 
Achievement (personal success through demonstrating competence according to 
social standards) 
The most frequently mentioned characters were student (23 times), athlete (9 
times), worker (7 times), and teacher (6 times). For place, university (20 times), school 
(11 times), workplace (10 times), and stadium (6 times) were the most frequently 
mentioned. For the actions, graduating (11 times), winning (10 times), promotion (7 
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times), and teaching (6 times) were the most often cited. For better diversity, Olympics 
(4 times) was considered as place. Also, workplace was replaced by office, and teaching 
was adapted to avoid duplication. The examples generated were (1) students graduating 
from university, (2) athletes winning the Olympics, (3) employees getting a promotion 
at work, and (4) teachers accomplishing their duties at school.  
Participants Entries (%) Pos. Action Entries (%) Pos. Place Entries (%) Pos. 
student 23 17.7% 1 graduating 11 4.8% 1 university 20 
14.7
% 
1 
athlete 9 6.9% 2 winning 10 4.3% 2 school 11 8.1% 2 
worker 7 5.4% 3 promotion 7 3% 3 workplace 10 7.4% 3 
teacher 6 4.6% 4 teaching 6 2.6% 4 stadium 6 4.4% 4 
employee 5 3.8% 5 exams 6 2.6% 4 hospital 6 4.4% 4 
man 4 3.1% 6 passing 5 2.2% 5 Olympics 4 2.9% 5 
driver 3 2.3% 7 getting 5 2.2% 5 office 4 2.9% 5 
learner 3 2.3% 7 running 4 1.7% 6 track 3 2.2% 6 
footballer 3 2.3% 7 competing 4 1.7% 6 sports 3 2.2% 6 
    doing 4 1.7% 6 studio 3 2.2% 6 
    studying 3 1.3% 7     
    results 3 1.3% 7     
    race 3 1.3% 7     
    work 3 1.3% 7     
    medal 3 1.3% 7     
    degree 3 1.3% 7     
    driving 3 1.3% 7     
 
Power (social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources) 
The most frequently mentioned characters were manager (12 times), Prime 
minister (10 times), teacher (10 times), and politician (9 times). Workplace (15 times), 
school (10 times), parliament (8 times), and house (5 times) were the most frequently 
mentioned places. For the actions, making (12 times), deciding\decisions (7 times), 
speaking\speech, meeting, and teaching (5 times each) were the most often cited. 
Disciplining and giving (3 times), and town hall (4 and 3, respectively) were considered 
as actions and place. The examples generated were (1) managers chairing a meeting at 
the workplace, (2) prime-ministers or presidents making decisions at parliament, (3) 
teachers disciplining students at school, and (4) politicians giving speeches in town 
halls.  
Participants Entries (%) Pos. Action Entries (%) Pos. Place Entries (%) Pos. 
manager 12 7.9% 1 making 12 4.7% 1 workplace 15 9.7% 1 
prime 10 6.6% 2 deciding or decisions 7 2.8% 2 school 10 6.5% 2 
minister 10 6.6% 2 speech 5 1.9% 3 parliament 8 5.2% 3 
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teacher 10 6.6% 2 meeting 5 1.9% 3 house 5 3.2% 4 
politician 9 6% 3 teaching 5 1.9% 3 court 4 2.6% 5 
officer 8 5.3% 4 do 3 1.2% 4 town 4 2.6% 5 
police 7 4.6% 5 you 3 1.2% 4 hall 3 1.9% 6 
head 6 4% 6 giving 3 1.2% 4 office 3 1.9% 6 
judge 4 2.6% 7 voting 3 1.2% 4 company 3 1.9% 6 
president 4 2.6% 7 disciplining 3 1.2% 4 country 3 1.9% 6 
boss 3 2% 8 arresting 3 1.2% 4 centre 3 1.9% 6 
lecturer 3 2% 8 country 3 1.2% 4 white 3 1.9% 6 
ceo 3 2% 8 work 3 1.2% 4 hospital 3 1.9% 6 
mp 3 2% 8     street 3 1.9% 6 
 
Security (safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self) 
The most frequently mentioned characters were police officer (21 times), parent 
and guard (6 times), and a general example, myself (5 times). Home (21 times) and 
streets (10 times) were the most frequently mentioned for places, followed by several 
other examples (e.g., church, car, bank, workplace, school), all mentioned 3 times. For 
the actions, patrolling (7 times), locking (6 times), caring (5 times), and getting, 
arresting, and keeping (4 times each) were the most frequently mentioned. Security (4 
times) was considered as example of participant. The examples generated were (1) 
police officers patrolling the streets, (2) parents taking care of their children at home, (3) 
security guards locking doors in a bank, and (4) police officers arresting criminals in the 
streets.  
Participants Entries (%) Pos. Action Entries (%) Pos. Place Entries (%) Pos. 
police 21 13.9% 1 patrolling 7 3% 1 home 21 
14.7
% 
1 
officer 21 13.9% 1 locking 6 2.6% 2 streets 10 7% 2 
parent 6 4% 2 caring 5 2.2% 3 church 3 2.1% 3 
guard 6 4% 2 door 5 2.2% 3 car 3 2.1% 3 
myself 5 3.3% 3 child 4 1.7% 4 bank 3 2.1% 3 
teacher 4 2.6% 4 getting 4 1.7% 4 workplace 3 2.1% 3 
security 4 2.6% 4 married 4 1.7% 4 local 3 2.1% 3 
worker 4 2.6% 4 children 4 1.7% 4 place 3 2.1% 3 
mother 3 2% 5 arresting 4 1.7% 4 school 3 2.1% 3 
child 3 2% 5 keeping 4 1.7% 4 centre 3 2.1% 3 
house 3 2% 5 taking 3 1.3% 5 parliament 3 2.1% 3 
owner 3 2% 5 looking 3 1.3% 5     
minister 3 2% 5 policing 3 1.3% 5     
    beat 3 1.3% 5     
    teaching 3 1.3% 5     
    going 3 1.3% 5     
    front 3 1.3% 5     
    safety 3 1.3% 5     
    criminals 3 1.3% 5     
    watching 3 1.3% 5     
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Tradition (respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that 
traditional culture or religion provide) 
The most frequently mentioned characters were religious and priest (14 times 
each), vicar (10 times), and two general examples, man and person (6 times). Church 
(38 times), home (11 times), school (6 times), and worship place (4 times) were the 
most frequently mentioned places. For the actions, giving (11 times), getting married 
(11 times), praying (10 times each) and taking (4 times) were the frequently mentioned. 
Family (3 times), and visiting (3 times) were considered as additional characters and 
actions. The examples generated were (1) religious people praying at home, (2) priests 
giving sermons in church, (3) couples getting married at church, and (4) individuals 
visiting family at home.  
Participants Entries (%) Pos. Action Entries (%) Pos. Place Entries (%) Pos. 
religious 14 11.2% 1 sermon 12 5.2% 1 church 38 
27.7
% 
1 
priest 14 11.2% 1 giving 11 4.7% 2 home 11 8% 2 
vicar 10 8% 2 marriage \ wedding 11 4.7% 2 school 6 4.4% 3 
man 6 4.8% 3 praying 10 4.3% 3 place 4 2.9% 4 
person 6 4.8% 3 service 6 2.6% 4 worship 4 2.9% 4 
woman 3 2.4% 4 taking 4 1.7% 5 temple 3 2.2% 5 
family 3 2.4% 4 visiting 3 1.3% 6     
children 3 2.4% 4 father 3 1.3% 6     
teacher 3 2.4% 4 going 3 1.3% 6     
    attending 3 1.3% 6     
    church 3 1.3% 6     
    leading 3 1.3% 6     
 
Conformity (restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm 
others and violate social expectations or norms) 
The most frequently mentioned characters were child (9 times), student and 
police officer (6 times each), and worker and prisoner (5 times each). School (13 times), 
home (9 times), prison (6 times), and church (5 times) were the most frequently 
mentioned places. For the actions, wearing (6 times), following and eating (5 times 
each), and serving (3 times) were the most often cited. Disciplining and giving (3 
times), and town hall (4 and 3, respectively) were considered as well. The examples 
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generated were (1) children eating healthy food at home, (2) students following a dress-
code at school, (3) prisoners following prison rules, and (4) workers respecting 
colleagues.  
Participants Entries (%) Pos. Action Entries (%) Pos. Place Entries (%) Pos. 
child 9 6.7% 1 wearing 6 2.5% 1 school 13 9.6% 1 
student 6 4.4% 2 following 5 2.1% 2 home 9 6.6% 2 
officer 6 4.4% 2 eating 5 2.1% 2 prison 6 4.4% 3 
police 6 4.4% 2 them 3 1.3% 3 church 5 3.7% 4 
worker 5 3.7% 3 Doesn’t 3 1.3% 3 public 3 2.2% 5 
prisoner 5 3.7% 3 serve 3 1.3% 3 streets 3 2.2% 5 
teenager 4 3% 4 public 3 1.3% 3 workplace 3 2.2% 5 
person 3 2.2%     4 house 3 2.2% 5 
guard 3 2.2%     4 party 3 2.2% 5 
soldier 3 2.2%          
school 3 2.2%          
 
Benevolence (preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom 
one is in frequent personal contact) 
The most frequently mentioned characters were worker (13 times), nurse (12 
times), and teacher and mother (7 times each). Home (28 times), hospital (15 times), 
school (6 times), and workplace and church (5 times) were the most frequently 
mentioned places. For the actions, caring (13 times), helping (10 times), looking (7 
times) and providing\giving (6 times each) were the most often cited. Volunteer (6 
times) and community (4 times) were considered as well. Other words mentioned as 
actions were considered to generate examples: children (7 times), patients and homeless 
(5 times each), and food (4 times). The examples generated were (1) workers helping 
each other at workplace, (2) nurses taking care of patients in hospital, (3) volunteers 
providing food for homeless people in the community, and (4) mothers looking after 
their children at home.  
Participants Entries (%) Pos. Action Entries (%) Pos. Place Entries (%) Pos. 
worker 13 9.1% 1 caring 13 4.7% 1 home 28 
19.3
% 
1 
nurse 12 8.4% 2 helping 10 3.7% 2 hospital 15 
10.3
% 
2 
teacher 7 4.9% 3 looking 7 2.6% 3 school 6 4.1% 3 
mother 7 4.9% 3 children 7 2.6% 3 workplace 5 3.4% 4 
charity 6 4.2% 4 providing 6 2.2% 4 church 5 3.4% 4 
social 6 4.2% 4 giving 6 2.2% 4 community 4 2.8% 5 
volunteer 6 4.2% 4 people 5 1.8% 5 care 4 2.8% 5 
doctor 4 2.8% 5 patients 5 1.8% 5 kitchen 3 2.1% 6 
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member 3 2.1% 6 homeless 5 1.8% 5 office 3 2.1% 6 
carer 3 2.1% 6 charity 4 1.5% 6 anywhere 3 2.1% 6 
parent 3 2.1% 6 food 4 1.5% 6 room 3 2.1% 6 
    therapy 3 1.1% 7 street 3 2.1% 6 
    working 3 1.1% 7     
    elderly 3 1.1% 7     
    talking 3 1.1% 7     
    supporting 3 1.1% 7     
    meal 3 1.1% 7     
    cooking 3 1.1% 7     
 
Replication set (Studies 8-11) 
Studies 8 to 11, from Chapter 3, were replicated using a different set of 
behaviours and a different sample. To recall, Chapter 3 aimed to generate spatial planes 
based on direct comparisons between value expressive behaviours and the abstract level 
of human values. The behaviours used in this replication set was generated based on 
Hanel’s (2016) findings – and therefore, previously collected. As in the Pilot Study 
previously presented, participants were asked to provide typical situations for different 
values from Schwartz’s model. The most frequent examples (4 to each value type, in a 
total of 40) were selected to compose the final group of behaviours in these studies. 
Also, differently from the studies from Chapter 3, I used a student sample. 
In these studies, I asked the participants to indicate to what extent the value-
expressive behaviours related to their respective value types (Supplementary Study 1); 
to rate the similarities between all the examples of value-expressive behaviours and the 
ten value types from Schwartz’s model (Supplementary Study 2); to position the value-
expressive behaviours along Schwartz’s two value dimensions, using bipolar scales 
(Supplementary Study 3); and to make direct judgments of similarities between all 
value-expressive behaviours (Supplementary Study 4). I then assessed their spatial 
arrangement through Multidimensional Scaling and the degree of convergence with 
Schwartz’s space, using Procrustes analysis. If the behaviours are unrelated to the 
underlying motives and values, the spatial arrangements should be unrelated to 
Schwartz’s value model.   
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Supplementary study 1 (Replication study 8). 
In this study, participants rated to what extent the set of behaviours matched the 
respective value types from which they were originated. In total, four behaviours were 
selected per value type, resulting in 40 behaviours. I also assessed the correlations 
between participants’ ratings of values importance and how important they considered 
performing the behaviours. 
Method. 
Participants, material, and procedure. Participants were 184 psychology 
students who took part in exchange for course credit.  However, five participants were 
excluded because they failed the IMC (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) or\and test items 
twice.  In this study, differently from Study 8, I also asked participants to answer the 
Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), to test whether there is a relation 
between the construct and failing in the IMC.  However, no significant result was found. 
Moreover, the mean age of the remaining 179 participants was 19.29 years (SD = 2.01), 
with 162 women (90.5%), and 17 men (9.5%). The material and procedure used in this 
Study is available on Study 8 (p. 91).  
Results and Discussion. 
As can be seen in Table 1, most of the behaviours were rated as being more than 
50% related to their respective value types, as expected. The only exception was power, 
which had all behaviours between 44% and 49%.  In Study 8, most of the behaviours 
were described as more than 50% related to their value types, with one exception 
(“Children eating healthy food at home”, Conformity).  
Table 1. 
 
Relatedness between each behaviour and the value types 
Situations Code Mean SD 
Benevolence    
Comfort others in times of need BE1 79.43 15.51 
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Supporting colleagues at workplace BE2 77.12 14.94 
Giving food to poor people BE3 67.63 24.77 
Offering a lift BE4 63.25 20.07 
Universalism    
Respecting everyone regardless of gender religion or 
ethnicity 
UN1 89.84 13.22 
Promoting gay rights UN2 85.08 17.22 
Treat everyone the same UN3 79.67 19.26 
Treating co-workers fairly UN4 78.79 14.29 
Self-Direction    
Having the possibility to choose SD1 82.11 15.88 
Vote for whomever you want SD0 77.42 15.60 
Starting a university degree SD3 74.10 16.92 
Defending your own opinion SD4 72.85 16.10 
Stimulation    
Travel to new places ST1 84.49 14.73 
Exploring different cultures ST2 75.90 17.08 
Practicing extreme sports ST3 74.68 19.14 
Going to lots of parties ST4 64.47 20.19 
Hedonism    
Having a fulfilling sexual relationship HE1 77.35 16.23 
Having a drink with friends HE2 67.03 19.79 
Relax watching television HE3 64.95 19.24 
Being in the presence of nice people HE4 62.03 23.37 
Achievement    
Working hard to get something AC1 86.27 12.38 
Getting good grades on exams AC2 84.37 14.97 
Obtaining a job promotion AC3 83.66 11.05 
Not resting until achieve your goals AC4 80.31 14.50 
Power    
Providing financial support to your own family PO1 49.86 24.58 
Pay for family vacations PO2 48.01 23.57 
Buying expensive food PO3 47.78 26.87 
Act with respect during a meeting PO4 44.07 23.17 
Security    
Combating terrorist attacks SE1 77.49 18.26 
Trusting the justice system (Police, Court, etc.) SE2 69.52 17.88 
Voting in political matters SE3 59.37 21.98 
Fight for my country SE4 57.09 23.05 
Tradition    
Preserving your national culture TR1 77.64 17.22 
Celebrating religious ceremonies TR2 76.57 19.44 
Honouring your parents’ requests TR3 70.67 17.12 
Spending time with family at holidays TR4 63.90 21.95 
Conformity    
Complying with the law CO1 77.61 17.61 
Respecting the rules CO2 73.81 21.20 
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Obeying a superior at work CO3 70.24 20.20 
Children following parents instructions CO4 68.46 18.68 
Test Items    
Cheat in a board game (Power) TEST1 34.82 26.36 
Gossiping about friends (Conformity) TEST2 30.51 26.09 
Complaining about different points of view (Trad.) TEST3 20.24 21.60 
Constantly talk about your own life (Conformity) TEST4 20.13 18.53 
Disrespecting others' opinion[s] (Hedonism) TEST5 16.45 18.88 
Feeling depressed (Hedonism) TEST6 14.50 20.69 
Criticizing another's religion (Benevolence) TEST7 10.71 17.32 
Finish coursework late (Tradition) TEST8 10.07 16.32 
Sleeping late (Universalism) TEST9 8.93 13.37 
 
 After, the importance attributed to the value types (centered) was correlated with 
the importance attributed to the behaviours.  As can be seen in Table 2, all the value 
types correlated positively with their respective behaviours, usually to a greater extent 
than they correlated with other value types (e.g., moving across the rows in Table 2). 
Only the importance attributed to universalism-related behaviours correlated higher 
with another value type, benevolence (r = .36).  The overall pattern of these results was 
also seen in Study 8, except for Self-direction behaviours, that were not significantly 
correlated to their respective value type. Welch's t test (t[10.57] = 11.370, p < .001] 
indicated that the correlations in the main diagonal of Table 2 were on average higher 
(M = .34, SD = .09) than those off the diagonal (M = .13, SD = .10). 
Table 2 . 
 
Correlations between groups of behaviours and value types 
Val\Beh BEN UNI SD STI HED ACH POW SEC TRA CON 
BEN .39 .36 .15 .14 .15 .11 .08 .20 .21 .20 
UNI .24 .26 .12 .19 .08 -.09 .06 .12 .09 .04 
SD .09 .23 .26 .10 .11 .12 .15 .09 .04 .06 
STI .12 .21 .24 .35 .21 .11 .19 .17 .04 .08 
HED -.01 .04 .18 .18 .23 .21 .17 .08 .09 .12 
ACH -.02 .16 .22 .15 .21 .42 .21 .03 .10 .10 
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POW -.11 -.15 .04 .14 .13 .15 .24 .01 .13 .14 
SEC .14 .18 .12 .08 .23 .20 .22 .34 .30 .30 
TRA .16 -.01 .03 .12 .02 -.04 .14 .27 .52 .30 
CON .10 .03 -.06 .05 .09 .01 .14 .24 .40 .35 
Note. Numbers in bold: p < .05; Orange = Self transcendence; Yellow = Openness to 
Change; Blue = Self-enhancement; Grey = Conservation. 
 
Supplementary Study 2 (Replication Study 9) 
In this study, I asked participants to rate to what extent the set of 40 value-
expressive behaviours presented in Supplementary Study 1 were similar to the ten value 
types from Schwartz’s model. That is, participants were asked to compare each of the 
behaviours (e.g., Complying with the law, CO1) to each one of the value types (e.g., 
Security, Stimulation), resulting in a total of 400 pairs of similarity judgments. 
However, as in Study 9, to avoid boredom and fatigue, they only rated half of the 
similarities, randomly selected, resulting in a total of 200 comparisons per participant. 
Method. 
Participants, material, and procedure. Participants were 180 psychology 
students who took part in exchange for course credits.  Eleven of these participants were 
excluded after failing to successfully complete the IMC (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and 
"test items" ("please, rate all the following items as Not At All"), which were added at 
random points in the procedure.  The remaining sample contained 169 participants, 
mostly female (89.9%) and British (84%), with a mean age of 19.49 (SD = 2.63). The 
material and procedure used in this Study is available on Study 9 (p. 96). 
Results and Discussion. 
An ordinal MDS was performed using the PROXSCAL algorithm. Stress-I 
indicated a good model fit (.12; recommended lower than .35, Sturrock & Rocha, 2000), 
suggesting that the data fits well into a two-dimensional Cartesian plane.  A match with 
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a hypothetical spatial plane from Schwartz’s model showed significantly congruence 
between the spatial plane (rm = .67, p ≤ .001).  As can be seen in Figure 1, most of the 
behaviours from the same higher order value were placed close together.  It can also be 
seen the assumption of conflict between the higher order values, with self-transcendence 
opposing self-enhancement, for instance.  Nonetheless, as expected, some deviations 
were found.  For example, behaviours related to self-enhancement were presented as 
sharing positions with behaviours from openness to change, while some others were 
positioned further apart from their groups [e.g., "Voting in political matters" (SE3), 
"Combating terrorist attacks" (SE1), "Providing financial support to your own family" 
(PO1), and "Act with respect during a meeting" (PO4)].  Of importance, values from 
self-enhancement and openness to change share a personal focus, which might help to 
explain their mixed positions in the spatial plane. Curiously, the results in Study 9 
indicated some deviations from self-transcendence behaviours, mixing with 
conservation.  These value types, however, share a social focus. 
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Figure 1. MDS structure for similarities ratings between behaviours and value types.4 
Supplementary Study 3 (Replication Study 10) 
In this study, participants were asked to position the behaviours along bipolar 
scales representing Schwartz’s two dimensions, self-enhancement vs self-transcendence 
                                                 
4 Working hard to get something, AC1; Getting good grades on exams, AC2; Obtaining a job 
promotion, AC3; Not resting until achieve your goals, AC4; Comfort others in times of need, BE1; 
Supporting colleagues at workplace, BE2; Giving food to poor people, BE3; Offering a lift, BE4; 
Complying with the law”, CO1; Respecting the rules, CO2; Obeying a superior at work, CO3; Children 
following parents instructions, CO4; Having a fulfilling sexual relationship, HE1; Having a drink with 
friends, HE2; Relax watching television, HE3; Being in the presence of nice people, HE4; Providing 
financial support to your own family, PO1; Pay for family vacations, PO2; Buying expensive food, PO3; 
Act with respect during a meeting, PO4; Vote for whomever you want, SD0; Having the possibility to 
choose, SD1; Starting a university degree, SD3; Defending your own opinion, SD4; Combating terrorist 
attacks, SE1; Trusting the justice system (Police, Court, etc.), SE2; Voting in political matters, SE3; Fight 
for my country, SE4; Travel to new places, ST1; Exploring different cultures, ST2; Practicing extreme 
sports, ST3; Going to lots of parties, ST4; Preserving your national culture, TR1; Celebrating religious 
ceremonies, TR2; Honouring your parents’ requests, TR3; Spending time with family at holidays, TR4; 
Respecting everyone regardless of gender religion or ethnicity, UN1; Promoting gay rights, UN2; Treat 
everyone the same, UN3; Treating co-workers fairly, UN4 
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and openness vs conservation. If a behaviour was placed closer to one end of these 
dimensions, it would indicate that the behaviour is more characteristic of this end. 
Unlike Study 10, in this replication I used two samples, inverting the direction of one of 
the bipolar scales for one of the samples. 
Method. 
Participants, material, and procedure. For this study, I collected two samples.  
In the first student sample, 19 out of 245 participants were excluded from analyses 
because they failed the IMC twice (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and\or test items.  The 
second student sample contained 226 participants; most were women (61.9%) and the 
mean age was 23.10 seconds (SD = 6.00). In the second sample, 13 out of 180 
participants were excluded from analyses because they failed the IMC twice 
(Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and\or test items.  The remaining sample contained 167 
participants, with a mean age of 19.82 years (SD = 3.12).  Most were women (89.8%). 
The material and procedure used in this Study is available on Study 10 (p. 100). The 
only difference in the tasks used in this replication is the direction of one of the 
dimensions, for the second sample. Instead of openness to change vs conservation, was 
presented to conservation vs openness to change. 
Results and Discussion. 
When assessing if the spatial plane matches with a hypothetical arrangement of 
values, results indicate a significant congruence (rm = .76, p ≤ .001). However, as in 
Study 10, the spatial plane (Figure 2) only slightly visually resembled Schwartz’s 
structure, in despite of the significant match. Openness to change and conservation 
behaviours clearly were positioned opposing each other, however some self-
enhancement behaviours were positioned next to self-transcendence.  Five behaviours 
were more strongly linked with the opposite end of the value dimension, one from 
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openness to change, one from conservation, and three from self-enhancement. As in 
Study 10, the motivations that underlies these behaviours might help to explain these 
deviations.  For example, "Defending your own opinion" (SD04), was derived from an 
openness to change value (self-direction), but appeared closer to conservation.  
Nonetheless, this behaviour has elements of conservation motivation, because, although 
the idea of expressing your own opinion indicates independent thought, insisting on this 
idea is protective of the status quo in one’s own thinking. Also, “Providing support to 
your own family" (Power 1)”, "Pay for family vacations" (Power 2), "Act with respect 
during a meeting" (Power 4), and "Voting in political matters" (Security 3) were 
positioned closer to the other end of the dimension.  Interestingly, most of these 
behaviours were also positioned further away from their respective end of the dimension 
in the supplementary study 2.  Also, it is important to highlight that the power values 
were described as less than 50% related to their value type, in the supplementary study 
1. When comparing with the results from Study 10, should be noted that self-
enhancement behaviours were the ones that most deviated from their original end of the 
dimension. Nevertheless, these exceptions provide a useful steer as to particular 
behaviours that may be weaker instantiations of the intended values. 
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Figure 2. Behaviours placed among Schwartz’s dimensions.5 
Students sample 2.  As can be seen in Figure 3, the results were consistent with 
the first sample. This spatial plane also matches Schwartz’s significantly (rm = .75, p ≤ 
                                                 
5 Working hard to get something, AC1; Getting good grades on exams, AC2; Obtaining a job 
promotion, AC3; Not resting until achieve your goals, AC4; Comfort others in times of need, BE1; 
Supporting colleagues at workplace, BE2; Giving food to poor people, BE3; Offering a lift, BE4; 
Complying with the law”, CO1; Respecting the rules, CO2; Obeying a superior at work, CO3; Children 
following parents instructions, CO4; Having a fulfilling sexual relationship, HE1; Having a drink with 
friends, HE2; Relax watching television, HE3; Being in the presence of nice people, HE4; Providing 
financial support to your own family, PO1; Pay for family vacations, PO2; Buying expensive food, PO3; 
Act with respect during a meeting, PO4; Vote for whomever you want, SD0; Having the possibility to 
choose, SD1; Starting a university degree, SD3; Defending your own opinion, SD4; Combating terrorist 
attacks, SE1; Trusting the justice system (Police, Court, etc.), SE2; Voting in political matters, SE3; Fight 
for my country, SE4; Travel to new places, ST1; Exploring different cultures, ST2; Practicing extreme 
sports, ST3; Going to lots of parties, ST4; Preserving your national culture, TR1; Celebrating religious 
ceremonies, TR2; Honouring your parents’ requests, TR3; Spending time with family at holidays, TR4; 
Respecting everyone regardless of gender religion or ethnicity, UN1; Promoting gay rights, UN2; Treat 
everyone the same, UN3; Treating co-workers fairly, UN4 
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.001). In addition to the deviations noted above, “Spending time with family at holidays” 
(TR04) was slightly positioned towards the other end of the dimension.  Once again, the 
content of the behaviours can help to understand why these deviations happened.  
Despite having a tradition of spending time with family during holidays, it can also 
indicate an opportunity to do something new, as for example, travelling to a different 
country or enjoying an outdoor activity with the relatives.  It all depends on how the 
situation is interpreted by the individual, showing the importance of the content when 
assessing these.  
 
Figure 3. Replication of behaviours among Schwartz’s dimensions.6 
                                                 
6 See previous note. 
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Supplementary Study 4 (Replication Study 11) 
In this study, I aimed to assess how the value expressive behaviours would be 
distributed when removing the explicit influence of human values in the similarity 
judgment comparisons. For that, I asked participants to compare the 40 behaviours 
pairwise, resulting in a total of 780 comparisons. However, as in Study 11, participants 
were randomly presented to one-third of them (260). 
Method. 
Participants, material, and procedure. Two-hundred forty-three students took 
part in exchange for course credit.  Six of them failed the IMC twice (Oppenheimer et 
al., 2009) and\or test items. After excluding those who failed, we had 237 participants, 
with a mean age of 19.21 (SD = 2.16), who were mostly women (89%) and British 
(84.4%). The material and procedure used in this Study is available on Study 11 (p. 
104). 
Results and Discussion. 
An ordinal MDS was performed using the PROXSCAL algorithm, and 
Torgerson configuration.  Results indicated a good model fit (.25; recommended lower 
than .35, Sturrock & Rocha, 2000). Its match to a hypothetical spatial plane from 
Schwartz’s model was also significant (rm = .48, p ≤ .001). The final structure can be 
seen in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. MDS structure of behaviours’ comparisons. 
Similarly to Study 11, most of the behaviours from conservation and openness to 
change values were placed in opposing positions across the spatial plane. However, 
while in Study 11 the behaviours form these higher order values did not mix, in this 
study one conservation behaviour (“Celebrating religious ceremonies”, Tradition 02) 
“entered” the convex hull area of openness to change. Also, once again self-
transcendence behaviours mixed with conservation and self-transcendence. While in 
Study 11 the self-transcendence behaviours were highly clustered, in despite of its 
deviations, in this study the area was more spread across the spatial plane. 
It is important to notice that, as in Study 11, this structure can also suggest a 
dimensional interpretation based on the focus of the behaviours.  The behaviours placed 
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to the left of the spatial plane have a higher social focus (e.g., “giving food to poor 
people”, “voting in political matters”, “act with respect during a meeting”, “promoting 
gay rights”), while the behaviours more to the right represent more personal actions 
(e.g., “going to lots of parties”, “relax watching television”, “practicing extreme 
sports”, “having a drink with friends”).  
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